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Russia: Council of Europe Membership Criticized

964F1602A Moscow ZAVTRA in Russian Mar 96 No 11, p 4

[Article by "Experimental Creative Center" Corporation: "Is Council of Europe Useful?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Support from all different kinds of forces for the idea of Russia's joining the Council of Europe has led to Russia's being dragged into semantic, geostrategic, geopolitical and general-policy processes that are foreign to it. Here, one can understand the position of those who have always demanded that Russia swear allegiance to "civilized society." At least these forces have not betrayed themselves. But one cannot understand or accept the position of patriotic and communist groups for whom supporting the project through which Russia would join the Council of Europe is a betrayal of the principles of being a great power, a switch from the positions held by Soviet patriotism to the positions held by Western social-democracy.

In this form, the given position is especially "promising" because, again, all is built upon Gorbachev's models of hypocrisy, ambiguity, "random" games. Here, the "new patriots" are working to convince their allies that this "random" game was caused by the necessity to bide our time, to calm those forces in the West who might interfere with their rise to power. However, those forces are not so stupid that they would pay any attention to curtsies dropped for the sake of friendship by Russian elites coming into power to personages like A. Hammer. These forces demand entirely real payment for their loyalty to candidates for the presidential post.

One of the largest payments is membership in the Council of Europe. Support for joining from the Duma, in which communists hold the majority, means that it is at their hands that Russia is being shoved into what is for her a foreign and ruinous geopolitical soup. We are literally speaking of Russia's fate. And in this question, we must be completely principled. Here, there will be no references to the demands of the election campaign or the need to be cunning with the imperialists. This action could be irreversible. And this means that the price for the West's dubious support of people engaged in this kind of game is already too great.

But what realistically would membership in the Council of Europe mean?

The Council of Europe is the maternal bosom for all the organizations on which the European unification is being built. Within the Council of Europe, itself, a key ideologeme is disseminated, on the basis of which the present Europroject is constructed. This is the ideologeme of so-called "Western values." It was under this flag that all of Gorbachev's destructive initiatives were realized. In joining the Council of Europe, we are giving a "green light" to the same spiritual viruses that are so insidious for Russia. We are repeating for a second time all the same mistakes, again we are stepping on the same rake. If we join the Council of Europe, it would be ridiculous to speak of the nonproliferation of NATO, since NATO is the "iron armor" that protects the body of Europe and the soul of European Western values. Once we have sold our soul and become one with a strange and enemy body, it will be too late to say that the armor doesn't suit us. "There's no going back."

But most important is the practical aspect of this membership. Members in the Council of Europe must not only feed their prisoners better. They must also extend to specialists from other lands the right to resolve the problems of their own home. For example, Chechnya immediately becomes no longer our internal problem, but a problem of the OSCE. Because the conflict in Chechnya could draw in Dagestan and the entire Caucasian hot belt, the prospects for resolving our problems using the Yugoslav model are no longer purely speculative. After a time, blue helmets will appear in the Caucasus, and Russians will leave the Caucasus. And go where? And where is the guarantee that the next action will not be the implementation of the same kind of procedure much closer to Moscow?

The most painful and serious factor that politically connects the vote for Russia's acceptance into the Council of Europe with problems concerning ratification of the START-2 treaty turns out to be the statement, which has already been heard in the Western press, that one of the guarantees of a "favorable" vote has become the promise by persons in the Russian parliamentary delegation to promote ratification of START-2 in the RF State Duma! While another side of the same problem turns out to be the fact that, according to data provided by several experts, one of the main conditions for allocation to Russia of the ten-billion International Monetary Fund credit is the RF government's promise to ensure ratification of START-2!

The Council of Europe is a "Trojan horse," to which we are opening the gates. We should think hard about the fatal insides of that horse. We should think hard about the question of whose hands are opening the gates. We should think about this now. Later will be too late. In some ways, it is already too late. But even in this case, the nation's dignity demands that a study be conducted, and that the people who have made decisions of this kind must answer for those decisions. And no less important is the overall methodological conclusion. It sounds something like this.

Under conditions of a fight for power in a ideologically split society, external forces are selling their support to the country's internal forces at a certain price. The price is the sale of certain state interests. Many of these interests are especially meaningful and for them this kind of sale is especially prohibited. There are no institutions for such prohibitions. But they must be created through a super-party and super-ideological independent study conducted through the state...

CIS/Russia: CIS Convention on Citizenship

964F1617A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (EKONOMICHESKIY SOYUZ SUPPLEMENT) in Russian 16 Mar 96 p 12

[Text of "Convention on Simplified Order of Obtaining Citizenship by Citizens of the States Which Are Participants in the Commonwealth of Independent States," executed in Moscow on 19 January 1996]

[FBIS Translated Text] The states which are participants in the Commonwealth of Independent States, henceforth referred to as the Agreeing Parties,

Proceeding from the desire of their peoples to preserve and strengthen the historical traditionally friendly associations and good neighborly relations,

Developing cooperation amongst themselves for purposes of maintaining civic peace and international accord,

Confirming their adherence to obligations in regard to ensuring human rights and freedoms in accordance with the generally accepted international standards,

Wishing to ensure for their citizens the realization of the right of choice and acquisition of citizenship of any of the Agreeing Parties on the basis of their own free will,

Guided by the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States,

Striving to improve the mechanisms of cooperation within the Commonwealth and to increase their effectiveness,

Have come to agreement on the following:

Article 1.

Each of the Agreeing Parties grants its citizens who leave to take up permanent residence on the territory of any of the Agreeing Parties the simplified (registration) order of giving up (ceding) citizenship, and likewise grants citizens of any of the Agreeing Parties arriving for permanent residence on its territory the right to acquire its citizenship in simplified (registration) order, in the presence of one of the following conditions:

a) If the applicant formerly held citizenship of one of the Agreeing Parties and at the same time citizenship of the USSR, lived on their territories on 21 December 1991 and permanently resides there up until the time of implementation of the present Convention;

b) If the applicant has a close relative—spouse, parent (adoptive parent), child (including adopted), sister, brother, grandfather or grandmother, granddaughter or grandson—who permanently resides on the territory of the Agreeing Party of acquired citizenship, and is a citizen thereof.

2. The procedure indicated in point 1 of the present article applies to citizens of each of the Agreeing Parties permanently residing on the territory of any of the Agreeing Parties, regardless of the duration of residence on the territory of the Agreeing Party of acquired citizenship.

The acquisition of citizenship and cession of citizenship in accordance with the present Convention is performed on the basis of the free expression of will of the citizens of the Agreeing Parties.

Article 2.

For acquisition of citizenship and for cession of citizenship in simplified (registration) order in accordance with the present Convention, the citizen of any of the Agreeing Parties must submit to the appropriate agencies of the Agreeing Parties of acquired citizenship the following documents:

—application on acquisition of citizenship and cession of citizenship;

—copy of birth certificate or other document verifying the identity and place of birth of the citizen;

—document confirming the presence of one of the conditions specified in point 1, Article 1.

The authorized agencies of the Agreeing Parties perform registration of the acquisition of citizenship and cession of citizenship of the Agreeing Parties in simplified order within a period of no more than 3 months, with adherence to the requirements specified by the domestic legislation of the Agreeing Parties.

A person who has filed petition for acquisition of citizenship of any of the Agreeing Parties retains his former citizenship until his petition is granted.

The authorized agencies of the Agreeing Party granting citizenship shall forward the national passports of persons receiving citizenship, with appended copies of the petition on acquisition of citizenship and cession of citizenship, to the diplomatic or consular institution of the Agreeing Party of former citizenship, for subsequent registration of cession of citizenship.

Article 3.

1. Upon change in citizenship of parents, as a result of which both become citizens of one of the Agreeing Parties or both give up citizenship of one of the Agreeing Parties, the citizenship of their minor children changes accordingly.

2. The citizenship of minor children, one of whose parents is a citizen of one of the Agreeing Parties, and the other parent acquires citizenship of any other Agreeing Party, is determined by agreement of the parents, and must be expressed in a petition filed in accordance with Article 2.

3. Children whose parents live apart retain citizenship of the parent who has custody of them, if there was no other agreement between the parents on this point.

4. In the case of different citizenship of the parents, the previously established citizenship of children may be changed upon their reaching the age of majority, in accordance with the legislation of the Agreeing Parties, in simplified order.

5. Citizenship of children does not change upon change of citizenship of parents who have been deprived of their parental rights. Change in citizenship of children does not require consent of parents who have been deprived of parental rights.

Article 4.

Each of the Agreeing Parties retains the right to refuse to grant simplified (registration) order of acquiring citizenship or giving up citizenship to a person who has petitioned for this, in the cases specified by its domestic legislation.

Article 5.

The decision of a competent agency of any of the Agreeing Parties on refusal to grant acquisition or cession of citizenship in simplified (registration) order may be appealed within a month's time in the court of the appropriate Agreeing Party.

Article 6.

Questions which are not stipulated in the present Convention are resolved by the Agreeing Parties in accordance with the domestic legislation of the Agreeing Parties.

If the domestic legislation of the Agreeing Parties establishes more preferential conditions of citizenship for some category of persons, in this case the domestic legislation of the Agreeing Parties shall be applied.

The Agreeing Parties shall take measures on coordinating their legislation on citizenship.

Article 7.

Questions associated with interpretation or application of the present Convention are resolved by means of consultation and negotiation between the Agreeing Parties.

Article 8.

The present Convention does not affect statutes of other international agreements in which the Agreeing Parties are participants.

Article 9.

1. The present Convention is subject to ratification by the states which signed it. Ratification charters are handed over for safekeeping to the Executive Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which performs the functions of depository of this Convention.

2. The present Convention shall become effective on the 30th day from the day the third ratification charter is handed over for safekeeping to the depository. For the state, a ratified charter which is handed over for safekeeping to the depository after implementation of the present Convention shall go into effect on the 30th day from the day of submission of its ratification charter for safekedeping to the depository.

Article 10.

1. The present convention shall remain in effect for five years from the day of its implementation. Upon expiration of this term, the Convention is automatically renewed each time for a new five-year period.

2. Each of the Agreeing Parties may withdraw from the present Convention upon giving written notification of this fact to the depository 12 months prior to expiration of the current five-year term of its effectiveness.

Article 11.

After the present Convention has gone into effect, other states may join in it with the consent of all the Agreeing Parties. This is done by means of forwarding to the depository the documents on such annexation. The annexation is considered as having gone into effect upon expiration of 30 days from the day of the depository's receipt of the last notification of consent for such annexation.

Article 12.

The depository will immediately inform all states which have signed the present Convention or annexed themselves to it regarding the day of submission for safekeeping of each ratification charter or document of annexation, date of implementation of the Convention, and likewise of its receipt of other notifications.

Executed in the city of Moscow on 19 January 1996 in one original copy, in the Russian language. The original copy is kept at the Executive Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which forwards a certified copy to each of the states signing the present Convention.

CIS/Russia: Convention on CIS Interparliamentary Assembly

964F1617B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (EKONOMICHESKIY SOYUZ SUPPLEMENT) in Russian 16 Mar 96 p 12

[Text of "Convention on Interparliamentary of States Which Are Participants in the Commonwealth of Independent States," executed in Minsk on 26 May 1995]

[FBIS Translated Text] The states which are participants in the present Convention,

Striving toward continued development of mutual cooperation in the political, economic, legal and other spheres,

Taking into consideration the principles secured in the Memorandum of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States dated 21 October 1994, regarding the importance of pursuing an active line toward turning the Commonwealth of Independent States into an effective association of states and the need for consistent formulation of an effective integrated structure of the Commonwealth,

Believing that an important contribution to the cause of development and increased effectiveness of their mutual cooperation is made by joint activity aimed at bringing their national legislation closer together and creating proper mechanisms for its successful implementation,

Considering the principles contained in the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States,

Considering the principles of the Agreement on Interparliamentary Assembly of States Who Are Participants in the Commonwealth of Independent States, concluded by the Supreme Councils (Parliaments) of the CIS participant states on 27 March 1992, the Rules of the Interparliamentary Assembly, as well as other statutes of the Interparliamentary Assembly which are of an international character, and which are in effect at the moment of adoption of the present Convention,

Evaluating as being rather beneficial for continued development of interparliamentary cooperation within the scope of the Commonwealth of Independent States the experience accumulated by the Interparliamentary Assembly, which up until this time has exercised its activity in the capacity of an agency of interparliamentary cooperation,

Considering it necessary, for purposes of developing the mechanism of interparliamentary cooperation within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States, to give the Interparliamentary Assembly the proper legal status,

Have come to agreement on the following:

Article 1

The Interparliamentary Assembly is an interstate body of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Article 2.

For purposes of the present Convention, the terms presented below are defined as follows:

a) "Participant-state" — a state which has fulfilled the procedures specified in points 1 and 2, Article 22 of the present Convention;

b) "Parliament of a state participating in the present Convention" - the supreme legislative body of this state in accordance with its constitutional statutes;

c) "Interparliamentary Assembly" - Interparliamentary Assembly of CIS participant states, founded by the parliaments of the CIS participant states which signed the appropriate agreement in the city of Alma-Ata on 27 March 1992, consisting of parliamentary delegations of the participant states, the Assembly Council, the permanent and temporary commissions, other auxiliary bodies, as well as the Secretariat of the Council of the Interparliamentary Assembly;

d) "Officials of the Interparliamentary Assembly" - the Secretary General of the Assembly Council, other members of the personnel of the Interparliamentary Assembly working in it on a permanent basis and included by the Secretary General in the list of officials of the Interparliamentary Assembly subject to ratification by the Assembly Council, with the exception of persons hired for work in the state on whose territory the staff headquarters of the Interparliamentary Assembly, its agency or agencies are located, who are paid by hourly wage;

e) "Experts commissioned by the Interparliamentary Assembly" - persons other than officials fulfilling the assignments of the Interparliamentary Assembly, providing expert services for it and hired for work in accordance with its internal rules:

f) "Facilities of the Interparliamentary Assembly" - buildings or parts of buildings, including the land plots on which they are located, belonging to the Interparliamentary Assembly and used by it for its official purposes;

g) "Property and assets of the Interparliamentary Assembly" - all property belonging to the Interparliamentary Assembly, as well as the assets belonging to it, regardless of where and in whose management such property and assets are found;

h) "Rules" - Rules of the Interparliamentary Assembly.

Article 3.

1. The Interparliamentary Assembly consists of parliamentary delegations of the participant states.

2. A parliamentary delegation consists of representatives of the participant states elected or appointed by the parliament of state participating in the present Convention from among its members and in accordance with its internal rules and procedures. A parliamentary delegation is headed up by the leader of the parliamentary delegation.

3. The scope, term of effectiveness and order of termination of the powers and authorities of a parliamentary delegation of a participant state is defined by this participant state in accordance with its internal rules and procedures.

4. With the consent of the Assembly Council, or at its invitation, the following may participate in the capacity of observers at open sessions of the Interparliamentary Assembly and its bodies:

a) Representatives of the agencies of the Commonwealth of Independent States;

b) Representatives of the parliaments of states which are not participants in the present Convention;

c) Representatives of international organizations;

d) Representatives of public organizations of participant states, as well as of states indicated in subpoint "b", point 4 of the present article.

Article 4.

The Interparliamentary Assembly:

a) Discusses questions of cooperation of the participant states in various spheres, and forwards its recommendations on these questions to the Council of Heads of State and/or to the Council of Heads of Government, other agencies of the Commonwealth of Independent States, or parliaments, depending on the essence of the question being reviewed;

b) Reviews questions forwarded to it by the Council of Heads of State and/or Council of Heads of Government, and forwards recommendations on them respectively to the Council of Heads of State and/or Council of Heads of Government, and also to other agencies of the Commonwealth of Independent States;

c) Accepts recommendations for coordinating the legislation of the participant states;

d) Accepts standard (model) legislative statutes, and in accordance with the appropriate recommendations forwards them to the parliaments of the states participating in the present Convention;

e) Accepts recommendations for synchronizing procedures of ratification (approval) by parliaments of the CIS participant states of treaties (agreements) concluded within the scope of the Commonwealth, and in case of the appropriate decision adopted by the Council of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth of Independent States—also other international treaties, participation in which by the CIS participant states is rather desirable for achievement of their common goals as secured in the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States;

f) Accepts recommendations for bringing legislation of the participant states into correspondence with the principles of international treaties concluded by these states within the scope of the Commonwealth of Independent States;

g) Aids in the implementation of exchange of information of a legal character between the participant states;

h) Discusses other questions of interparliamentary cooperation.

Article 5.

1. The Interparliamentary Assembly is convened for regular and extraordinary plenary sessions. The regular plenary sessions of the Interparliamentary Assembly are held no less than two times a year. The place, time, and also the preliminary agenda of the regular plenary session of the Interparliamentary Assembly are determined at the preceding plenary session of the Interparliamentary Assembly or at the meeting of its Council.

2. If, for any reason whatsoever, it is impossible or extremely difficult to hold a regular plenary session at

the place and time specified in accordance with point 1 of the present article, the chairman of the Assembly Council determines the place and time at which it is to be held, with consent of all its members.

3. Extraordinary plenary sessions of the Interparliamentary Assembly may be convened by the Assembly Council.

4. The chairman of the Assembly Council, or at his assignment the Secretary General, forwards to the parliaments of the states participating in the present Convention and to observers who have been invited to be present at the plenary session of the Interparliamentary Assembly, notification of the place and time at which it is to be held.

5. Meetings of the Interparliamentary Assembly, the Assembly Council and its other bodies are, as a rule, open.

Article 6.

1. The parliamentary delegation of each participant state has one vote, if the Interparliamentary Assembly does not decide otherwise.

2. Decisions of the Interparliamentary Assembly on discussed questions are adopted by the parliamentary delegations present at the session and participating in the voting, in accordance with the Rules. Decisions of the Interparliamentary Assembly may be adopted only at its plenary sessions.

Article 7.

1. If the Interparliamentary Assembly does not adopt a decision to the contrary, the functions of chairman at the plenary session of the Interparliamentary Assembly shall be performed in turn by the leaders of the parliamentary delegations. The sequence shall be determined by the Assembly Council.

2. The chairman calls to order and concludes the plenary sessions, oversees debates at the plenary session, puts questions to a vote, monitors adherence by members of the parliamentary delegations and observers to the Rules and other internal regulations of the Interparliamentary Assembly, coordinates with the leaders of the parliamentary delegations the time and preliminary agenda for the next plenary session of the Interparliamentary Assembly, and performs other functions as specified in the Rules.

Article 8.

The internal activity of the Interparliamentary Assembly is implemented in accordance with the present Convention and the Rules.

Article 9.

1. The organization of activity of the Interparliamentary Assembly is performed by the Assembly Council, which consists of the leaders of the parliamentary delegations of the participant states. The functions of the Assembly Council are defined by the present Convention, and likewise by the Rules and other statutes of an internal character adopted by the Interparliamentary Assembly. For purposes of establishing its internal procedures, the Assembly Council may adopt its own rules.

2. The Assembly Council elects the Chairman of the Council. The Chairman of the Assembly Council is elected by secret ballot from among the members of the Council, for a term of 1 year. The person who is elected to serve as the Chairman of the Assembly Council may be re-elected, but with the condition that he cannot hold this office for more than three consecutive terms.

A candidate is considered elected if the majority of the Council members present and participating in the voting have voted for him.

Article 10.

The Interparliamentary Assembly, acting in accordance with the present Convention, has the right to institute permanent and temporary commissions, consisting of representatives of the parliamentary delegations, and likewise other auxiliary bodies which it deems necessary for successful fulfillment of the functions placed upon it.

Article 11.

1. A permanently acting administrative body of the Assembly Council is the Secretariat. The Secretariat provides assistance to the Interparliamentary Assembly, the Assembly Council, the permanent and temporary commissions and other auxiliary bodies which may be created in accordance with the present Convention insofar as the organization of the work of the Interparliamentary Assembly and its bodies is concerned. Specifically, the Secretariat:

a) Prepares, translates, prints and disseminates official documents and materials of the Interparliamentary Assembly;

b) Prints and disseminates official publications of the Interparliamentary Assembly;

c) Stores documents in a proper manner in the archives of the Interparliamentary Assembly, and bears responsibility for their safekeeping;

d) Receives and generalizes information on measures undertaken by the parliaments of the states participating in the present Convention for purposes of implementing the decisions adopted by the Interparliamentary Assembly.

e) Performs all other work which is required by the Interparliamentary Assembly for fulfillment of the functions placed upon it.

2. The Secretariat consists of the Secretary General, his deputies—official represenatives of the parliaments of states participating in the present Convention and such personnel as may be needed for effective fulfillment of its functions.

3. The Secretary General manages the activity of the Secretariat. The Secretary General is appointed by the Assembly Council upon nomination by the chairman of the Assembly Council, for a term of 3 years. In the performance of his functions, the Secretary General is answerable to the Assembly Council and its chairman.

Article 12.

The Interparliamentary Assembly has the right to conclude international treaties within the limits of the competency specified by the present Convention.

Article 13.

1. The Interparliamentary Assembly exercises the rights of a legal entity on the territory of the participant states, and, specifically, has the right:

a) To conclude treaties;

b) To acquire movable and immovable property and dispose of it;

c) To file cases in court and to participate in judicial inquiries.

2. The rights specified in the present article are exercised by the Secretariat in the name of the Interparliamentary Assembly.

Article 14.

1. With the exceptions specified in point 2 of the present article, the Interparliamentary Assembly enjoys the same privileges and immunities on the territory of the participant states as are granted to the United Nations Organization in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

2. The Interparliamentary Assembly, its property and assets, are immune from any form of judicial intervention, with the exception of cases when:

a) A civil claim is filed against the Interparliamentary Assembly, its body or member of its personnel regarding compensation of loss in connection with a traffic accident involving a vehicle belonging to the Interparliamentary Assembly, its body or member of its personnel, or operated in the name of the Interparliamentary Assembly, if this loss is not compensated by insurance;

b) A civil claim is filed against the Interparliamentary Assembly, its body or member of its personnel in connection with the death or bodily injury caused by an action or inaction on the part of the Interparliamentary Assembly, its body or personnel;

c) The Interparliamentary Assembly or its bodies perform commercial activity for purposes of profit.

Article 15.

1. With the exceptions specified in points 2 and 3 of the present article, in regard to privileges, immunities and benefits, the members of parliamentary delegations of the participant states, officials of the Interparliamentary Assembly, and experts commissioned by the Interparliamentary Assembly exercise on the territory of the participant states the regimen which is no less favorable than that regimen which is granted respectively to representatives of the members of the United Nations Organization, officials of the United Nations Organization, and experts commissioned by the United Nations on the basis of the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

2. The principle in point 1 of the present article is not applied to mutual relations between the member of a parliamentary delegation and a state of which he is a citizen.

3. The principles of points "b," "d," "e," "f," and "g" of Section 18, Article V, of the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations are not applied to officials of the Interparliamentary Assembly who are citizens of the state on whose territory the staff headquarters of the Interparliamentary Assembly is located or where the agency or agencies in which such persons work are located.

4. The privileges and immunities are granted to members of parliamentary delegations of participant states, to officials of the Interparliamentary Assembly and experts commissioned by the Interparliamentary Assembly not for their personal gain, but in order to ensure the independent fulfillment of their functions associated with work in the Interparliamentary Assembly. The parliament of a state participating in the present Convention, acting in accordance with its domestic rules and procedures, not only has the right, but is obligated to refuse immunity of its representative in every case when, in its opinion, the immunity hinders the fulfillment of jurisprudence, and if this refusal may be performed without detriment to the purpose for which the immunity

was granted. The Secretary General has the right and is obligated to reject the immunity granted to any official of the Interparliamentary Assembly, and likewise to any expert commissioned by the Interparliamentary Assembly, in those cases when, in his opinion, the immunity hinders the fulfillment of jurisprudence, and if he can reject it without detriment to the interests of the Interparliamentary Assembly. In regard to the Secretary General, the right to refuse immunity belongs to the Assembly Council.

5. The Interparliamentary Assembly cooperates on an ongoing basis with the appropriate authorities of the participant states for purposes of facilitating proper fulfillment of jurisprudence, ensuring fulfillment of recommendations of law enforcement agencies and preventing any abuses in connection with the privileges, immunities and benefits granted in accordance with the present Convention.

Article 16.

The principles of Article VII of the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations are applied to the Interparliamentary Assembly, the Secretary General and his deputies, as well as to other officials of the Interparliamentary Assembly and experts commissioned by the Interparliamentary Assembly, mutatis mutandis.

Article 17.

All differences of opinion arising in connection with the interpretation and application of the present Convention, with the exception of cases when the parties agree to resolve them by some other means, shall be handed over for arbitration review, instituted for purposes of resolving the given specific dispute and consisting of two arbiters, each of which is appointed by one of the parties to the dispute, as well as a third arbiter who is appointed by the first two arbiters.

Article 18.

The place of location of the Interparliamentary Assembly is the city of St. Petersburg.

Article 19.

Financing the activity of the Interparliamentary Assembly is performed on the basis of share participation by the participant states.

Article 20.

If the statutes of the present Convention specify principles other than those presented in other statutes regulating the activity and status of the Interparliamentary Assembly, the principles of the present Convention shall be applied.

Article 21.

Amendments may be introduced into the present Convention by agreement between all its participants.

Article 22.

1. The present Convention is open to signing by all CIS participant states.

2. The present Convention is subject to ratification. Ratification charters are handed over for safekeeping to the Executive Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which will fulfill the functions of depository of the present Convention.

3. The present Convention becomes effective from the day the third ratification charter is handed over for safekeeping.

4. The present Convention is concluded for an indefinite term. Each participant state may withdraw from it, having sent the appropriate notification to the depository. In this case, the present Convention ceases its effectiveness for this participant state upon the expiration of six months from the day of receipt of such notification by the depository.

Executed in the city of Minsk on 26 May 1995 in one original copy, in the Russian language. The original copy is kept at the Executive Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which shall send each state signing the present Convention a certified copy of it.

Note: The document was signed by Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, the Russian Federation, and Tajikistan.

Russia/Belarus: Agreement on Convertible Currency Ratified

964F1616A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (EKONOMICHESKIY SOYUZ SUPPLEMENT) in Russian 16 Mar 96 p 11

[Decree No 228, dated 28 February 1996, Moscow, on the Approval and Submission for Ratification of the Agreement Between the Russian Federation Government, the Russian Federation Central Bank and the Government of the Republic of Belarus and National Bank of the Republic of Belarus on Measures for Providing for the Mutual Convertibility and Stabilization of the

Exchange Rates of the Russian Ruble and Belarussian Ruble]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation Government decrees:

1. That the Agreement Between the Russian Federation Government, the Russian Federation Central Bank and the Government of the Republic of Belarus and National Bank of the Republic of Belarus on Measures for Providing for the Mutual Convertibility and Stabilization of the Exchange Rates of the Russian Ruble and Belarussian Ruble signed in Moscow on 6 January 1995 be approved and submitted for ratification to the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly.

2. That Oleg Vyacheslavovich Vyugin, Russian Federation deputy minister of finance, be appointed official representative of the Russian Federation Government for the consideration by the chambers of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly of the ratification of the agreement referred to in Point 1 of this decree.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Government

Russia/Belarus: Agreement on Economic Cooperation

964F1616B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (EKONOMICHESKIY SOYUZ SUPPLEMENT) in Russian 16 Mar 96 p 11

[Agreement between the Russian Federation Government and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on Areas of Economic Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus; date of signing not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Government of the Russian Federation and Government of the Republic of Belarus, hereafter referred to as the Sides,

guided by the 21 February 1995 Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, the 6 January 1995 Agreement on a Customs Union Between the Russian Federation and Republic of Belarus, and the 13 November 1992 Agreement Between the Russian Federation Government and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on Free Trade,

expressing their resolve to refrain from imposing restrictions in reciprocal trade,

acknowledging that the Sides' purpose is the continued formation of a Customs Union, in accordance with the 6 January 1995 Agreement on a Customs Union Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, that will become an important milestone in interstate economic integration,

noting the extensive potential opportunities afforded by the practical implementation of the 6 January 1995 Protocol on the Institution of Free Trade Without Exclusions and Restrictions Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus,

agree to the following:

Article 1

The purposes of this agreement are to promote the expansion of commercial relations and the harmonious development of economic relations between the Sides and of economic activity, the raising of the population's living standard and employment level, and the raising of labor productivity and strengthening of financial stability, and to ensure equal conditions for competition in trade between the two countries.

Article 2

The Sides agree that the priority area of further work on improving the conditions of reciprocal trade should be the creation of maximally favorable conditions for the activities of both counties' economic agents. To that end, the Sides will study the effectiveness of their activities under the conditions of existing systems of economic regulation, including both tariff and non-tariff regulation, and will take appropriate measures with due regard for the specific structural features of the economies of the Russian Federation and Republic of Belarus, guided by the principles of carrying out market economic transformations in both states.

Article 3

The Sides pledge to carry out, on the basis of uniform principles, joint measures for the state support of entrepreneurial activity and for the creation, on the territories of the states that are parties to this agreement, conditions for the effective functioning of institutions belonging to the market infrastructure.

Article 4

The Sides reaffirm the principle of applying uniform rates of customs payments in trade with third countries, as well as quantitative limitations, in accordance with the 6 January 1995 Protocol on the Institution of Free Trade Without Exclusions and Restrictions Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, except for cases stipulated in existing agreements between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.

The Sides pledge not to impose taxes, fees and other payments analogous to customs duties in reciprocal trade.

Article 5

The Sides agree that the practical implementation of free trade without exclusions and restrictions between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus in accordance with provisions of the 6 January 1995 Agreement on a Customs Union Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus offers broad opportunities for the further development of commercial relations between economic agents of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.

Article 6

The Sides will create necessary and equal conditions for the development of fair competition among economic agents.

The Sides will coordinate joint actions in the area of the prevention, limitation and halting of monopolistic activity and unfair competition, will agree upon criteria for determining enterprises that hold monopolies, and will take steps to harmonize other elements of legislation in the area of competition.

Article 7

The Sides agree not to grant export or other subsidies to enterprises located on their countries' territories if, as the result of granting such subsidies, the conditions of fair competition in reciprocal trade are violated.

Article 8

In implementing measures in the context of forming a Customs Union between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, the Sides proceed on the premise that each of them will independently carry out the process of its joining the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The Sides will hold regular consultations and exchange information on questions of mutual interest in the process of joining the WTO.

Article 9

Reciprocal trade by both countries in goods and services, the prices of which are state-regulated, will be carried out using the mechanism of regulation applicable to the domestic market, and the Sides will not use price-regulation measures in reciprocal trade that are applicable to third countries.

Article 10

The Sides will study the effectiveness of the performance of their states' economic agents under the conditions of existing tax systems and will take appropriate measures to exclude dual taxation of income and property, including through the conclusion of an appropriate interstate agreement.

Article 11

The Sides agree that observance of the principle of freedom of transit is a key condition for attaining the goals of this agreement and a fundamental element in the process of linking the Sides' economic complexes to the system of the international division of labor and cooperation.

Transit shipments will not be subject to unwarranted delays or restrictions.

Article 12

The sides will foster the development of cooperative production arrangements and scientific and technological cooperation on the interstate, interbranch and interregional levels and the level of economic agents, including through the provision of various forms of state support.

Article 13

The Sides will take the necessary measures to deepen and synchronize market reforms on the basis of regular consultations and the exchange of information and experience in the area of carrying out economic reforms.

Article 14

The Sides will take joint actions to form a unified scientific and technological space and to develop and implement joint projects of scientific and technological cooperation aimed at the production of competitive products.

The Sides agree that key conditions of the development and deepening of cooperation are coordinating monetary, budgetary, credit, tax and pricing policy, as well as payment and settlement relations, and ensuring that national currencies retain stable purchasing power.

Article 15

The Sides proceed from the need to preserve the leading position of Russian and Belarussian producers in the branch and regional markets of both states, especially in the sphere of the marketing of finished output; to rationalize commercial, cooperative-production, and scientific and technological relations; to provide incentives for the access of their countries' capital to various spheres of both countries' economies; to implement joint projects, and to enter the markets of third countries.

Article 16

The Sides will draw up proposals for and draft agreements on mutually advantageous cooperation in the area of investment, scientific and technological, production, credit and settlement and payment relations, and in the fuel and energy and agroindustrial complexes.

The Sides will develop the specialization of economic branches and individual production facilities necessary for the effective development of interstate cooperative-production relations.

The Sides will prepare forecasts of the development of commercial and economic relations until the year 2000 and present them for consideration by a bilateral Russian-Belarussian commission.

Article 17

The Sides will promote the formation of the transnational economic associations and financial-industrial groups necessary for the development of both counties' economies, and of a system of financial and lending institutions, and the preparation of joint programs for introducing new forms and conditions of reciprocal payments into practice.

Article 18

The Sides will promote the development of relations between regions in the framework of their countries' laws.

Article 19

The Sides will work out areas for the development of existing communications and transportation connections between their countries in the areas of fishing and maritime shipping, with the joint development and utilization of port infrastructures and, and other areas of cooperation in that branch.

The Sides will develop cooperation in the area of marketing information and trade fairs and expositions.

Article 20

The Sides will refrain from actions capable of causing harm to commercial and economic relations with states other than the parties to this agreement, as well as with those states' associations and with international organizations.

Article 21

Disputes between the Sides with regard to the application or interpretation of provisions of this agreement will be resolved through consultations and negotiations.

Article 22

This agreement will enter into force as of the date of the exchange of notifications concerning the Sides' completion of the procedures necessary to put it into effect, and will remain in force until the end of 12 months from the date that one side receives written notification from the other of its intention to terminate the agreement.

Russia/Belarus: Agreement on Pricing Policy

964F1616C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (EKONOMICHESKIY SOYUZ SUPPLEMENT) in Russian 16 Mar 96 p 11

[Agreement between the Russian Federation Government and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on Pricing Policy; date of signing not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] In order to create favorable conditions for the development of market relations between economic agents of the Russian Federation and of the Republic of Belarus on the basis of bringing their states' pricing policies closer together within the framework of the Customs Union, the Government of the Russian Federation and Government of the Republic of Belarus, hereafter referred to as the Sides, guided by the 21 February 1996 Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus and the 6 January 1995 Memorandum on the Expansion and Deepening of Russian-Belarussian Cooperation, agree to the following:

Article 1

The Sides will consistently follow a course of liberalizing prices and tariffs that enables economic agents of the Russian Federation and Republic of Belarus to carry out reciprocal deliveries of products (and goods and services) at free contractual prices.

Article 2

The Sides will carry out the internal state regulation of prices (and tariffs) for the products of natural monopolies and products purchased for state needs, and for other types of products, a list of which will be determined by each Side. The application of the aforementioned regulated prices on the territory of the other Side's state will in each case (for each type of product) be subject to agreement between the Sides.

Article 3

The coordination of pricing policy will be carried out on the basis of the observance of common principles of taxation, uniform customs tariffs, and uniform methods of calculating the unit cost of products.

The Sides will instruct the appropriate executive branch agencies to continue work in this direction.

Article 4

In order to promote equalization of the conditions of the activity of the Sides' economic agents:

The Russian Side will grant Russian producers of petroleum and petroleum products the right to supply them to Belarussian consumers at the free prices formed on the Russian Federation's domestic market;

The Belarussian Side will not permit the unsanctioned reexport of petroleum and petroleum products delivered from the Russian Federation and will not apply to Russian consumers the minimum prices for exported products established for Belarussian suppliers.

Specific prices (and tariffs) will be defined in contracts concluded between economic agents of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus.

Article 5

The Sides reaffirm the agreement achieved on the basis of the 5 January 1994 Agreement Between the Russian Federation Government and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on the Delivery of Russian Natural Gas to the Republic of Belarus and the Creation of a System of Transit Gas Pipelines on the Territory of the Republic of Belarus.

The Sides agree that the cost of natural gas at the border of the Republic of Belarus and the charge for the transit of Russian natural gas through the territory of the Republic of Belarus and for the transportation of customer-supplied gas for processing at enterprises of the Republic of Belarus will be determined annually in bilateral negotiations on the basis of existing prices on domestic markets, taking into account operating costs and the profits to ensure the dependable operation of gas transportation systems.

Article 6

In order to ensure the observance of their mutual interests, the Sides will jointly monitor the implementation of this agreement, examine the economic results of its implementation and, if necessary, make changes in and additions to it.

Article 7

This agreement will enter into force as of the date of its signing and cease to be in force six months from the time that one of the Sides notifies the other Side in written form of its intention to terminate the agreement.

Russia: Decree on Diesel Engine-Kazakhstan Venture

964F1604A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (EKONOMICHESKIY SOYUZ SUPPLEMENT) in Russian 16 Mar 96 p 14

[Decree: "Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation, 28 February 1996, No. 219, Moscow, entitled: 'Conclusion of an Agreement Between the RF Government and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Creating a Joint Venture for the Production of Diesel Engines'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Government of the Russian Federation decrees:

To approve the draft that was submitted by the RF Ministry For Cooperation With the States Participating in the Commonwealth of Independent States, that was coordinated with the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other interested federal agencies of the executive authority, and that was worked out with the Kazakhstan Side — the draft of the Agreement Between the RF Government and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Creating a Joint Venture for the Production of Diesel Engines (appended)*.

To instruct A. A. Bolshakov, Deputy Chairman of the RF Government, to conduct negotiations with the Kazakhstan Side and, upon the attainment of an understanding, to sign on behalf of the RF Government the indicated Agreement, authorizing him to introduce into the appended draft any amendments and additions that are not of a fundamental nature.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, Chairman of the RF Government

* Not published in EKONOMICHESKIY SOYUZ.

Russia/Iran: Russian-Iranian Relations Assessed

964F1456A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (EKONOMICHESKIY SOYUZ SUPPLEMENT) in Russian 2 Mar 96 p 15

[Interview with S. Tretyakov, Russian Ambassador to Iran, by ETTELAAT newspaper, under "World and Russia" rubric: "'Relations Between Moscow and Teheran of a Strategic Nature': From an ETTELAAT

Interview With S. Tretyakov, Russia's Ambassador in Teheran"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Corr.] Which place does Iran occupy in Russia's foreign policy?

[Tretyakov] Russian executive officials look upon Iran as an independent and important regional power, and feel that although we do not have a large, common border with it (as we did during the time of the Soviet Union), we do have a common heritage—the Caspian Sea. For Russia, Iran may become an important economic partner, in our foreign economic ties, it should occupy a more important place than now. For this reason, our government's representatives approach Iran from a strategic point of view, since relations are being developed for the long term.

[Correspondent] Because Russia and Iran take the same approach to the question of the Caspian Sea, what is Russia's opinion on specific problems concerning the legal status of the Caspian Sea?

[Tretyakov] In order to prevent any possible disorder or incorrect, ecologically harmful usage of the Caspian Sea, we must determine its new legal status. After all, continuing the current indeterminate situation in the area of fishing could lead to very dangerous consequences.

In recent years, the Caspian states have been working on a suitable fishing treaty. It should be noted that the Azerbaijan Republic has a special position on this.

[Correspondent] How do you evaluate Azerbaijan's approach?

[Tretyakov] Russia regards any unilateral actions as obstacles to cooperation, since they could lead to the growth and deepening of contradictions. Moscow suggests that cooperation and trust must be uppermost in the Caspian Sea.

[Correspondent] In this connection, are there any differences of opinion between Moscow and Teheran?

[Tretyakov] Fortunately, here we are like-minded. We are working together with Iran to organize cooperation between the Caspian states, so that, based on a joint, fundamental document for these states, the possibilities and consequences of other countries' presence in the sea can be examined.

[Correspondent] In other words, Russia is not opposed to the presence of other states in the Caspian region?

[Tretyakov] Exactly. It looks as if neither of our countries has anything to say against a foreign presence in the Caspian Sea, but if it begins before the legal status of the sea is determined, it could have a negative effect on relations between coastal states.

[Correspondent] Taking into consideration everything that has been said, what is your opinion on Azerbaijan's oil consortium with Western oil companies?

[Tretyakov] Russia assumes that any contract that is concluded must comply with the new legal status of the Caspian Sea. The consortium's very existence adds to the discord. Evidently, Kazakhstan also intends to create an oil and gas consortium, with the participation of Italy and England.

This is exactly why Russia is emphasizing that the legal status of the Caspian Sea must be determined as quickly as possible, with the coastal states participating, since our wishes are not always realistic.

[Correspondent] How do you assess the competition between certain nonregional states for influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus and its consequences for security and stability in the region?

[Tretyakov] Russia's opinion is essentially that this region should not become an arena for competition, tension or conflicts, and that the countries which create the basis for the presence of nonregional states must themselves be responsible for those consequences. Russia is prepared for bilateral, multilateral or collective cooperation with the region's countries, specifically, within the framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation (ECO). We would like to participate in the trilateral cooperative venture, begun at the initiative of Iran, between Ukraine, Turkmenistan and Iran, and between Turkmenistan, Iran and Armenia.

CIS/Iran: Central Asia's Ties With Iran Growing

964F1456B KOMMERSANT DAILY in Russian 6 Mar 96 p 4

[Article by Georgiy Bovt, Stanislav Tarasov: "Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs Visit to CIS: There Are No Silk Roads in Big Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Over the course of his several-day tour of CIS countries, Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MID] head, visited the Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Georgia and Azerbaijan, then set out for Ukraine and Moscow. The visit had several motives. And this multitude of motives was in many ways determined by the fact that many politicians are already looking towards a time when the territory of the former USSR will no longer be seen as a single geopolitical state, and are even now concerned with the reorientation of transport and export-import flows.**

The main subject of Velayati's conversations with Central Asian leaders was the problem of their integration with southern countries. The main subject is infrastructure integration. The heads of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, and later, the presidents of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine were extended an invitation from Iran's president, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, to come to a ceremony celebrating the opening on May 13 of the Meshed Sarakhs Tedzhen railroad (from Turkmenistan to Iran). This line will give the republics of Central Asia extremely convenient access to the Persian Gulf, and will make it possible to decrease freight delivery times from China's Pacific Ocean shore to Istanbul, compared to the marine route through the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal. The railroads of China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey will be connected in a single chain. Emphasizing the epic quality of the event, the parties at the negotiations recalled several times the Great Silk Road in connection with it.

Velayati's visit to Turkmenistan was timed to coincide with the signing of yet another important agreement: the state company "Turkmentelek" signed a contract with Iran's state telecommunications company on the construction in the republic of a section of the Transasian-European Fiber-Optic Communications Line (TLE). It will connect China with Germany through the Asian countries. The problem of diversification in post-Soviet geopolitical communications was also discussed in Kiev. For Ukraine, the "Iranian factor" means an opportunity to increase access to Iranian fuel, and, in doing so, to lessen dependence on Moscow. However, after negotiations that have already been going on for three years, a workable agreement on how to transport Iranian oil to Ukraine through Turkmenistan has yet to be born. For now, a different trilateral agreement has been functioning for nearly a year between Ukraine, Turkmenistan and Iran, by which Ukraine manufactures mineral fertilizer from gas supplied by Turkmenistan, then that fertilizer is delivered to Iran. Ukraine also has great hopes for another project: recently the firm "Antonov" opened the bidding for organizing the production in Iran of An-140 transport aircraft. However, Teheran is now in far from the best financial shape, which creates certain significant difficulties both for this and other ambitious integrated projects.

Iran's main source of hard currency is oil, however, the complex arrangement of forces in the region that are fighting for access to it does not promise easy profit for Teheran. Here, it is not just Russia and Turkey—Iran's long-time competitors—who are joining the game, but the West, as well, mainly the United States.

This problem made itself known most graphically during Velayati's visit to Azerbaijan. More that a few words were spoken about good neighbors. And about the successful development of economic cooperation: trade between Iran and Azerbaijan in 1995 grew by 122 percent. Geydar Aliyev emphasized his desire to create "favorable conditions for Iranian business circles in Azerbaijan," and gave high marks to Iran's humanitarian aid to Azerbaijani refugees. However, at a press conference in Baku, the plans of the two ministers of foreign affairs—Gasan Gasanov and Velayati—essentially skirmished, formally, because of Israel. In response to an announcement by an Iranian journalist of public "concern" in his country having to do with Azerbaijan's recent closeness with Israel (where a large Azerbaijani diaspora resides), Gasanov basically said that Teheran should be more worried about the fact of Armenia's occupation of a part of Azerbaijan—"as the result of that aggression, one million Shiites have been turned into refugees, 30 thousand have died, mosques are in ruins." In Baku's opinion, Iran is not the last to blame in breaking the economic blockade of Armenia. In fact, Israel is not the problem. To be more exact, there are many problems.

In Baku, Velayati failed to clarify the situation surrounding Iran's part in developing oil deposits in the Caspian "Shakhdeniz." As we know, Iran was dropped from the Caspian international consortium, even before it joined, under U.S. pressure. Aliyev's stake on the West and his flirtation with Turkey can hardly suit Teheran, and greatly complicate its negotiations with Azerbaijan on oil problems. Specifically, they have not yet succeeding in reaching a consensus on the question of the Caspian's legal status. Teheran today is closer to Moscow's position, proposing that to speak now about dividing the Caspian Sea shelf into national sectors without first resolving the problem of how the coastal countries would make use of its natural resources would be premature. Nor was Aliyev able to assure, with Velayati's agreement, resolution to mutual satisfaction of the question of a two-way railroad line. Baku proposes to join the Azerbaijan border town, Astara, with the Iranian Kazvii and Rasht. Iran's MID head ignored the proposal. And this is understandable—after all, the Iranian authorities have always had a fearful attitude towards Baku's calls for integration, recalling that many more Azerbaijanis (by almost two times) live in the North of Iran than in Azerbaijan (in Iran, pure Persians are an ethnic minority). Baku's flirting with the West, the West's stake in the region on Turkey, and, in relation to Iran—on the Kurds, as a counterweight to the Islamic regime—all this introduces more than a few delicate moments into Teheran's policy beyond the Caucasus. For example, Iran has been slow to conclude a treaty on the border with Azerbaijan, confirming that it is entirely suited by the existing treaty with the USSR. And at one time in Moscow, one of the authors of these lines had occasion to hear from a highly-placed Iranian diplomat that Teheran would definitely prefer to deal with the USSR. The last stop in Velayati's voyage is listed as Moscow.

Russia/China: Russo-Sino Alliance Deemed Disadvantageous

964F1626A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 13 Mar 96 p 5

[Article by Vladimir Abarinov: "Benefits of Alliance With China Are Doubtful; It Will Bring Moscow Nothing but New Complications"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The idea of "seeking allies in the East," which has recently been expressed by high officials in Moscow, seemingly in response to the NATO expansion, is not devoid of extravagance. Moreover, it is unrealistic, unpromising and dangerous for Russia.

Let us begin with the fact that no one in Beijing is offering us such an alliance, and even quite the contrary: They are denying the very possibility of formulating the question on any serious level. Let us assume that this is Eastern cleverness. Let us even agree that China needs such an alliance in view of its coming southward expansion. But why does Russia need it?

China is a participant in numerous territorial disputes, of which the most acute and dangerous is certainly not the islands of Spratli or Diao Yudao (they are Senkaku), but rather the conflict with India, which represents a factor of instability not even on a regional, but on a global scale. The opposition of two of the largest states of Asia has led to an unprecedented arms race on the subcontinent. The "young dragons" are arming themselves not because they do not know what to do with their dollars, but because there are more potential and real threats in this region than anywhere else.

It is difficult to say what "grounds the author has to believe" that the Beijing authorities consider the main threat to the country's security to be separatism. From what we know about Chinese military doctrine, what follows is just the opposite: Beijing considers the main threats to be external, and Russia holds a primary place among them. The reasons for this are obvious: Russia has the most powerful naval fleet in the Pacific Ocean, and is not averse to using military force to protect its fishing resources. Its foreign policy position is characterized primarily by instability. It sympathizes with India and supplies it with missiles. It is conducting a territorial dispute with Japan, etc., and its local authorities are challenging the interstate border treaty.

Only in Beijing is the Taiwan problem considered to be a domestic Chinese one. It bears no relation to separatism, since the Koumintang never spoke out for in favor of the island's independence from the mainland, and the propagandists of this viewpoint have only been out of jail for a few years. The Taipei authorities believe themselves to be the only lawful government of China. This position may be considered an anachronism, but it is specifically this position, judging by all, that will lead to the victory of the current president Li Teng-hui in the upcoming elections.

There is no reason to believe that, in the case of a military conflict between the PRC [People's Republic of China] and Taiwan, the United States would be guided by the standards of international law. It is true that Washington does not have a formal military agreement with Taipei, but it does have such agreements with Tokyo and Seoul, and in both of these capitals they believe that the United States bears particular responsibility for maintaining regional security. When last year the PRC began provocational launches of ballistic missiles in the direction of Taiwan, the aircraft carrier "Nimitz" entered the Taiwan Strait. This move was perceived by the countries of the region as a gesture of support for Taipei. As for economic sanctions, we need hardly pin our hopes on a Chinese veto in the Security Council. It is enough for the Americans to introduce their own national sanctions—even simply depriving China of the status of most favored nation in trade with the USA would have a most ruinous effect on the Chinese economy. The allies of the USA, and first and foremost Japan, we must believe, would take analogous measures. In any case, the Americans must do something with their huge trade deficit with the PRC, which last year comprised $33.8 billion.

But even separatism in China may only partly be considered as a domestic problem. Tibet has long ago become a major international problem and great irritant in the PRC's relations not only with the Western world, but also with the countries which profess Buddhism. The problem of Outer Mongolia notably complicates Sino-Mongolian relations. The repressions (local dissidents qualify them as genocide) against the Uygur, Kazakh and Kirghiz population, which represent a human rights problem specifically from the standpoint of international law, are not the exclusive competency of the PCR. Where is the guarantee that, with a certain confluence of circumstances, Alma-Ata, like Moscow, will not pose at international forums the question of defending the rights of its fellow countrymen abroad? We may recall that there are almost a million Kazakhs living in China, and that quite recently Beijing lodged a high-level official protest against the violations of the border regimen which were sanctioned by the Kazakh authorities. There is no question that China is interested in stability on its northern borders, but does not consider it possible to remove the existing problems, as the West, neighboring countries and the world community or its own dissidents demand.

The Asia-Pacific region in general is extremely restless. Truly, there is no country here which does not have very severe domestic and foreign problems. To its ethnic and confessional conflicts we should add also the widespread drug trade, terrorism, piracy, the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technologies, and the black market in conventional arms. China is conducting an active political game in the region, is a major exporter of domestic-made arms, and is constantly being suspected of exporting nuclear technologies. Having entered into an alliance with it, Moscow will inevitably be pulled into this foreign game, with unpredictable consequences and doubtful dividends.

It is extremely improbable that, in return, China will help Russia stabilize the situation in Central Asia and secure its southern boundaries. How will it do this? Russia, on the other hand, must beware of any intervention whatsoever, if only in the form of mediation, in the conflicts which it considers to be the sphere of its exclusive influence.

The greatest self-flattery is the hope that, to please Moscow, Beijing will exert influence on Islamabad, which in turn will influence the development of events in Afghanistan in a direction favorable to Russia. That is, that it will help regulate the inter-Tajik conflict. Not to mention the fact that such a multi-level structure looks very much like a project for a castle in the air. For many years, China, together with Pakistan, has actively supported the Modzhakheds, and it has absolutely no reason to spend this political capital. Even the incomparably more humble task of freeing the crew of the aircraft belonging to the Tatar aviation company which was transporting arms for the needs of the Tabbani regime was resolved by Moscow through Islamabad without China's mediation.

The author's information regarding the demographic situation in the Far East is unreliable. We, in turn, are using the 129th edition of the reference manual, Statesman's Year-Book, edited by Brian Hunter. The population density in the border province of Heilongjiang is significantly higher than on the adjoining Russian territories: It comprises 71 persons per square km, while in Khabarovsk Kray it is only two, in Amur Oblast—2.8, and in Primorskiy Kray—12.5 persons per square km. There are over 3 million people living in the administrative center of Harbin Province. In the Russian Far East there is no such large city: The population of Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk and Vladivostok taken together is two times less. But that is not the point. The author has an oversimplified understanding of "demographic pressure." Population migration is taking place certainly not by the principle of connecting vessels—there is no direct correlation here. Finally, wherein lies the threat of "demographic expansion?" According to the most fantastic and unsubstantiated estimates, today there are around 2 million Chinese illegally living in Russia. However, we cannot point out a country in the region which does not have a large Chinese community. In Thailand there are 6 million Chinese, in Indonesia and Malaysia—5 million each, and even in tiny Vietnam there are around 1 million of them. (In the United States there are fewer Chinese than Russians, and about as many as there are Cubans). Nevertheless, the authorities of these countries certainly do not see the Chinese community as a fifth column, threatening their national security and sovereignty. The only exception is Indonesia, which in 1965 suppressed a communist revolt inspired by Beijing. The real numbers, however, refute the myth about the 2 million. For example, last year 17,392 Chinese entered Primorskiy Kray, while 11,164 returned to their homeland. And this is expansion? In any large city of the world there is a "Chinatown." This is normal. Yet the hysterical shouts regarding the infamous demographic expansion are clearly inadequate to the reality of the situation, and therefore not normal. We should, however, say that a close economic interaction exists between the border regions, and is rapidly developing. The Russian Far Eastern territories have long felt alienated from European Russia, and to a significant degree provide for their first priority needs by means of trade with the Chinese side. The local ruling elites on both sides of the border are equally interested in continued cooperation, removal of excess customs barriers and easing of the visa regimen for residents of the border regions. Therefore, the protests of local Russian leaders against "demographic expansion" and unilateral territorial concessions to China bear a purely speculative character, have for their purpose the creation of an image of the enemy, and lead public opinion along a false path.

Most probably, these accusations will continue in the future, but will have no serious influence on bilateral relations. For Russia, the only possible and beneficial conception of mutual relations with China consists of full normalization of these relations. Great powers are incapable of maintaining partnerships with each other simply because they do not know how to: A partner for them is always a little brother. As for disarmament and arms control, this is specifically that sphere of mutual action which will present mutual interest for a long time to come, under any political conditions.

Political Issues

Russia: Realists' Union Leader on Yeltsin Election Chances

964F1629A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Mar 96 p 2

[Interview with Yuriy Vladimirovich Petrov by Sergey Mulin; place and date of interview not given: "Yuriy Petrov: 'Zyuganov's Party Will Stay Communist'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Supporting Yeltsin, the chairman of the Realists' Union feels it would be suitable to create a party with a socialist orientation.**

Yuriy Petrov wears two hats: He heads the State Investment Corporation on Turgenev Square, and he chairs both the Realists Intellectual Club—the universally recognized brain center of left-of-centrists, and the Realists' Union. Formerly the first secretary of the oblast committee in Sverdlovsk for three years after Yeltsin, he was returned by Boris Nikolayevich to big politics for a short time in 1991, when he became chief executive officer of the presidential administration. Retirement of Yuriy Vladimirovich, whose staff maneuvers were perceived to be the main threat to Gaydar's reforms, was an obsession of the capital's democratic community for at least a year. When Petrov was finally replaced by Filatov, and then Filatov was recently replaced by Yegorov, it was found that this did little to rectify Kremlin politics in general. Today Yuriy Petrov still has the ear of the highest officials, but he no longer feels that "influence" is a synonym of "presence," although he was observed to be present in the Russian delegation at the Gore-Chernomyrdin talks and during Yeltsin's trip to his homeland, in Yekaterinburg. It is with the president that we began our conversation.

[Mulin] Yuriy Vladimirovich, you know the president well. And you are probably aware that people who are ready to concede to the inevitability of Zyuganov's victory do so on the basis of the notion that Yeltsin's life as a politician has ended, and he is unable to push the country ahead any further. As the leader of the Realists' Union, do you agree with this appraisal?

[Petrov] Could he do something more? He could, if he were to correct his stated course. If he were to select a team that will implement this course with regard for accumulated experience, and will move matters forward. At this stage he no longer needs to do all of the busy work—he bears the responsibility for the country's fate, including for the promises he made so loudly in the past and the ones he will have to make in the election campaign. I think that elections are generally hard on any politician, while presidential elections are a serious trial for anyone who takes on this task and accepts the nomination, including a moral trial.

The opposition always has the advantage: Its position is easier and better because it can criticize specific mistakes and actions without saying anything about the positive things that have been done. Yeltsin had been in the opposition himself, and his current opponents have specific complaints against him, justifiable in many ways. As for what he intends to do further, and they ways and means by which he intends to set things straight, is another matter. What do people mean when they say that communists want to turn things back? Back to what? To a fully planned economy? I never heard anyone say that. A total overhaul of property ownership? I for example also feel that if mistakes were made in privatization, then certain enterprises and even sectors need to be nationalized under the principles of a market economy. There are examples of such a thing everywhere in the world economy.

[Mulin] When Yeltsin was the leader of the opposition, this was a progressive phenomenon for those days: Ideas were suggested that moved the country forward. As you yourself said, the present course of the government is exhausting itself. Even if the president stays, won't this be a team of a different sort?

[Petrov] He himself said that the first correction in course is to protect the Russian commodity producer and protect the investment process, and then on this basis the social problems that have grown acute and are no longer tolerable could be solved. The people's standard of living must be raised, and it can be raised only by restoring our production, goods, and services. The reforms were conceived so that more would be produced for the people, and so that their purchasing power would be raised, but unfortunately the reverse occurred.

Everyone who stands on constructive principles, and who is certain that our movement must be evolutionary, proceeding step by step and capitalizing even on the extremely painful experiences of the last years of economic reform, must support Yeltsin today. The president and his supporters must adopt many ideas of the opposition. And after that, they need to form the government very carefully, though not according to the principle of personal devotion, and not strictly along party lines. The vacant offices—of ministers and deputy chairmen— need to be filled competitively, by selection of the best.

[Mulin] Before the elections, or after?

[Petrov] I think that there's nothing standing in the way right now. Why wait for some kind of shadow cabinet to come into power if the issue demands its resolution now? Things need to be decided now, without waiting for the elections: Three months in the country's life are not a short time, they are a quarter of a year, and it is important for the government to work and for the wheels to turn during these three months. A real president is in power, and he has to do his job.

[Mulin] Do you feel that an abrupt correction in course will do more good than harm?

[Petrov] Yes, I think so. But you must understand that all changes take their own time: No matter how much we tell an apple to ripen faster, it won't.

[Mulin] Do you feel that it is a plus or a minus that practically no serious political party force is standing behind the president, with the exception perhaps of the NDR [not further identified], which was created as the "party in power"?

[Petrov] This is one of the costs of political pluralism. By the next presidential elections I think we will arrive at distinct party affiliations of candidates. But there are apprehensions as well. A person who comes from a particular party is connected to it by ties of discipline, and a sufficiently strong positive, constructive influence may be exerted upon him. But other things could happen as well: Orthodox forces might win in the communist party. I myself don't have much faith in that, but there is movement in that direction, and rather active at that.

[Mulin] Everything is evolving objectively to a point where sooner or later a party with a social democratic orientation will arise. When? On the basis of whom—Zyuganov, Popov, or perhaps you?

[Petrov] The party presently headed by Zyuganov will stay communist. That it continues to drift in the direction of social democracy is another matter: This is evident both in the program principles and in the statements of the leaders. Extremes are harmful, and everyone has come to feel this. Gavriil Popov and his friends conducted a congress of unification, and we in the Realists' Union have discussed the prospects of transforming our movement into a party many times, only one with a more clearly expressed socialist orientation.

The tragedy of social democracy in Russia is that there are too many leaders, but no parties, because there are no real leaders among them. Collective leadership is a good thing, but what we need now is a person who, first of all, will devote himself to this work, and second, will be accepted both by the political elite and by the people, a person who is not engaged, who is not shopworn, I would say. New people need to come to politics. Can you understand that?

[Mulin] What structure could assume the organizational side of things? It's no secret, after all, that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation came into being basically not due to the conservatism of the masses but owing to the organizational capabilities of Zyuganov and Kuptsov.

[Petrov] This is not a business for dilettantes. It isn't something that can be done concurrently with two or three other obligations and concerns. Our Realists' Union is consulting with a number of parties and movements with our left-of-centrist orientation, as we call it. We could become one of the "bricks" at the foundation of a new party that would protect and defend the interests of the people.

[Mulin] Won't the fact that you rather openly support the current president hinder the party's establishment?

[Petrov] Whether he is accepted or not, each of us will have to make our own choice, and unfortunately the choice is not the best one would hope for. We are talking about a party that will take shape, be established, and work after the elections. The party's development itself will occur more in the third and fourth quarters of the year.

[Mulin] Do you exclude participation of a person like Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in the party's creation?

[Petrov] Well, I personally do. What he himself wants to do is another question, but I think that for him, this is a stage that has already been traveled. It isn't necessary now. During the time of a party's initial establishment, it should not contain persons whose acceptance in society is questioned.

[Mulin] Then what about Luzhkov, whom Gavriil Popov called one of the most promising leaders of Russian social democracy?

[Petrov] I think that in terms of his convictions, Yuriy Mikhaylovich doubtlessly stands on the positions of social democracy and left-wing social democracy—it's all in the terminology—and he could certainly be such a leader. But he has always said that he would want to focus on economic work, and it must be said that things have been working out excellently for him. God grant that such a governor or mayor, one who could organize and conduct business in this way, would be in every city and oblast in our country.

[Mulin] What about the feeling of uncertainty that dogged the Russian delegation during the Gore-Chernomyrdin talks, and which you expressed to the audience during a meeting of the Realists' Club? Has it passed?

[Petrov] I was talking then about the atmosphere in Washington. Unfortunately I don't know what is going on there now, but over here, things are becoming clearer. The landmarks have become more distinct, and in my opinion the main conclusion has become obvious: Only we can save ourselves. No one needs a strong Russia except us. This is a special country. This is Russia. This is something that no politician should ever forget.

Russia: View of Zyuganov, Yeltsin as Only Viable Candidates Scored

964F1582A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Yuriy Yakovlevich Lyubashevskiy, "Diagilev-Center" president, under "Politics" and "Carte-Blanche" rubrics: "Russia's Historic Chance: a Vote for Grigoriy Yavlinskiy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The nearly historical unavoidability of a choice is being persistently imposed upon Russian society: Yeltsin or Zyuganov. The other candidates—Lebed, Zhirinovskiy, Yavlinskiy—are only noted by other authors,—so that people don't think they aren't aware of them. Zhirinovskiy is most frequently named in order to add to the problem of Zyuganov: "What do you want, a choice between Zhirinovskiy and Zyuganov?" And who would want that?

It is complicated to praise the president, and the most intelligent of his allies say: yes, our president has his flaws, yes, he has made more than a few mistakes, maybe he isn't even a democrat—but, after all, you don't want Zyuganov for president? But only Yeltsin can stop Zyuganov! Many have taken hold of this weak idea, among whom there are definitely people of intelligence and conscience, who obviously for some reason don't know what they're doing. Boris Nikolayevich, himself, with his usual directness and, in my opinion, with complete sincerity, actually says to the democrats: "Where else can you go?"

Zyuganov's allies—naturally, not from the KPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation]—are saying something like: yes, Zyuganov has not enough "red, not enough left," or "it's too bad that he hasn't given up Marxism," and so on, but who besides Zyuganov will be able to conquer Yeltsin and bring down the hated regime?

The state of blindness brought on by the "unavoidable"—the Yeltsin-Zyuganov choice—makes it difficult even to imagine a different danger: it is exactly in this case that Zyuganov can win, and not because people are "for Zyuganov," but because they are "against Yeltsin."

Let us try a somewhat different approach to the aspirants' chances. As surveys show (people have come to believe in them), and as the majority of analysts feel, Zyuganov will be able to get, both in the first and second rounds, about 30 percent of the votes. I think that this figure is the maximum, and perhaps, inflated—I will explain below. We will observe something else, as well: according to the data from many polls, no less than 60 percent of voters would not vote for Zyuganov at any time. This share is of nearly the same significance as the number of people who reject communism and the return of the communist party to power (under any name). These are people who support reforms, democracy, who may be dissatisfied with the way things are today, but who feel that there is no way back. Pay attention: these people, who constitute the majority of voters, in the absence of "their own" candidate will vote "against all candidates," and will not let Zyuganov become president.

Unfortunately, Yeltsin is facing a similar situation. Today, according to survey data, the number of his allies has grown to ten percent, and, theoretically, may grow to 20 percent, which could allow Yeltsin to make the second round. But, after all, something like 60 percent of voters will not accept Yeltsin. These are all the communists, all the social- and national-patriots, a great many democrats, regardless of their leaders' orders.

Fortunately, the same situation also exists for Zhirinovskiy. His positive maximum lies within those ten percent, maybe a little more, while those that are categorically against him number up to 70 percent.

Now, a somewhat unexpected statement: as of today and the foreseeable future, only Yavlinskiy and perhaps Lebed will be able to win a second round, and, most important, only with their participation will a second round occur. Here, Yavlinskiy most likely will win against any competitor, including Lebed, while Lebed's chances of winning against Zyuganov—border on being worth the risk.

Today, Yavlinskiy and Lebed, who have among their assets, according to average survey data, about ten percent of the allies each, have almost no enemies, especially Yavlinskiy. Adherents of Yeltsin, Zyuganov, Lebed and even Zhirinovskiy are prepared to vote for him as a "second choice." According to one of the surveys made in past years, over half of all surveyed expressed their lack of confidence in Yeltsin, Zyuganov and Zhirinovskiy. For Yavlinskiy, this number was 12 percent!

The entire experience of Russian elections has demonstrated that no transfer of votes takes place at the leader's command. If Gaydar's allies are going to vote for Yeltsin or for Yavlinskiy, they will do so at their own will. Their choice will depend upon their assessment of the situation, on the political behavior of all three of the above-mentioned political figures. Nor is it worth fearing that Zhirinovskiy will give away (or sell) his votes to anyone. And it is not worth buying them. You can sell or buy a vote in the Duma, but not in a voters' campaign.

Taking the above into consideration, let us examine the chances for Zyuganov, Yeltsin and Yavlinskiy in a second round. About 20 percent of his native KPRF could vote for Zyuganov, possibly fewer, since not all allies of the KPRF want to see Zyuganov president. And as for adherents of the other communist parties—not all; for many of them, Gennadiy Andreyevich is too respectable. And of the national-patriots, not all: for the same reasons. As a result, there is over 30 percent that Zyuganov won't get, and there are no other reserves.

Some of the adherents of NDR [Russia Is Our Home] could vote for Yeltsin, and maybe some of the KRO [Congress of Russian Communities] people. With the most favorable distribution and, perhaps, unfortunately, he will not get more than 20 percent in the first round, and if he goes on to the second, that figure will not get any higher. Again, there are no reserves. Communists of all hues will never vote for Yeltsin, nor will any national- or social-patriots. Yavlinskiy's allies will vote against him, regardless of the positions of Grigoriy Alekseyevich, himself.

Zhirinovskiy's people will not vote for Yeltsin, even if Vladimir Volfovich personally leads them into the fray.

Who can vote for Yavlinskiy if he goes into the second round? His own seven percent, which according to all the surveys reaches ten percent. No less than ten percent of Yeltsin's and the NDR's people. If there are more of these—so much the better, then Grigoriy Alekseyevich's chances rise immeasurably. I am afraid that in this case, Yeltsin's allies won't have anywhere else to go, and this will be the right choice. Nearly all of Gaydar's people will vote for Yavlinskiy, I think, regardless of the leader's orders, some of the allies of both Fedorovs, of other democratic organizations, a portion of the KRO's people. Intelligent and careful communists who believe (and correctly believe!) that there should be a KPRF faction in the Duma, and that a communist president with a communist Duma is a dangerous combination will vote for Yavlinskiy.

We must not forget that in this case, the party of power with its serious capabilities and a large portion of the apparatus will be on Yavlinskiy's side. Yavlinskiy's love of peace, known to all, guarantees a lack of political feuding, and Yavlinskiy's numerically small personal command will force him after the victory to search for allies, and not set up "his people."

The Zyuganov-Lebed variation is resolved less simply and in another way. In this case, Zyuganov fails to capture some of the patriots' and the civilized nationals' votes (if such exist), the votes of government workers, the military, yes, and his own party members; Zyuganov's total percentage will be less than against Yavlinskiy.

Lebed, himself, will get, besides his faithful electorate, the votes of some allies of Yeltsin, Yavlinskiy, some of the democrats, Zyuganov's enemies, and finally, people who don't give a damn for any platforms, and who simply like this dashing and elegant retired general.

However, Lebed may also lose noisily to Zyuganov, especially if he renews his connection with an unpopular public force, or with unpopular politicians. But the sad part is that the chance that either Yavlinskiy or Lebed would make it into the second round is enormously small. Only a departure from the accustomed, imposed patterns, personal, intense meditations will let us escape from our intellectual cages and make our own decisions about the fate of our country and about our own fate. Perhaps, again, just as five or six years ago, the country's fate depends upon the leaders of opinion, people who write and speak, again the intelligentsia has a chance. For now, nearly all of it is obediently following a clearly imposed path.

Russia: Gennadiy Zyuganov Profiled

964F1581A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Mar 96 p 5

[Article by Andrey Vladimirovich Fedorov, associate of the "Political Research" Foundation, under rubric "Analysis," on the "Ideas and People" page: "Gennadiy Fedorov — On the Eve: Both He and His Party Are Ready for Victory"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the main results of the parliamentary election was the fact that only two persons proved to be in the category of "political heavyweights" in Russia —Boris Yeltsin and Gennadiy Zyuganov.

It is very important also that Gennadiy Zyuganov very quickly sensed his new political weight and made the proper conclusions. The first indicator of this was Zyuganov's refusal to participate in a discussion with the participation of Anatoliy Chubays on an "Itogi" [Results] program. Thus the leader of the KPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] unambiguously showed both his political opponents and his own supporters that he will converse only with an equal partner.

It is natural that, properly speaking, in the course of the preelection debate Zyuganov will encounter and discuss various topics with other candidates, but the chief conversation face to face is possible only with Yeltsin. Incidentally, it is already obvious today that no meaningful dialogue will occur. Both sides actually have an extremely small self-interestedness in this and are more inclined to assume a confrontational position.

What kind of a leader of the Communist Party do we have today, on the eve of the election?

'I'm Not a Charismatic'

Zyuganov today is not very similar to the person that he was two or three years ago. Today he is primarily a self-confident political figure who thinks out his moves carefully. He no longer has the need to prove his legitimacy or the legitimacy of the Communist Party — there has been a major turning point in the moods of society.

But one thing has remained unchanged — Zyuganov continues to lack charisma in the traditional understanding of that word. Another politician would turn himself inside out in order to create charisma for himself. But not Zyuganov. As a shrewd Western politician once said, you need charisma only when you want to carry out either a revolution or a counterrevolution. Zyuganov does not have any such intentions, at least any that he has ever expressed aloud. His public idea in the speeches he has made in recent years is evolution with a consideration of the historic experience of Russia and the Soviet Union.

Charisma was critically needed by Yeltsin on his path to power. By possessing it, Yeltsin managed to do practically the impossible — to travel the path from political lone wolf to the president of one of the largest world powers. Zyuganov's position today is different. He does not have to scramble to the top of anything in order to attract society's attention. Standing behind him is the country's largest and best organized political party. That is what provides him with the possibility of not particularly burdening himself with thoughts about charisma. The press attempts to catch every word of his, and his frequent appearances on the television screen, if we are to judge from the numerous public opinion polls, have been yielding tangible results. Directly or indirectly, the KPRF has more than 150 printed publications under its control throughout the country. For the time being, other candidates, including Yeltsin, are only making plans to operate a press center, but Zyuganov's press center is already operating and holding weekly press conferences.

A certain segment of the business circles has been rendering him a definite amount of assistance, although most frequently it is invisible to the outsider's eye. A number of major Russian banks are already making their contribution today to the financing of the election campaign of the leader of the Communists.

So those who today are saying that the noncharismatic Zyuganov will not receive the support needed to become the country's leader are seriously mistaken. Including, first of all, because Zyuganov himself understands his own lack of charisma and makes practical conclusions from that, which is something that not every politician is capable of doing.

He is beginning more and more to play according to the methodology used by the 1989-1990 model of Yeltsin himself — a politician who is accessible to the people and who communicates directly with the people. As the election approaches, against the background of the president's armed motorcades that stop traffic, this contrast will become increasingly noticeable.

It is typical that Gennadiy Zyuganov himself recently gave extremely strict instructions to his party colleagues, primarily those from the regions, that they were not to "get swept away" during their forthcoming trips to the regions of the country. The opponents here have seemingly exchanged roles.

It is already obvious that a key element in Zyuganov's election campaign will be the maximum use of the errors made by the current authority, rather than the revelation of any broad-scale prospect for a "bright future." A rather good team of analysts, plus the completely explainable voluntary and constantly intensifying leakage of information from the presidential and governmental apparatus, from the Moscow mayor's office, and many governors' offices noticeably facilitate for Gennadiy Zyuganov the waging of the fight for the presidential chair.

Zyuganov is intelligent enough to understand that everyone is expecting him, first of all, to correct the situation that has developed, rather than the total restructuring of Russian society in the spirit of the restorational model (which today, in principle, is already impossible), and this also frees him of the need to draw a picture of the future in all the details. So all the attempts of Zyuganov's opponents to force him to do that are doomed to failure. They must be ready for that. Fighting Zyuganov by the method of asking him questions such as "How will you reorganize the banking system?" is useless, because if any answer ensues, it will be extremely remote from reality. Gennadiy Andreyevich apparently has absolutely no intentions of showing his cards ahead of time.

It is also completely unpromising to attempt to fight Zyuganov by reading aloud various quotations from his numerous books and articles, inasmuch as, in reply, the attacker will receive a no less impressive package of quotations from Yeltsin or Gaydar. Moreover, I shall allow myself to express the idea that Zyuganov is today more self-interested than he has ever been before in the powerful anti-Communist wave that is being raised by the authorities (naturally, only with the proviso that that wave will rise just as inefficiently as it did before the most recent parliamentary election). In one of his statements the leader of the Communist Party stated outright that "counter-advertising of this kind only saves us millions of rubles and convinces people that the authority is feeble-minded."

Zyuganov's weak spot is the area of foreign policy. So Yeltsin, well aware of that fact, is blocking rather effectively all the Communist Party leader's possibilities, of whatever degree of reality, to strengthen his positions by presenting himself to the West as a moderate and carefully weighed politician with whom the West can work. At least one thing that has already been brought to the attention of all the leaders of the foreign countries who are planning to visit Moscow is the Kremlin's unambiguous opinion that meetings with Zyuganov must be excluded from the items scheduled during the trip. And apparently that is how it will be, although Yeltsin's foreign partners nevertheless are building informal bridges to Zyuganov, not excluding his victory and carefully considering all the possible consequences of that. Zyuganov, on his part, is doing only what he can do realistically — with enviable regularity he meets representatives of the foreign press in Moscow and with the maximum effectiveness uses any opportunity for communicating with the Western political elite, as occurred not too long ago at the World Economic Forum in Davos.

The main question that should be directed at Zyuganov may be, from my point of view, both on the part of Russian society and on the part of the West, is just one: who will succeed, and how will he succeed, in guaranteeing to society that, in the event of his victory in the presidential election, negative processes will not begin in the political sphere and in the economy, primarily those processes that are linked with the limitation of the citizens' rights and freedoms? As of today, there are no such guarantees, but the newspaper pages are being filled more and more with materials concerning the KPRF plans that are frightening the respectable man in the street.

The Corridors End...

Zyuganov today is carrying out the same work, in parallel with Yeltsin — he is attempting to represent himself as a figure who personifies the national consensus. It is clear that, for various reasons, neither one will succeed in doing this, and, as was previously said, the preelection polarization will inevitably lead to a situation in which, in May and June, the terms "red" and "white" will apparently be the most popular ones in the commentaries made by politicians and journalists.

In certain regards it will be more difficult and in other regards easier for Zyuganov than it will be for Yeltsin. As a beginning, it should be recalled that, from the formal point of view, Gennadiy Zyuganov is not a candidate to the position of president of the Russian Federation from the KPRF. He was nominated by an initiative group of citizens among whom definitely not all are party members. Correspondingly, he has been registered by the Central Electoral Commission with number 1 specifically as the "candidate from the people."

That is, from the very beginning the logic of the actions of the Communist leader was constructed on the precise awareness of the fact that Zyuganov is doomed to a search for political breadth that goes far beyond the framework of the ideology of the Communist Party. Moreover, naturally, this scheme was not simply coordinated with Gennadiy Andreyevich himself, but also was largely initiated by him. Including with a consideration of the too hasty attempts to unite the efforts in the past, particularly within the framework of "Consent in the Name of Russia."

The fact that the KPRF unanimously supported his candidacy as the party leader in the forthcoming presidential election was actually only a necessary formality, and that was understood perfectly by most of the people sitting in the auditorium.

From my point of view, what emerges from this for Zyuganov in the final analysis is the main problem in his campaign — his pre-election program. For a definite period of time he was able to get by with statements to the effect that he was guided by the program with which the KPRF was proceeding to the parliamentary election.

But it is already obvious that he simply cannot continue using that argumentation, especially within the framework of his impending trips across the country. As the potentially single candidate from the leftist-patriotic coalition that is developing, he is simply required to come forward with his own personal program, that differs from the many slogans and principles of the KPRF program.

It is here that the most complicated thing begins. So far Zyuganov has not provided a precise answer to the question of what path he will take. On the one hand, Viktor Anpilov wants to "straighten him out," and publicly at that (by demanding that he include the thesis of restoration of the Soviet authority in full volume and the immediate recreation of Gosplan). On the other hand, the possible alliance with Govorukhin, Lebed, Sv. Fedorov, and certain other politicians who are in opposition to Yeltsin and who view the KPRF with noticeable apprehension, requires (if only immediately before the second round of the voting) formulations that are unacceptable for many of his associates in the Communist Party leadership, especially with respect to private property and the question of the reconsideration of the results of privatization. One thing is 100-percent clear: in the coalition "under Zyuganov" no place will be found for Mikhail Gorbachev under any conditions.

This dual nature of Zyuganov's position, in my view, will be the chief destabilizing factor in his election campaign. He will have to prove publicly constantly, including from the television screen, that he is ready to be the leader of forces that cover a broad spectrum. Gennadiy Andreyevich can confirm these words only by demonstrating a "multipurpose" program, since otherwise the fight against him will be noticeably facilitated for his political opponents.

All that remains for us today is to see how wide Zyuganov's program corridor will prove to be. In any case he will be forced to make serious pledges publicly. But the entire question is whether Zyuganov will succeed, even in the event of his victory, to became a real guarantor of their implementation. Or will he become a hostage to his own party? As is well known, Yeltsin is an excellent example of this: after a victory, one's supporters frequently forget more quickly than one's opponents do.

In order to win, Zyuganov absolutely has to represent the "government of the nation's confiden[illegible]" (at least for a definite transitional period). Moreov[illegible] it is a government that should include rather brilliant individuals, rather than a gray mass of people who are unknown to the country, albeit they are selflessly devoted to the KPRF. That must be done by him no later than the beginning of May. Otherwise the political effect of that step will be insignificant.

We say 'Zyuganov' and we mean 'the party!' We say 'party' and we mean 'Zyuganov'!

It would be a tremendous error to say today that Zyuganov and the KPRF are twin brothers. Actually, within the KPRF, as within any other party, a very serious internal struggle of opinions and views is in progress. (And it is not only between generations, but also between "parliamentary Moscow" and the "contending regions." As admitted by a number of regional leaders of the KPRF, they are already being "stirred up by the compromises.") However, in the Communist Party, because of well-known reasons, that struggle is being carried out in a form that is concealed from the eyes of outsiders. There have been several situations during recent years when the fight for influence within the KPRF was waged in an extremely ferocious manner, but in all instances Zyuganov emerged as the winner.

To a large extent this is linked with the fact that Gennadiy Andreyevich knows how to listen to an opponent and not lash out wildly. In addition, such a strong "organization man" as Kuptsov, who realistically holds in his hands the threads of power, and primarily the connection with the regional organizations, is completely on Zyuganov's side. The KPRF apparatus actually has inherited from the CPSU effectiveness and a high state of discipline. If in the structures of the present authority the Kremlin's decisions were to be made known to the regions with the same timeliness and accessibility as is currently the case with the KPRF with respect to the party leadership's decisions, much in the country could be different.

Zyuganov's leadership in the party today cannot be realistically disputed by anyone. It is a fact that must be accepted without any special discussion. If things are set up correctly in the election campaign, that leadership may be strengthened irrespective of the final result. Although, naturally, one cannot preclude the possibility that, in the event of defeat, attempts to remove Zyuganov from his position of party leader will be resumed.

One cannot fail to recognize that Zyuganov operates rather skillfully, while not setting himself apart too much. This is especially visible on the basis of the work of the parliamentary faction of the KPRF, when frequently the decisive word is left for others, especially the very experienced Anatoliy Lukyanov.

Incidentally, this state of affairs also has its shortcomings. Actually the party today has proven to be in a situation when there are few brilliant figures in its ranks, and, among the highly intellectual political warriors who are capable of defending the line and positions of the KPRF in any auditorium, especially in front of the television cameras, one can name only a few — Svetlana Goryacheva, Gennadiy Seleznev (currently extremely constrained by his high position), Aman Tuleyev, Anatoliy Lukyanov, and Yuriy Ivanov. So Zyuganov objectively will have to assume the basic weight of the work, without counting too much upon the party ranks.

In addition, it can be seen by the naked eye that powerful blows are being struck at Zyuganov from the ranks of the Communist movement outside the KPRF. Garifullina's recent book and Golovenko's articles in MK and IZVESTIYA indicate that Gennadiy Andreyevich should not count on these rear areas to a considerable degree. Moreover, I am convinced and even know that within the forthcoming months he will have to experience two or three unpleasant moments because of published items of this kind. It must be said that events such as this are introducing a definite amount of discord into the KPRF ranks, especially in the outlying areas.

Today many people ask the question: does a "collective Zyuganov" exist? I will permit myself to say that there does. And, in certain respects, he is very similar to the "collective Yeltsin" — he is just as invisible (although the names are well known), but extremely influential and, as we get closer to the election, the degree of his influence will only increase. I am convinced that it is precisely the "collective Zyuganov" who will never allow Zyuganov the individual to cross over publicly the boundary that separates the Communist from the Western-type social democratic, for which Gennadiy Andreyevich on the whole, in my opinion, is ready.

Zyuganov is not blameless and he made a large number of mistakes in his political actions during the past five years. Each of them will exert its influence upon the election campaign: they are the voting o the KPRF faction in December 1991 in support of the decision concerning the collapse of the Soviet Union, the vacillations in the autumn of 1993, and many others. The recognition of the errors that was begun by Zyuganov himself, including on the pages of the press, sometimes leaves a dual impression. On the one hand, it is as though a person is publicly admitting his own mistakes, and,, on the other hand, what is obvious is a demonstration of his weakness in a situation when it was necessary to make a deliberate and decisive choice. And sometimes that is not forgiven...

But Zyuganov has one indisputable advantage over Yeltsin. Zyuganov, against a background of corrupt scandals in the presidential and governmental teams (the white-hot pitch of such investigations, I am convinced, will increase as the election nears) looks attractive. Zyuganov has clean hands: without any problems at all he handed over to the press a declaration about his income during the past two years. But if an attempt is made to "run over" him by accusing him of certain shady matters, he also something with which he can reply. It is already known right now that his team, and in particular the previously mentioned Yuriy Ivanov, has been collecting information extremely actively by way of various channels, concerning the royalties that Boris Yeltsin received for his books in the West and whether any taxes had been paid on those amounts of money. In this regard I would like to mention that a blow of this kind in the course of the recent presidential election in Poland had been struck by Kwasniewski at Walesa and the consequences of that step had exerted an important influence on the results of the voting.

Five Threats to Zyuganov on the Path to Power

Threat No. 1. Although in society today it is not generally the practice to speak publicly about it, there has been discussion of it in the lobby. We are talking about the threat of the physical elimination of Zyuganov. For many people, that alternative of the development of events appears to be so tempting that it may even become a reality. At a particular critical moment closer to the election, someone in Boris Yeltsin's entourage may simply have a nervous breakdown, and the well-known Stalinist principle "if there isn't a person, there isn't a problem" will be implemented. Naturally, in this instance Yeltsin will not even be informed. Those carrying out the deed will proceed from the feeling that "history justifies them."

So the recent decision by the KPRF leadership to intensify the protection of their leader is rather timely, although, practically speaking, it is difficult to carry out in practice. It remains only to hope that Russia will succeed in avoiding the pages of history that the United States experienced in the 1960's.

And it is also worthwhile thinking carefully about what is best for the authority today: to have at the head of the KPRF a person of moderate views, with whom one can seek a compromise, or to get in place of him a "hard line" politician, a kind of "pure Communist" of the Aman Tuleyev type?

Threat No. 2. This is the intensification in April-May of the political confrontation between the State Duma, on the one hand, and Boris Yeltsin and the government, on the other. Many things can serve as the reason — from the denunciation of the Belovezhskaya agreements and the refusal to ratify START-II, to a vote of no confidence in the government. This threat nevertheless can be deflected rather quickly, with a consideration of the state of discipline of the KPRF faction in the parliament and the role that is played by present State Duma Speaker Gennadiy Seleznev, who is increasingly taking into his hands the entire series of mechanism for managing the life of parliament. Confrontation is political unprofitable for Zyuganov, since it puts him in a rather complicated situation on the eve of the election. The image of a moderate politician may be easily destroyed by the pro-presidential mass media, as we have observed many times in recent years. In addition, the State Duma and its practical opportunities are objectively being used today by the KPRF and its allies to wage the election struggle, and it would be more than unreasonable to be deprived of that.

Threat No. 3. The disintegration, shortly before the election, of the planned coalition of the leftist and patriotic forces, which disintegration will simply make impossible a victory at the election with a consideration of the fact that the KPRF without allies will not be able to improve the parliamentary results significantly. The feeling of certain individuals in the party leadership that the electorate of all the potential allies, at least in the second round, "will vote for Zyuganov anyway" (Yeltsin uses approximately the same formulations with respect to the democrats) is actually far from the true state of affairs.

This threat is a real one both because of the dissatisfaction with Zyuganov's "opportunism" on the left (that dissatisfaction objectively will increase as the leftist-patriotic coalition expands), and because of the dissatisfaction that is already manifesting itself today with regard to the existence of "radicalism" (especially in the sphere of the economy — wide-scale nationalization) on the right.

Nor can one discount the age-old problem of the "dividing of the portfolios." For Zyuganov this is a vitally important matter to a degree that is no way less than for Yeltsin.

Threat No. 4 is the "obliging fools" who, for completely understandable reasons, have been appearing around Zyuganov —and this is completely obvious.

Threat No. 5 is linked with the May holidays. A repetition of the tragic events of 1 May 1993 in Moscow in any form, even a softened form, may instantaneously put an end to Zyuganov's chances of becoming president. It is already obvious today that the KPRF leadership will have to use all means to prevent an undesirable development of events.

If all these threats remain only potential, then Gennadiy Zyuganov's chances of coming to power by the voting day will only increase, especially since the present authority is managing to make so many errors that at times one can only be astonished.

Gennadiy Andreyevich himself, in my deep conviction, is ready for power. He represents rather clearly exactly how it should be managed. But his team's readiness — naturally, with a definite exception — evokes big doubts. Many of those in the entourage of the KPRF leader do not understand what profound changes have occurred in the country's life or that the power structures and leadership methods from the recent past will lead to the collapse of power as such.

As for the main question — is the nation ready to see Gennadiy Zyuganov as the country's leader and the bearer of practically unlimited presidential power — the answer will be provided only by the election itself. If it occurs...

Russia: OGONEK Views Lebed Candidacy

964F1538A Moscow OGONEK in Russian Mar 96 No 11, pp 15-17

[Comments by various authors regarding candidacy of Aleksandr Lebed for President of the Russian Federation, compiled by OGONEK]

[FBIS Translated Text]

[Begin boxed material]

Aleksandr Lebed—Selected Comments

ABOUT HIMSELF:

—I am a cat who prowls alone.

—Before I was a soldier, and everything was clear to me. But now I live in a different world.

—I have been taught by many smart people. They taught me many things, except one—how to lose. Once I have joined the fight, I do not intend to give in to any promises from the right or from the left.

—There will never be a place for me in the government of either the current President of Russia Boris Yeltsin, or in that of the communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov.

ABOUT COMMUNISTS:

—My program differs significantly from the program of the communists. We have departed too far from that shore (referring to the former communist regime in the former USSR). It has become hidden in the fog, and we will never again return to it. We have only to go forward.

—I have not found a single party raykom [rayon committee] secretary who, like Salvador Aliende, would take a "shmaiser" in hand and say: "I will die, but I will not give up power." On the contrary, they have all happily retreated to their previously prepared commercial positions.

ABOUT GRACHEV:

—He even taught me to play cards. We fought together in Afghanistan. It was there that, in about 1987, our paths began to diverge. At first Grachev gained fame for saving people. Then for his high degree of discipline.

He had no crimes. On paper. Pavel Sergeyevich quickly understood that every official misstep corresponds to a monetary equivalent. Therefore, he was famous for his "hospitality." At that time he did not waste ambassadors, envoys, attaches, advisors and the lackeys who served them...

ABOUT A STRONG HAND:

—I crashed down a fist upon his jaw, putting into it everything that had welled up in me. His teeth chattered, he slid along the tile floor for several meters and, hitting his head upon the door at the other end of the corridor, became quiet. And then he silently went toward the exit.

—I silently and strongly hit him in the jaw.

—I had to recall everything I had ever been taught, and had to work with my fists for glory.

—I was suddenly indignant. The leader of the "rationalizers" took it in the jaw and grew quiet, having slid along the floor into the corner. Across him fell his first deputy. On top, next to and on the side of them, nine more "rationalizers" fell. Only one turned out to be strong. I had to hit him twice.

ABOUT CHECHNYA:

—One gets the impression that an openly criminal mafia regime was being lovingly nurtured in Chechnya, which paid up until a certain moment. Then, when it realized that it had gotten strong enough, had grown up and could tell the older brother where to go, it stopped paying. It had to be punished. But how can one punish it?

—The roots must be cut off in Moscow. Why give aid to a republic in which they are killing builders? There should be no builders, no building materials, no money until full cessation of military actions, except for humanitarian aid: medicine and food.

—The ones in power should have fought against the cause, and not the effect. We should not have closed our eyes to the extremist-oriented Dudayev, Basayev and other fighters who did not keep their word, much less conduct negotiations with them.

Could we not have destroyed them back in the Summer of last year, if even journalists easily got interviews with them?

—I have had occasion to see a lot of combat, and I affirm this fact: There are enough scoundrels in war on both sides—rape and sadism—all of this is present on both sides. This is the terrible division into "ours" and "not ours" which was undertaken by Nevzorov and those like him.

[End boxed material]

A political scientist's view: His train pulled out in the Summer

...by Igor Klyamkin, "Public Opinion" Fund

Lebed reached his peak of popularity at about the middle of last Summer. That unexpected rise was associated with the fact that Lebed satisfied the rather mass demand which existed in society for a consolidating figure. Therefore, it is characteristic that the communists as well as the followers of Zhirinovskiy and the proponents of "Yabloko," and even part of Gaydar's supporters, all sympathized with him.

And why specifically Lebed? First of all, at that time he appeared not as an ideological figure (and when there is a prevalent disenchantment in society with all ideologies, this is rather significant). He seemed to break the barriers between the traditional political niches, promising to become an all-national leader. Secondly, he embodied (perhaps more as a result of his charismatic appearance) the idea of order. Thirdly, being a military man, he spoke out against the war in Chechnya. The latter circumstance in combination with the second one became particularly attractive for his supporters.

All this fully corresponds to the basic peculiarity of the post-Soviet man: On one hand, he is nostalgic for "order," and on the other—he does not want any shocks, he does not want this order to be associated with the application of force. It is therefore not surprising that the statements of a combat general against the war in Chechnya became that last argument which brought him the sympathies of the voters.

However, starting sometime in mid-Fall, Lebed's popularity began to wane. I have already had occasion to write about this in OGONEK. The Congress of Russian Communities (CRC), with which he associated his pre-electoral hopes at that time, did not add to his popularity a bit (as we know, the CRC itself was not elected to the Duma). There were several reasons for this. One may complain that Lebed was weakly "developed" by the mass media, being edged out by Skokov (the reason is serious, but secondary in importance). We may blame him for the fact that he knowingly agreed to be second (for a politician who is perceived as an all-national figure, this was inadmissable). However, the main reason lies elsewhere: Having joined a definite ideology, whose bearer is the Congress of Russian Communities, Lebed immediately lost his primary advantage—the image of a nonideologized politician. From the standpoint of the prospects of becoming an all-national leader, he then lost very much. I would say—everything...

The current efforts to somehow compensate for the Fall losses, the changeover to a certain consolidating rhetoric will unlikely be of any help to him now. He used up his chance, and the train, as they say, has pulled out.

Moreover, one gets the impression that Lebed is, at the present time, generally not ready for the role of a public politician of national scope. Even if he were able to restore his Summer level of popularity, this would probably not be enough to aspire to the role of first person in the state. His unintelligible statements in the mass media, including on television, testify to the fact that he lacks some clarity of positions, and simply political and economic training. And, it seems, he has no compensating qualities. He cannot play either the role of a professional such as Yavlinskiy, or, say, a charismatic leader such as the "early" Yeltsin. So that, in any case, his chances appear extremely doubtful.

Will they increase as a result of Lebed's unification with numerous groupings which have not joined either the "party of power" or the communists? It is unlikely. After all, the Lebed voter is quite different from that of, say, Svyatoslav Fedorov. And there is no reason to believe that there will be some mechanical addition of their electorates as a result of the unification of these leaders. Most likely there will be losses, and I am not sure that the total sum of votes will be enough to reach the run-offs, even if they agree on a single candidate.

Nevertheless, if we allow, purely hypothetically, that Lebed becomes president, what awaits the Russian citizen? Of his preelectoral declarations, he may partially fulfill only the promise of army reform. In everything else he falls into that space of political struggle and those real tendencies which today embody, on one hand the TEK [fuel-energy complex] and the export sectors which have profited from liberalization, and on the other hand—the VPK [military-industrial complex] and the power structures. And he, of course, would implement the same line which has already realistically been outlined on the Russian political scene and represented by such figures as Soskovets, Korzhakov and others. If we define the political tendency, then in rough approximation it may be defined as follows—from Chernomyrdin to Soskovets.

A psychologist's view: You cannot hit every one in the face...

...by Leonid Gozman, psychologist

The image of General Lebed which has been formulated in the mass consciousness is not so much a reflection of his inherent properties as the projection of certain fears and hopes of his fellow countrymen. Yet in order for these fears and hopes to be projected onto you, you yourself must be, as strange as this may seem, a rather undifferentiated figure, a kind of projection screen, a clean slate on which public consciousness may draw any figure.

While Aleksandr Ivanovich sat in Tiraspol, he fulfilled this very symbolic role. Yet when he left the 14th Army and joined big politics, he lost much, because he became... concrete.

Neverthess, what kind of man he is remains largely unknown. For the general public, information about him emanates primarily from him. From this standpoint, his autobiographical book, "I Hurt for This Great Country," is undoubtedly of some interest. Then again, it is not very important which Lebed this is—the real one, or the one which he would like to see himself as.

What is interesting about this autobiography? He is constantly emphasizing (this even seems to happen by itself) that he is against the system. The system is unjust, the system is incorrect. His run-ins with the system may end in failure (for example, his numerous unsuccessful efforts to get into flight school). Or they may turn out to be quite successful (as, for example, the tastefully described interview in the CPSU Central Committee before his approval for the position of division commander). He was approved, found to be worthy, although the interview itself left him with a sense of "humiliation which I have not experienced before or since." Which, we might add, is rather strange for a party member, an officer who has had occasion to be in worse situations.

If the system is unjust, it is necessary to establish fairness. The desire is quite noble, were it not for HOW he establishes it. With his fist!!!

The taste, if not to say savoring (which is especially worrisome), with which he describes physical violence and blows to the jaw of an enemy. Fights may be described in various ways. They can be described as Dumas does in the "Three Musketeers," when after a successful thrust of the sword the opponent seems to fade away somewhere... No blood, no mud, no corpses. Or one can show a fight as in an American action film: With crunching of bones, streams of blood smeared on the wall, etc. Aleksandr Ivanovich Lebed, in his own description, is closer, of course, to the hardened lawman from an American Western than he is to D'Artagnian.

His tale of dealing with the "old men-rationalizers" who thought up sadistic "experiments" to be conducted on the young people is particularly indicative. I cannot help but sympathize with a commander who tries to bring about order among his subordinates and eradicate "hazing." Yet what is surprising and alarming is something else: That a man who aspires to the position of head of state does not even examine the variant of administrative punishment or, for example, handing the "old men" over to the court. He brings about justice himself. And again—with his fist. From his standpoint, this is the triumph of justice. But from the standpoint of the victims—was the retribution sufficient? And the main thing—is there some assurance that one blow with the fist put an end to the "hazing", or did it simply go underground?

The image of himself which Aleksandr Lebed creates (we cannot exclude that in reality he is an entirely different person), this image is somewhat alarming. Perhaps it is good to have such a battalion commander or chief at work, and we cannot exclude the possibility that someone would like to have an older brother or father like this. That is possible... But I doubt very much that the country would be lucky if it were to get such a president. Our country is big, you cannot punch everyone in the face. That means, it will be necessary to delegate the right to bring about justice to someone else. Even if Aleksandr Ivanovich himself is a man with a crystal-clear soul (and I have no reason to doubt this), will it not happen that those men to whom he delegates this right will be not so pure of soul, not so just?

President... President?

Viktor ILYUKHIN (Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Security, CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] faction)

I never considered him to be much of a politician, much less a state leader. The mass media have created the image of a hero and savior who put an end to the war in the Dniester region. The fact is, it was the the Dniester residents who defended and protected themselves.

Lebed acted more as the destroyer of the Dniester region. This is noted both by President Smirnov and the fighters of the former Riga OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] which went there after the well-known events of 1991. At that time, criminal cases were filed against many of them, and they were sought by the Latvian authorities. And Lebed betrayed all of them, divulged who was living under what surname. How can he act as the defender of Russia and the Russian people?

In Russia there are generals who are risking their lives in this very same Chechnya. On their background, Lebed pales.

Vladimir LUKIN (Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, "Yabloko" faction)

Lebed has a constitutional right to be nominated to the role of president, just as any commander of a division, regiment, platoon or army. Anything is possible, only I do not know what will happen after that. Well, suppose they elect him—then what? Does anyone know what he intends to do? Does he himself know?

I appraise very highly Aleksandr Ivanovich's manner of speaking idiomatically, as for example: "Stupidity is not the absence of mind, it is a kind of mind." But, you must agree, it is not enough to know how Russia should develop in a macroeconomic respect, what the relationship is between the economic positions of the regions and, we will presume, the subjects of the federation, and what the basic principles of self-government are.

He may also appear as a strict nationalist, as well as an ally of the communists. Sometimes he is a defender of democracy and almost a democrat, and sometimes he likes Pinochet.

And all together this creates a a sense of some kind of basic confusion.

Aleksey MITROFANOV (LDPR [Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia] faction)

As a work colleague in the Duma, I cannot help but observe him: He is very colorless, it seems that even his suit bothers him. He should be wearing something sporting... He does not speak in public much, he only once said something about the airborne forces. That is, he has not shown himself to be any kind of a professional politician.

But then what kind of a president would he be? Much less take away votes from anyone...

He was asked at a press conference what his attitude is toward the law on division of production. He did not have any attitude, because he does not understand anything about this. And so he said: "In the Army we used to say: You are an officer, so don't make a smart face." That was his joke.

Maybe he is a good man, but then in a purely professional sense... Perhaps he thinks that he will surround himself in the presidential post with assistants and advisors. But then we will have a leader such as Leonid Ilyich, who does not rule by himself. The general will beat his fist on the table for the public (which, I might add, is what the Belorussian bureaucrats want to make out of Lukashenko), while we go about our business and write everything off on him. But we need a leader...

Boris FEDOROV ("Onward, Russia!" Movement)

I assume that General Lebed was not a bad general. But when people who have difficulty in understanding what is going on in the country are nominated for president, they appear simply pathetic. A real military man must serve in the army. And one who wants to become a politician must sit for 5-10 years in the State Duma, and then after that be nominated somewhere.

I believe that a general's uniform is more becoming to him than a civilian suit, especially with the cap and visor, so that one cannot see his hair. After his television appearance, the most memorable thing was his unsmiling face. Even when he was asked a question to which he did not know the answer, he still tried to keep a gloomy silence. It seems this manner is his only weapon. Yevgeniy Kiselev asked him about the economic program. And Lebed answered: "I will say later." And that was such an embarrassment!

Aman TULEYEV (presidential candidate)

I consider the nomination of Lebed as candidate for the office of president to be not normal. After all, the people's-patriotic block, the left-wing opposition of the centrist ilk, nominated G. A. Zyuganov. After this, over 20 parties and movements supported this candidacy. We must work for a single candidate. And Lebed will be playing on this same field, and this will already lead to dispersion of votes. I believe that the game is on, and we cannot exclude the possibility that he has some kind of agreement with the democrats. You stick your head out, take a look, then sniff around, and when you have sniffed out the situation, define which way you are going—here or there.

Nikolay RYZHKOV (leader of the "People's Power" parliamentary group)

The fact that Lebed is running for president is his own personal matter. And we in our deputy group, "People's Power," of which he was a member up until 5 March, had a calm attitude toward this. After all, we have three candidates for president in our group. Aside from him there is also Sv. Fedorov and Govorukhin. Before his departure, I spoke with Lebed, clarifying his reasons for leaving us. He told me that he has made a final decision to fight for the office of president, and does not want to be associated with any deputy group. He will be independent.

Views of Moscow Residents

Rating of those aspiring to the office of President of Russia, based upon the results of an express-survey conducted on 2-3 March 1996 by VTsIOM [All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion]

B. YELTSIN - 20

G. ZYUGANOV - 13

G. YAVLINSKIY - 8

Sv. FEDOROV - 6

A. LEBED - 5

V. ZHIRINOVSKIY - 4

Ye. GAYDAR - 4

Other candidate - 3

Do not know yet whom to vote for - 20

Do not intend to vote - 11

Do not know whether I will vote - 6

Russia: Ministry, Committee List Amended

964F1499A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Mar 96 p 6

[Article: "Amendments and Changes to the List of Complete and Abbreviated Names of Ministries and Other Federal Agencies of the Executive Authority of the Russian Federation (direction of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation and the Apparatus of the RF Government, dated 2 February 1994, No. 180"]

[FBIS Translated Text] 1. The following is to be removed from the List of Complete and Abbreviated Names of Ministries and Other Federal Agencies of the Executive Authority of the Russian Federation:

RF Department of Tax Police — DNP Rossii.

2. The following is to be included in the section "Other Federal Agencies of the Executive Authority" in the indicated List:

RF Federal Tax Police Service — FSNP Rossii.

Basis: Edict of the President of the Russian Federation, dated 14 February 1996, No. 197.

[Signed] V. Yu. Shustitskiy, chief of the Clerical Affairs Administration of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, [Signed] V. Kurenkov, deputy to the Head of the Apparatus of the RF Government.

0503p-P36
20 February 1996

Russia: More Presidential Election Rules

964F1499B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Mar 96 p 6

[Decree: "Explanations Concerning the Procedure for the Actions of Authorized Agents of Candidates for the Position of President of the Russian Federation, Members of Electoral Commissions With the Right of a Consultative Vote, Authorized Representatives of Electoral Associations, Electoral Blocs, and Voter

Initiative Groups, Observers, and Representatives of the Mass Media During the Conducting of an Election of the President of the Russian Federation," approved by Decree of the RF Central Electoral Committee, dated 26 February 1996, No. 79/643-II]

[FBIS Translated Text] These explanations regulate, in conformity with the requirements of Federal Law entitled: "Election of the President of the Russian Federation" (hereinunder "Federal Law"), the procedure for the actions of authorized agents of candidates for the position of the president of the Russian Federation, members of electoral commissions with the right of consultative vote, authorized representatives of electoral associations, electoral blocs, and voter initiative groups, observers, and representatives of the mass media [SMI] during the conducting of an election of the president of the Russian Federation.

Hindering the legal actions of the indicated category of participants in the electoral process entails administrative or criminal responsibility in the procedure established by federal legislation.

1. Authorized Agents of Candidates for the Position of President of the Russian Federation

In conformity with Part 6 of Article 37 of the Federal Law, a candidate for the position of President of the Russian Federation who has been registered by the RF Central Electoral Commission can have as many as 200 authorized agents. Citizens of the Russian Federation who possess an active franchise can be authorized agents. The authorized agents are appointed on the basis of the candidate's declaration in written form and the personal declarations of authorized agents on behalf of the candidate, which must indicate the last name, first name, and patronymic, year of birth, place of work, position occupied, and place of residence of the authorized agent.

The RF Central Electoral Commission, after receiving the indicated documents, registers the candidates' authorized agents and issues to them identification cards of the established type.

For the period starting with the day of registration of the authorized agent until the day of the official publication of the overall results of the election of the President of the Russian Federation, the administration of the enterprise, institution, or organization, irrespective of the form of ownership, is required, on the basis of the personal declaration of the authorized agent, to grant him unpaid leave.

Authorized agents of candidates for the position of President of the Russian Federation have the right:

— to carry out, in any of the forms that are admissible by law and by the use of legal methods, electioneering and other activities that promote the election of the candidates, and to represent their election programs;

— to speak at pre-election conferences and meetings with the voters, and to participate in pre-election debates and discussions;

— to receive the necessary assistance from state agencies and agencies of local self-government in conducting pre-election conferences and meetings with the voters;

— to be present at sessions of electoral commissions;

— to be at the electoral precincts, including those in military units, during the conducting of the voting, the tallying up of the voters' votes, and summing up the voting results;

— to be acquainted with the documents of the electoral commissions, as well as the minutes concerning the results of the voting and the election results;

— to appeal the decisions and actions (inaction) of the electoral commissions and to be present during the consideration of complaints and declarations.

As a rule, no more than two authorized agents per candidate for the position of the President of the Russian Federation may be present at a session of an electoral commission at any level.

Authorized agents of the candidates do not have the right:

— to interfere in the work of the electoral commissions;

— to sign at the polling place for a voter at his request to obtain ballots, or to fill out the ballots for him in the booth, specially equipped place, or room for secret voting;

— to conduct informational television or radio programs (transmissions), to participate in throwing light upon the election by way of the mass media in the event that they are creative workers or officials of the editorial board of the mass media.

The candidates for the position of President of the Russian Federation who have appointed authorized agents have the right at any time to recall them, at which time the candidate or, on his instructions, an authorized representative of the electorial association, electoral bloc, or voter initiative group, sends the RF Central Electoral Commission a notification of the recall for the purpose of annulling the identification cards that were issued to those authorized agents. The candidates have the right, in the established procedure, to appoint new authorized agents to replace the ones who were recalled.

2. Members of electoral commissions with the right of consultative vote

In conformity with Articles 11, 12, 13, 14 of the Federal Law, candidates for the position of President of the Russian Federation who were registered by the RF Central Electoral Commission appoint one member each with the right of consultative vote to the RF Central Electoral Commission, the electoral commissions of subjects of the Russian Federation, and to all the lower-level electoral commissions.

Persons who cannot be a member of an electoral commission with right of consultative vote are: a candidate for the position of President of the Russian Federation, his authorized agents, the candidate's spouse or close relative, or individuals who are directly subordinate to the candidate.

The activities of the member of an electoral commission with right of consultative vote begin as of the moment that the appropriate electoral commission receives the application of the candidate for the position of President of the Russian Federation concerning the appointment of the commission member, which contains an indication of the last name, first name, patronymic, year of birth (and for persons 18 years of age, also the day and month), place of residence, and official or home telephone number of the member of the electoral commission. Members of territorial and precinct electoral commissions with the right of consultative vote, in accordance with the candidate's instructions, may be authorized representatives of electoral associations, electoral blocs, and voter initiative groups. The appropriate electoral commission issues to commission members with the right of consultative vote identification cards of the established type.

The member of an electoral commission with the right of consultative vote carries out his activities in conformity with the requirements of federal legislation and the standing rules of the electoral commission.

A member of an electoral commission with the right of consultative vote has the right:

— to take part in sessions of the electoral commission;

— to speak at sessions of the electoral commission, to make recommendations with regard to questions that are within the competency of the appropriate electoral commission, and to require the conducting of a vote concerning them;

— to ask other session participants questions in conformity with the agenda and to receive substantive answers to them;

— to be acquainted with any documents or materials of the appropriate electoral commission or of electoral commissions at a lower level, and to receive certified copies of those documents.

Members of electoral commissions with the right of consultative vote can be part of working groups to monitor the observance by participants in the electoral process of the procedure and rules for conducting electioneering in the mass media, and the use of an automated information system, or of other groups formed by the electoral commissions.

Members of electoral commissions with the right of consultative vote do not have the right to participate in the voting during the making of a decision by the electoral commission, to take part in computing the voters' votes at the electoral precinct on the voting day, or to conduct electioneering, or to disseminate any electioneering materials.

In conformity with Part 8 of Article 19 of the Federal Law, the powers of the members of the RF Central Electoral Commission and the electoral commissions of the subjects of the Russian Federation with the right of consultative vote continue until the end of the registration of the candidates for the position of the President of the Russian Federation at the next election in the event that the candidate who has appointed them is elected President of the Russian Federation. The powers of the other members of those electoral commissions with the right of consultative vote end 30 days after the official publication of the results of the election of the President of the Russian Federation. The term of the powers of the members of territorial and precinct electoral commissions with the right of consultative vote expires simultaneously with the term of the powers of those electoral commissions.

3. Authorized representatives of electoral associations, electoral blocs, and voter initiative groups.

In conformity with Article 30 of the Federal Law, electoral associations, electoral blocs, and voter initiative groups appoint their representatives who are empowered to represent them in all matters that are linked with the participation of the electoral association, electoral bloc, or voter initiative group in an election of the President of the Russian Federation, including financial matters.

Authorized representatives may be appointed at a congress (conference) of the electoral association, electoral bloc, or its directing agency, or at a meeting of the voter initiative group. The electoral association, electoral bloc, and voter initiative group independently determine the number of authorized representatives and formalize, in the legally established procedure, one power of attorney for all the representatives, or a power of attorney for each of them separately.

After receiving from the electoral associations, electoral blocs, and voter initiative groups the documents established in Articles 32, 33 of the Federal Law, the RF Central Electoral Commission registers the authorized representatives of the electoral associations, electoral blocs, and voter initiative groups and issues registration cards to them. From the moment of receiving them, the authorized representatives have the right to begin the collection of voters' signatures in support of the candidate who has been nominated by electoral association, electoral bloc, and voter initiative group for the position of President of the Russian Federation.

The authorized representatives of the electoral association, electoral bloc, and voter initiative group:

— submit to the RF Central Electoral Commission the minutes containing the decision of the congress (conference) of the electoral association, electoral bloc, and voter initiative group concerning the nomination of the candidate for the position of President of the Russian Federation;

— certify the signature lists during the collection of voters' signatures in support of the candidate for the position of President of the Russian Federation;

— count up the number of voters' signatures that were collected in support of the candidate for the position of President of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Russian Federation and beyond its confines, and prepare minutes concerning the totals of the signatures collected;

— submit to the RF Central Electoral Commission no later than 1800 hours on 16 April 1996 the signature lists in support of the candidate for the position of President of the Russian Federation, as well as other documents for registering the candidate;

— receive from the RF Central Electoral Commission the confirmation in written form (statement) of the receipt of the signature lists and the other documents;

— have the right to be present during the verification by the RF Central Electoral Commission of the correctness of the formalization of the signature lists and other documents;

— carry out electioneering activities, and disseminate electioneering materials;

— have the right to participate in castings of lots being carried out by the RF Central Electoral Commission and the electoral commissions of subjects of the Russian Federation to determine the procedure for granting of air time to the candidates, electoral associations, electoral blocs, and voter initiative groups on the channels of Russia-wide and regional television and radio companies;

— have the right to be present at sessions of electoral commissions;

— carry out other powers that have been established by federal legislation, as well as by the electoral association, electoral bloc, or voter initiative group.

At a session of an electoral commission at any level, authorized representatives have the right to be present if they represent the electoral association, electoral bloc, or voter initiative group with regard to the question being considered by the appropriate electoral commission.

Authorized representatives of electoral associations, electoral blocs, and voter initiative groups do not have the right to exert an influence on the voters by promises to hand over monetary funds, securities, or other material wealth, to give them monetary funds, gifts, or other material assets, other than for the execution of pre-election organizational work (performance of duty at the polls, collection of signatures, etc.), to carry out the preferential resale of goods, to disseminate free of charge any goods, with the exception of printed materials, including illustrated one, or badges that have been specially manufactured for the election campaigns.

Observers

In conformity with Articles 14 and 20 of the Federal Law, on the voting day, from the moment of the opening of the polls until the signing by members of the precinct electoral commission with the right of the deciding vote of the minutes concerning the results of the polls, observers who have been sent by the candidates for the position of President of the Russian Federation, public associations (that have been registered by the RF Ministry of Justice) and electoral associations, electoral blocs, and voter initiative groups have the right to be present. A candidate, electoral association, electoral bloc, voter initiative group, or their authorized representatives, as well as a public association through its authorized agencies, have the right to appoint to any of the precinct electoral commissions one observer each.

The observer's power must be certified in written form by the candidate, public or electoral association or electoral bloc. The document that certifies the observer's powers must indicate his last name, first name, and patronymic, place of residence, and the number of the electoral precinct to which he is being sent. The document is valid with the presentation of a passport or identity card that replaces it. The providing of prior notification to the precinct electoral commission that an observer is being sent to the electoral precinct is not required.

An observer has the right:

— to be in the voting area of the appropriate electoral precinct on the voting day, including the electoral precinct in a military unit;

— to be present during the showing by the chairman of the precinct electoral commission of the ballot boxes before they are sealed and before they are opened after the completion of the voting;

— to be acquainted with the voter lists;

— to be present when voters are casting their vote outside the polling place area in the event that the voters are unable, for reasons of health or for other valid reasons, to go to the polling place;

— to be present when the members of the precinct electoral commission with the right of decisive vote are tallying up and canceling the unused ballots;

— to be acquainted with the minutes of the appropriate electoral commissions concerning the voting results and to receive certified copies of them;

— to make recommendations and comments to the chairman of the precinct electoral commission with regard to matters of organizing the voting;

— to appeal the actions (inaction) of the precinct electoral commission to the territorial electoral commission; or of the precinct electoral commission of an electoral precinct formed outside the confines of the territory of the Russian Federation to the RF Central Electoral Commission or the court.

An observer does not have the right:

— to sign for a voter on his request to obtain ballots at the polling place;

— to fill out for a voter on his request the ballots in the booth, specially equipped place, or room for secret voting;

— to commit actions that hinder the members of the precinct electoral commission from carrying out their functions.

The observer immediately leaves the voting area if his actions violate the secrecy of voting or if he attempts to influence the expression of the voter's will. The decision concerning this is made by the precinct electoral commission.

5. Representatives of the mass media

In conformity with the statutes in the Federal Law, representatives of the mass media have been called upon to provide the public with complete, objective, and reliable information concerning the progress of the election of the President of the Russian Federation at all stages of the election campaign.

As participants in the electoral process, representatives of the mass media have the right:

— to be present at sessions of electoral commissions, guaranteeing the publicity and openness of their activities;

— to be acquainted with decisions of the appropriate electoral commissions and to transmit copies of the decisions for publication in the mass media;

— to be present at public pre-election functions and to throw light on the rate of their execution in the mass media;

— to be at the electoral precincts on voting day during the conducting of the voting, and also during the tallying up of the votes cast and the preparation of the minutes concerning the voting results by the precinct electoral commissions;

— to be acquainted with the minutes of the electoral commissions concerning the voting results.

At sessions of the RF Central Electoral Commission, representatives of the mass media who have been accredited at the RF Central Electoral Committee have the right to be present.

Representatives of the mass media — journalists, officials of the editorial boards of the mass media, officials and creative workers of state television and radio companies — are prohibited from participating in throwing light on the election by way of the mass media, if the indicated individuals are candidates for the position of President of the Russian Federation, their authorized agents, or members of the electoral commissions.

Russia: 'Labor Union' Movement Looks to Election

964F1570A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Yuriy Nevezhin, under rubric Strategy": "'Labor Union' Proposes Conditions: The participation of trade unions in the election campaign threatens them with a schism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As the political leaders of various calibers and directions increase the intensity of introducing into their lexicon the terms and concepts of social partnership, the labor-union organizations themselves, willingly or unwillingly, must make a self-determination in the increasingly crowded political space.

On 13-14 March a series of organizational measures of the Russian Federation of Independent Trade Unions [FNPR] were held in Moscow. The 3rd Conference of the all-Russian public movement "Russian Trade Unions To the Election" released FNPR chairman Mikhail Shmakov from his duties as chairman of the movement's General Council, and Vyacheslav Goncharov became the new leader.

The conference participant passed a decision to rename the movement the "Labor Union," guided by the fact that "Labor Union" in the course of the campaign for the election to the State Duma had become widely known to the voters. Without postponing things indefinitely, "Labor Union" adopted a number of strict conditions on which the Russian trade unions will render support "to one of the candidates in the election of president of Russia." The support of the candidate is influenced by his public consent to make pledges, sign an agreement, and organize the movement's participation in the election campaign.

"Labor Union's" desire to "tie up" the future candidate with written and public promises is just as understandable as it is naive. What sounds especially unconvincing is the requirement to appoint, on the basis of recommendations from FNPR, candidates to the positions of the deputy chairman of the RF government in charge of social questions, the labor minister, the minister for social protection of the population, the director of the Federal Employment Service, and the heads of state foundations. The lack of any real mechanisms for the candidate's responsibility for failure to fulfill his pledges, and the wide divergence of the political preferences of the regional trade-union organizations and individual members, can threaten the unity of the FNPR structure itself.

The broad spectrum of the priorities of the trade-union members in the increasingly acute political situation may undoubtedly end in the splitting up of the FNPR in the event of its attempt to come out as a single front in the presidential election campaign, Mikhail Shmakov feels. At an FNPR General Council that was held on Thursday, he stated that there are "certain people" who have already bound themselves to political parties and there have been rumors about their withdrawal from the FNPR. "Whoever has raised the sword of schism must know that his own trade-union association will perish. The time of liberalism has passed, and the childhood disease of sovereignties has been extended."

The striving to monitor the FNPR structure and to pass the resolution "The Unity of the Trade-Union Movement and the Guaranteeing of Independence From Political Blocs and Parties" at the General Council attests not only to the desire of the trade-union leaders to distance themselves from the political chaos, but also to the obvious fact that they are counting on a probable "Communist renaissance" with the restoration of the role of the state in the direct administration of the country's economy.

The new keynote documents of the FNPR that are being proposed for discussion and that have been aimed at centralizing the structure will simplify the communication between the trade-union leaders and the power structures, particularly with regard to the question of paying debts in the budgetary sphere. The "certain people" who do not agree with the reforms have subjected Mikhail Shmakov to sharp criticism for the "compromising policy of the FNPR." In his report at the General Council, Mikhail Shmakov calls this an example of the attempts by certain political forces to grab onto the trade unions and use them for their own purposes. And although on 14 March the General Council, by a vote of 77 to 21, supported the resolution on unity, with the categorical objection of four leaders who called that a strategic error, the final choice was not made.

Today, however, an unadvertised meeting was held between Vladimir Kadannikov and members of the FNPR General Council.

What that choice will be was also not made completely clear by the unadvertised meeting between members of the FNPR council and Vladimir Kadannikov that occurred on 15 March. Producing on those who had gathered the impression of being a moderate pessimist, the first vice-premier stated that whoever promised to pay off the indebtedness with regard to wages should execute that promise, but he himself could not forecast payment in the budgetary sphere until April. Criticizing the mortgage auctions and "currency corridor," Vladimir Kadannikov recommended that the trade unions be more dynamic in monitoring the movement of budgetary subsidies and that they include in the collective contracts a paragraph concerning the right of the worker collectives to observe the fulfillment of the budgetary plans by the enterprises.

The impending changes in the country's economic strategy and the cooling of the relations with the international financial organizations that are the basic conductors of economic liberalism may restore the role of the trade unions as one of the levers for state administration of the economy.

The ferment in the FNPR ranks can be evaluated specifically as the attempt to prepare for this turn of events.

Hence the opposition within the FNPR. The logic of the actions taken by the Federation of Independent Trade Unions, which created a screen in the form of "Labor Union" and which presents itself in the form of a respectable, stable organization that is ready immediately to act as an element in the state administration of the economy is in this situation sufficiently understandable.

Russia: NDR Deputies Propose Chechen Crisis Solution

964F1570B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by Maksim Yerofeyev, under rubric "North Caucasus": "NDR Proposes a Comprehensive Approach: It Is Important in the Region To Observe Moderation in Delimiting the Powers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Newer and newer plans for settling the Chechen crisis are being placed on the desks of the country's highest administrators. The leaders of the NDR ["Our Home Is Russia"] parliamentary faction have also decided to assist the president and the premier in this difficult matter. Just as with everything that was previously done by them, they have undertaken the development of their peace plan in a major way, beginning with a trip across the region. The faction head, Sergey Belyayev, especially emphasizes this: unlike all the previous trips by parliamentarians that usually limited themselves only to Chechnya and, in an extreme case, to the neighboring rayons, the NDR delegation visited practically the entire region — from Stavropol Kray to Dagestan. It is curious to note that it is specifically to those territories that the movement is indebted primarily for its getting into the State Duma. So the idea is clear — the regional approach.

True, the NG [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] correspondent had already heard a similar idea. It was last year in Vladikavkaz, at exactly the time when the first bilateral Ossetinian-Ingush negotiations without federal middlemen had begun (and, incidentally, the constituent congress of the North Ossetinian NDR had occurred simultaneously). At that time Akhsarbek Galazov, president of North Osetinia, told me that he did not see any paths for settling the Chechen crisis separately from the remaining problems along both sides of the Large Caucasus, including Abkhazia, South Ossetinia, Prigorodnyy Rayon, and Karabakh. With that purpose he proposed creating a kind of regional coordinating agency of the heads of the RF subjects here (both the heads of the republics and of the krays) and all the interested parties in the trans-Caucasian states. That agency was also supposed to include the heads of government and of state, but the leading role was obviously assigned specifically to the regional leaders, who have a better knowledge of the situation and the local traditions. It is interesting that a half-year later the same thing was heard in the statement made by politicians at the federal level. Sergey Belyayev proposed creating a "kind of council of neighbors" in the Caucasus.

It must be said that, evidently, he genuinely believes that the North Caucasian regional elites are completely devoid of any separatist moods. In his words, everyone with whom he happened to speak during his trip made the unanimous entreaty, "Please believe that we are Russians and cannot think of ourselves without Russia." And I have no doubt that this was actually said. True, that faithfulness to Moscow has been largely forced.

So long as, for example, the budget of North Osetinia consists of federal subsidies to the extent of 75 percent, and that of Ingushetia to an entire 90 percent, one would scarcely think that the local elite will be inclined toward separatism. But, first of all, even Dudayev said something similar to this not too long ago. Secondly, in every North Caucasian republic, in addition to its elite, there also exists an opposition, as well as the ordinary population, which does not always experience the same warm feelings to the Center and the Russian nation. That is why, without denying the necessity of creating a "council of neighbors," there is a desire to warn the federal authorities: this agency must not have priority over them.

Among the NDR proposals one should also mention another one that evokes serious doubts: the creation in Dagestan, which has suffered greatly from the economic depression and wars in the neighboring rayons, a free economic zone based on the Ingush model. On the one hand, it is noted in a memorandum that the branches that are traditional for the republic are in a decline, unemployment is growing, and newer and newer crowds of refugees are arriving. However, that same Ingush experience indicates that freedom from taxes does not cause an investment boom in industry (just as it was several years ago, Ingushetia is a completely agrarian territory with the highest unemployment level). Instead of that, people rush headlong into the free zones, although one would rather think that the place for those people is in areas of incarceration.

One should include in the strong sides of the NDR position the principle that the war that is being waged in Chechnya is for the territorial integrity of Russia and that the only peace negotiations that should be conducted are those on conditions of the indivisibility of the country. In addition, there is a denial of the effectiveness of the waging of combat actions in the republic with the absence of strict measures to locate the base points of the hit men beyond its confines. The legality of the protection of Chechnya's administrative border by border troops is being subjected to doubt.

Thus, in addition to the previous models of settlement of the crisis — from the genocide of the Chechen nation to complete capitulation to the bandits — there has appeared a new one, that attempts in the optimal manner to combine the use of the carrot and the stick. I recall that I have already discussed at one time the extent to which this is desirable. The path that NDR proposes traveling along looks, at least at first glance, no worse than and in certain respects may even be better than the other ones. But this is not what is important. What is important is to finally get moving along some path.

Russia: Statute on Main Control Administration

964F1624A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Mar 96 p 6

[Presidential Edict No. 383 of 16 March 1996 and Statute on Main Control Administration of Russian Federation President]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Presidential Edict No. 383

Pursuant to RF Presidential Edict No. 117 of 29 January 1996, "Questions Connected with the Russian Federation Presidential Administration," **I hereby decree that:**

1. The attached Statute on the Main Control Administration of the President of the Russian Federation is hereby approved.

2. The following will be invalid:

Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 1015 of 24 May 1994 "On the Control Administration of the President of the Russian Federation" ("Collected Laws of the Russian Federation," 1994, No. 5, Sec. 402).

Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 540 of 29 May 1995 "On the Amendment of the Statute on the Control Administration of the President of the Russian Federation" ("Collected Laws of the Russian Federation," 1995, No. 28, Sec. 2199).

Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 1172 of 23 November 1995 "On the Amendment of the Statute on the Control Administration of the President of the Russian Federation" ("Collected Laws of the Russian Federation," 1995, No. 48, Sec. 4657).

3. This edict will go into force on the date it is signed.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation

The Kremlin, Moscow

16 March 1996
No. 383

Statute on Main Control Administration of President of Russian Federation

I. General Provisions

1. The Main Control Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (hereafter referred to as the Main Administration) will be a separate subdivision of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration.

2. The Main Administration will be guided in its activities by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, RF presidential edicts and directives, and directives of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration, and by this Statute.

The Statute on the Main Control Administration will be ratified by the president of the Russian Federation on the recommendations of the head of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration.

II. Functions of Main Administration

3. The principal functions of the Main Administration will be the following:

the regulation and confirmation of the observance of federal laws and Russian Federation presidential edicts and directives by federal agencies of the executive branch of government, executive agencies of members of the Russian Federation, and their officials, as well as by organizations;

the regulation and confirmation of compliance with the orders of the Russian Federation president and the head of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration;

the compilation of reports on the results of confirmation inspections for the president of the Russian Federation to prevent violations and improve the activities of federal agencies of the executive branch of government and executive agencies of members of the Russian Federation.

III. Duties of Main Administration

4. The Main Administration will perform the following duties in accordance with its principal functions:

organize the regulation and confirmation of the activities of federal agencies of the executive branch of government, executive agencies of members of the Russian Federation, and organizations and their administrators;

work with federal agencies of the executive branch of government and the executive agencies of members of the Russian Federation during the regulation and confirmation of the observance of federal laws;

regulate and observe the activities of subdivisions of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration;

coordinate the activities of the regulatory and oversight agencies of federal executive bodies and their subdivisions within the territory of members of the Russian Federation during inspections;

submit proposals based on the results of inspections to the president of the Russian Federation on the improvement of the performance of federal agencies of the executive branch of government;

forward information about discovered violations to agencies of the Russian Federation Procuracy, internal affairs agencies of the Russian Federation, agencies of the Federal Security Service, and other agencies of the executive branch of government when necessary.

5. The Main Administration will perform its assigned duties in conjunction with the advisers of the president of the Russian Federation and with separate subdivisions and state agencies of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration, providing them with the necessary analytical, informational, and reference materials, prepared by the Main Administration within the confines of its authority.

IV. Operational Support for Main Administration

6. The Main Administration will be empowered to do the following in the performance of its functions:

form commissions, made up of representatives of law enforcement agencies and regulatory bodies, as well as experts from federal agencies of the executive branch of government and executive agencies of members of the Russian Federation, to conduct inspections and to take the necessary measures during the inspections for the speedy elimination of discovered violations and for their prevention;

send officials of the Main Administration to meetings of the Government of the Russian Federation, its Presidium, and the collegiums of federal agencies of the executive branch of government and executive agencies of members of the Russian Federation, and to conferences held by federal agencies of the executive branch of government and executive agencies of members of the Russian Federation;

requisition documents, statements, and other information needed to conduct inspections, in accordance with the assigned duties of the Main Administration, from federal agencies of the executive branch of government, executive agencies of members of the Russian Federation, and organizations, either independently or through representatives of the appropriate government agencies whose services have been enlisted for the inspections;

submit proposals to the president of the Russian Federation and the heads of federal agencies of the executive branch of government and executive agencies of members of the Russian Federation on disciplinary actions and the suspension of the activities of the officials concerned prior to the publication of decisions on inspection results;

summon officials for oral and written testimony with regard to violations and non-compliance with federal laws and the edicts, directives, and orders of the president of the Russian Federation;

advise the heads of the appropriate federal agencies of the executive branch of government and executive agencies of members of the Russian Federation to take disciplinary actions against civil servants for the nonperformance or unsatisfactory performance of their assigned duties and to release civil servants who have committed offenses from their assigned duties temporarily;

send orders for the elimination of discovered violations to the heads of federal agencies of the executive branch of government and executive agencies of members of the Russian Federation. The orders must be processed without delay. Measures must be taken to correct the violations within a month or prior to the deadline specified in the orders, and the results should be reported to the Main Administration;

work in conjunction with the Russian Federation Government Staff, the Federation Council staff and State Duma staff of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly, the Russian Federation Central Accounting Office, the staffs of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court, Russian Federation Supreme Court, Russian Federation Superior Arbitration Court, and Russian Federation Procuracy General, the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, the Russian Federation Federal Security Service, the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian Federation Federal Tax Police Service, and other state agencies of the Russian Federation;

use the databases of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration, federal agencies of the executive branch of government, and executive agencies of members of the Russian Federation according to the established procedure;

contract the services of scientific institutions and individual researchers and experts according to the established procedure;

work with the regulatory agencies of foreign countries and international organizations in matters connected with regulatory activity and analyze the performance of regulatory functions in the presidential offices of other states.

7. Main Administration personnel will have guaranteed access to all buildings occupied by state agencies and other organizations, irrespective of departmental jurisdiction and property status, during regulatory operations and inspections.

8. Main Administration personnel will have guaranteed state protection in accordance with the Federal Law "On the State Protection of Judges and the Officials of Law Enforcement and Regulatory Agencies."

9. The provision of the Main Administration with information, documents, material and technical supplies, and transport services and the provision of its personnel with socioconsumer services will be the responsibility of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration of Affairs and the appropriate subdivisions of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration.

V. Officials of Main Administration

10. The deputy administrator of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration serving as the chief of the Main Control Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (hereafter referred to as the Main Administration chief) will be appointed to this office and removed from it by the president of the Russian Federation on the recommendations of the head of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration.

11. The Main Administration chief will have a first deputy chief and other deputy chiefs of the Main Administration, who will serve as the chiefs of offices of the Main Administration.

The first deputy chief of the Main Administration will replace the Main Administration chief in his temporary absence.

12. The Main Administration chief will do the following:

submit the Main Administration staff roster and structural plan to the head of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration for approval;

define the functions of offices and separate departments of the Main Administration and approve the statutes and official instructions pertaining to them;

submit recommendations to the head of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration with regard to official appointments and dismissals, the conferment of awards on Main Administration personnel, and disciplinary actions against them;

make decisions on official travel assignments for Main Administration personnel within the boundaries of the Russian Federation;

issue directives on Main Administration operations.

13. The Main Administration chief will represent the Main Administration in relations with federal government agencies, government agencies of Russian Federation members, and the appropriate agencies of other states.

VI. Responsibilities of Main Administration Officials

14. The Main Administration chief will be personally responsible for the performance of duties assigned to the Main Administration in accordance with the authority granted to him by this Statute.

15. The first deputy chief of the Main Administration, the Main Administration deputy chiefs serving as chiefs of offices of the Main Administration, their deputies, and the heads of other subdivisions of the Main Administration will be personally responsible for the performance of their duties within the confines of the authority granted to them.

Russia: Statute on State Personnel Administration

964F1624B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Mar 96 p 4

[Presidential Edict No 344 of 7 March 1996 and Statute on Main Civil Service and Personnel Administration of Russian Federation President]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Presidential Edict No. 344

Pursuant to RF Presidential Edict No. 117 of 29 January 1996, "Questions Connected with the Russian Federation Presidential Administration," **I hereby decree that:**

1. The attached Statute on the Main Civil Service and Personnel Administration of the President of the Russian Federation is hereby approved.

2. The Main Civil Service and Personnel Administration of the President of the Russian Federation will assess the

correspondence of proposed structural changes to the organizational policy and criteria with regard to new subdivisions, with consideration for the established system for the separation of duties, rights, and responsibilities in the Russian Federation Presidential Administration, in conjunction with the Main Governmental Law Administration of the President of the Russian Federation for the purpose of precluding the unjustified creation of new subdivisions of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration and the unjustified reorganization of existing subdivisions, as well as unnecessary duplication and parallelism in their work.

3. Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 298 of 12 February 1994: "On the Federal Civil Service Administration of the President of the Russian Federation" ("Collected Instruments of the President and Government of the Russian Federation," 1994, No. 8, Sec. 586) is hereby declared invalid.

4. This edict will go into force on the date it is signed.

[Signed] B. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation

The Kremlin, Moscow

7 March 1996
No 344

Statute on Main Civil Service and Personnel Administration of President of Russian Federation

I. General Provisions

1. The Main Civil Service and Personnel Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (hereafter referred to as the Main Administration) will be a separate subdivision of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration.

2. The Main Administration will be guided in its activities by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, RF presidential edicts and directives, and directives of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration, and by this Statute.

The Statute on the Main Administration will be ratified by the president of the Russian Federation on the recommendations of the head of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration.

II. Functions of Main Administration

3. The Main Administration will perform the following principal functions:

secure the activities of the president of the Russian Federation in defining the basic guidelines of state personnel policy and developing the civil service;

secure the activities of the president of the Russian Federation in making decisions on personnel matters under his jurisdiction;

secure the activities of the Civil Service Council of the President of the Russian Federation and the Personnel Policy Council of the President of the Russian Federation in accordance with the statutes on these councils;

secure the supervision of compliance with the laws of the Russian Federation on the civil service and state secrets within the Russian Federation Presidential Administration;

secure the pursuit of a single organizational policy in the Russian Federation Presidential Administration;

supervise personnel appointments for the Russian Federation Presidential Administration.

III. Duties of Main Administration

4. The Main Administration will prepare the following documents for the consideration of the president of the Russian Federation:

documents pertaining to personnel matters under the jurisdiction of the president of the Russian Federation;

documents on organizational and personnel matters pertaining to the composition of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration.

5. The Main Administration will be responsible for the following:

the preparation of proposals for the president of the Russian Federation on official personnel policy and the development of the civil service;

the selection of candidates and the creation of a personnel reserve for the appointment of authorized representatives of the Russian Federation president and the administration chiefs of Russian Federation members;

the processing of proposals forwarded to the president of the Russian Federation on personnel matters under his jurisdiction;

the organization and coordination of the preparation of documents for decisions by the president of the Russian Federation on military appointments to positions and dismissals from positions requiring senior-level officer ranks and on discharges from military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian Federation Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergencies, and Natural Disasters, the Russian Federation Federal Security Service, the Russian Federation Federal Border Service, the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence

Service, the Russian Federation Main Security Administration, the Federal Railroad Troops of the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation Presidential Security Service, the Federal Government Liaison and Information Agency of the President of the Russian Federation, and military units in which military service is envisaged by laws of the Russian Federation;

the organization and coordination of the preparation of draft Russian Federation presidential edicts and the necessary documents for decisions by the president of the Russian Federation on the conferment of senior-level officer ranks on servicemen and top-level special titles on the personnel of Russian Federation internal affairs agencies, Russian Federation customs agencies, and Federal Tax Police agencies;

the administration of records of the civil servants appointed to office and removed from office by decisions of the president of the Russian Federation, civil servants included in the personnel reserve for promotion to higher civil service positions, and the personnel of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration;

evaluations of the performance of the Russian Civil Service Academy of the President of the Russian Federation.

6. The Main Administration will participate in preparing the following for consideration by the president of the Russian Federation:

draft Russian Federation presidential edicts and the necessary documents for appointments and dismissals of diplomatic representatives of the Russian Federation to foreign states and international organizations;

draft Russian Federation presidential edicts on the conferment of diplomatic ranks and proficiency ranks on acting state advisers of the Russian Federation and state advisers of the Russian Federation;

draft Russian Federation presidential edicts on appointments of judges to federal courts;

draft Russian Federation presidential edicts on the conferment of official ranks on personnel of agencies of the Russian Federation Procuracy and judicial bodies;

draft Russian Federation presidential edicts and the necessary documents for decisions on appointments and dismissals of authorized representatives of the Russian Federation president and the administration chiefs of Russian Federation members;

draft lists of positions occupied by top-level officers and by top-level administrative personnel in Russian Federation internal affairs agencies, Russian Federation customs agencies, and Federal Tax Police agencies;

legislative bills on civil service matters to be introduced by the president of the Russian Federation in the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation according to the procedure of legislative initiative;

the plans and reports for draft regulatory instruments on matters pertaining to the civil service and state personnel policy;

analytical and informational materials on matters pertaining to the civil service and state personnel policy.

7. The Main Administration will do the following in the sphere of personnel management in the Russian Federation Presidential Administration:

prepare draft documents on matters pertaining to civil service and personnel in the Russian Federation Presidential Administration;

perform work according to the established procedure for the enlistment of the services of servicemen and officials of Russian Federation internal affairs agencies for the Russian Federation Presidential Administration;

arrange for competitions for vacant civil service positions in the Russian Federation Presidential Administration, the certification of civil servants in the Russian Federation Presidential Administration, and tests for civil service positions;

organize investigations of circumstances precluding appointments of citizens to civil service positions in the Russian Federation Presidential Administration and to high-level civil service positions;

record the decisions of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration with regard to civil service positions in the Russian Federation Presidential Administration, keep personnel files of civil servants, and make the necessary entries in the labor books of civil servants;

advise civil servants on questions connected with their legal status and the observance of restrictions connected with government service;

analyze the level of professional training of civil servants in the Russian Federation Presidential Administration and arrange for retraining and advanced training, including international cooperative programs, for personnel of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration;

develop and secure the institution of a single set of criteria for the functional structure of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration;

analyze and assess proposals on the creation of new subdivisions of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration and the reorganization of existing subdivisions.

8. The Main Administration will conduct a uniform organizational policy within the Russian Federation Presidential Administration by developing and instituting a single set of functional criteria.

9. The Main Administration will do the following to supervise the observance of laws of the Russian Federation on the civil service and state secrets:

verify the compliance of civil servants in the Russian Federation Presidential Administration, including candidates for high-level positions, with restrictions connected with government service;

organize and coordinate activity to guarantee the protection of state secrets in the Russian Federation Presidential Administration.

10. The Main Administration will perform its duties in conjunction with the advisers of the Russian Federation president and with separate subdivisions and state agencies of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration, providing them with the necessary analytical, informational, and reference materials, prepared by the Main Administration within the confines of its authority.

IV. Operational Support for Main Administration

11. The Main Administration will be empowered to do the following in the performance of its principal functions:

request and receive the necessary materials from subdivisions of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration and federal government agencies, as well as institutions, organizations, and officials, according to the established procedure;

use the databases of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration and other government agencies according to the established procedure;

use state communication systems and supply lines, including those of the central government;

enlist the services of researchers and experts for specific projects, including contracted services;

work in conjunction with the Federation Council staff and State Duma staff of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Russian Federation Government Staff, the staffs of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court, Russian Federation Supreme Court, and Russian Federation Superior Arbitration Court, and with federal agencies of the executive branch of government, the Russian Federation Procuracy General, and the government agencies of Russian Federation members.

12. The provision of the Main Administration with information, documents, material and technical supplies, and transport services and the provision of its personnel with socioconsumer services will be the responsibility of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration of Affairs and the appropriate subdivisions of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration.

V. Officials of Main Administration

13. The deputy administrator of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration serving as the chief of the Main Civil Service and Personnel Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (hereafter referred to as the Main Administration chief) will be appointed to this office and removed from it by the president of the Russian Federation on the recommendations of the head of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration.

14. The Main Administration chief will direct the activities of the Main Administration and will be an ex officio member of the Russian Federation President's Civil Service Council.

15. The Main Administration chief will have deputy chiefs of the Main Administration, including one first deputy.

The first deputy chief of the Main Administration will replace the Main Administration chief in his temporary absence.

16. The Main Administration chief will do the following:

submit the Main Administration staff roster and structural plan to the head of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration for approval, as well as proposals on allocations of funds to the Main Administration to cover the cost of scientific research, project planning, and expert appraisals based on the cost estimates of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration;

define the functions of subdivisions of the Main Administration and approve the statutes and official instructions pertaining to them;

recommend candidates to the head of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration for Main Administration personnel appointments;

submit proposals to the head of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration on dismissals of Main Administration personnel;

submit proposals to the head of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration on the conferment of awards on Main Administration personnel and on disciplinary actions against these personnel;

decide the distribution of duties among deputy chiefs of the Main Administration;

conclude contracts and agreements according to the established procedure and sign protocols and programs on international cooperation in the sphere of government service;

negotiate contracts on behalf of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration with scientific research organizations and specialists according to the established procedure for scientific research, project planning, and expert appraisals in accordance with allocations for these purposes in the cost estimates of the Russian Federation Presidential Administration;

make decisions on official travel assignments for Main Administration personnel within the boundaries of the Russian Federation;

issue directives on Main Administration operations.

VI. Responsibilities of Main Administration Officials

17. The Main Administration chief will be personally responsible for the performance of the duties assigned to the Main Administration in accordance with the authority granted to him by this Statute.

18. The first deputy chief of the Main Administration, the deputy chiefs of the Main Administration, the heads of offices of the Main Administration, their deputies, and the heads of other subdivisions of the Main Administration will be personally responsible for the performance of their assigned duties within the confines of the authority granted to them.

Russia: Federation Council's Likhachev on Legal Reform

964F1584A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Mar 96 p 2

[Interview with Vasiliy Likhachev, deputy chairman of the Federation Council of the Russian Federal Assembly, by Konstantin Katanyan; place and date not given: "Without a Legislative Guide, Reforms May Hit an Impasse: Federation Council Deputy Chairman Vasiliy Likhachev Believes That the Main Thing Is To Protect the Individual's Rights and Legitimate Interests"

[FBIS Translated Text] [Katanyan] Vasiliy Nikolayevich, in order for Russia to become a full-fledged member of the Council of Europe, a number of changes need to be made in existing RF legislation. What should we focus our attention on in this connection?

[Likhachev] I believe that quite a sizable number of the draft laws submitted for the Federal Assembly's consideration should undergo expert review for their conformity to international norms and to the agreements that we have already signed or are planning to accede to.

[Katanyan] And in what direction should legislators move in order to solve domestic problems as fast as possible?

[Likhachev] One of the main paths of legal reform should be legislative support for the system of human rights in society—first and foremost, real guarantees of the individual's rights and legitimate interests. One cannot help seeing that Russian citizens have not yet fully felt the fruits of legal reform. The individual in our society is not fully protected against officials' legal ignorance and even simple unwillingness to observe the law. Nor is he firmly protected against attacks by criminals on his property, health and even life. What's worse, he frequently does not find support and protection among those who are required to provide it: in the law-enforcement agencies.

Everyone realizes that the system must be reformed so that not only is punishment for breaking the law inevitable, but people are also held accountable for showing tolerance toward lawbreaking and for inaction in implementing the law or protecting civil rights and liberties.

[Katanyan] In addition to the problems of the individual, problems of entire regions continue to be pressing in our country. What priorities should we follow in the process of developing federal relations?

[Likhachev] The core of that process is to improve the constitutional and treaty foundations of Russian federalism in accordance with Article 11 of the RF Constitution. As we know, this process got started with the signing of the Federal Treaty in 1992. In 1994 a treaty was signed between the RF and Tatarstan, and now we already have 11 treaties delimiting areas of jurisdiction and mutually delegating powers between the federal authority and components of the Russian Federation.

These treaties enable federal agencies to focus more on accomplishing tasks common to the state as a whole and carrying out large-scale projects and programs of socioeconomic development that are important to all Russians.

At the same time, within the framework of the RF Constitution, the treaties and their accompanying agreements free the regions from micro-management by the center and give them space for creative initiative in addressing pressing problems, and for free national-state development that reflects the will of their peoples.

Moreover, I am convinced that only on the basis of treaties will it be possible to effectively resolve disputes in the sphere of federal development, and that only on the basis of a treaty will it be possible to stop the war and the dying of people in Chechnya and solve the problems of the Chechen Republic's status.

[Katanyan] However, some politicians seriously intend to change the structure of the Russian Federation by abolishing the national republics and giving all regions equal status, calling them gubernias.

[Likhachev] Russian federalism is not just a territorial but also a national-territorial means of building the state and a system for governing it, that is, it is embodied not just in regional but also in nationalities policy. In this connection, the legislature must pass a number of basic laws on questions of nationality relations and federalism. One of the most important of them is a law regulating the procedure for dividing jurisdiction and powers between the federal center and the components of the RF in matters of joint jurisdiction, without which the normal development of Russian federalism is impossible.

Also important are draft laws on the general principles for organizing the system of bodies of state authority of the RF's components, on federal executive branch agencies, on the RF Government and on the Constitutional Assembly, as well as general federal programs for the development of the national languages and cultures.

[Katanyan] And what do you think about the attempts recently made by a majority of the State Duma's deputies to revive the Federation in the borders of the USSR through the unilateral rescission of the decision to denounce the Union Treaty?

[Likhachev] As strange as it may sound, the decrees passed by the State Duma fit into the logic of Russia's political life on the threshold of the presidential election.

Documents adopted by bodies of authority are always held to the requirements of realism and legal effectiveness. From that standpoint, the State Duma's decisions raise many questions. These questions pertain to the RF's present status as a state, to its capacity as an agent subject to international law and responsible for keeping international commitments (including those it incurred as legal successor to the USSR's commitments), to the prospects for integrative processes within the framework of the CIS, and so forth.

In terms of their force, the State Duma's decrees are political documents and expressions of the Duma's position, which reflects a certain cross section of public opinion in the Russian Federation.

[Katanyan] The economic problems of federalism are just as important as the political problems. So far certain regions have been living according to the principle that friendship is one thing, but money is something else.

[Likhachev] Budget federalism has taken its first steps in Russia. Real progress is being impeded here by a series of problems in budgetary and tax policy, matters on which fairly substantial differences exist between the RF's components and the federal executive authority. These differences will arise again and again until a law is passed regulating all aspects of relations among the various levels of budgets. It will be very difficult to pass such a law, and it must be done, and done as quickly as possible.

[Katanyan] What other laws should the Russian parliament pass first of all?

[Likhachev] The distinctive characteristic of the reforms being carried out in the country is that their practical implementation has gone faster than their actual legislative formalization. Many matters have been resolved on an ad hoc basis, through presidential edicts and decrees of the RF Government. In some areas there continues to be a gap between the practice of reforms and their legal basis. A situation has arisen in which fundamental laws have not been passed in a number of basic areas of life, as a result of which the whole legal space is proving to be shaky and unstable. In other words, in order for legal reform to take place, its strategic areas need to be defined in accordance with the RF president's Message to the Federal Assembly, and with the Constitution.

Our chamber welcomes the turn, which has begun lately at the RF president's initiative, toward enhancing the social orientation of reform policy and providing real protection for citizens' economic and social rights. The social reorientation of reforms needs to be supported legislatively as well as politically.

For that to happen, in addition to the drafting or amendment of the Labor Code, the law on pensions and other acts of direct social import, it is very important to complete the creation of a system of laws that are mutually in agreement with one another and regulate the status, rights, duties and responsibility of the participants in market relations. In all countries, such acts in the realm of civil law are, along with tax legislation, the principal regulator of the market.

[Katanyan] But you have already passed the first and second parts of the Civil Code, which contain conceptual provisions for genuinely market legislation. Isn't the enough?

[Likhachev] The first and second parts of the Civil Code do not exhaust all the regulations necessary to regulate economic relations. Next in line is the third part of the Code, which consists of sections dealing with intellectual property, inheritance law, and private international law. One can hope that the third part of the Criminal Code will soon be submitted for parliament's consideration.

No less important to the continuation of democratic market reforms is the completion of work on the Land Code. The RF Constitution establishes that land may be privately owned. In all countries and at all times, land has been regarded as a very specific object of ownership, and different types of parcels of land have had different legal status. That should unfailingly be taken fully into account in our Land Code.

Moreover, in the area of providing legislative support for the fight against crime, we also lag behind the realities of the present day. Russians will not understand us if we do make ourselves clear in the near future by adopting the Criminal, Criminal-Procedural, and Correction codes.

At present the process of judicial and legal reform has been slowed down, which is having an extremely negative effect on the protection of citizens' rights and liberties. This situation is intolerable and demands immediate resolution, which requires constructive cooperation between the Federation Council and State Duma, as well as between them and the president, the Russian government and components of the Federation.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Dossier

Vasiliy Nikolayevich Likhachev was born in 1952 in the city of Gorkiy (now Nizhniy Novgorod). He received his higher education at Kazan State University. He is a doctor of legal sciences.

Beginning in 1978 he was an assistant and then researcher in Kazan State University's Department of State and Law and Soviet Development, after which he left to teach jurisprudence in Africa—in Guinea-Bissau and on Madagascar. After returning to Kazan in 1988, he became head of the Tatar Oblast CPSU Committee's Department of State and Law, and in 1990 he became head of the republic Constitutional Oversight Committee.

On 12 June 1991 he won the presidential election in Tataria as Mintimer Shaymiyev's vice president, and he remained in office through March 1995, when the president of the Republic of Tatarstan recommended his colleague for chairman of the newly elected parliament (State Council). His unanimous election as speaker guaranteed Vasiliy Likhachev membership (ex officio) in the Federation Council of the RF Federal Assembly. In January 1996 Vasiliy Likhachev was elected deputy chairman of the Federation Council.

Russia: Provisions of Civil Code Praised

964F1601A Moscow OGONEK in Russian Mar 96 No 10, pp 34-35

[Interview with Mark Masarskiy by Mikhail Krushinskiy, under rubric: "Conversations About a Sore Point," on the "Human Right" page: "A Code of Life That Comrade Zyuganov Does Not Like, but That Will Help Mr. Ivanov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **On 1 March the Russian Federation Civil Code that was adopted by the parliament and signed by the president went into effect. Many people feel that, with regard to its importance for the fates of the homeland, it is comparable with the Constitution. Why? That is the topic of discussion between an OGONEK correspondent and the well-known entrepreneur and public figure Mark Masarskiy. Currently he heads the International Association of Enterprise Managers and two joint-stock companies — "Volkhov" and "Rossiyskoye Zoloto," and is a member of the Expert-Analysis Council and the council of the Public House under the RF president.**

[Krushinskiy] How do you, as one of the coauthors of the Basic Law [Constitution] that is in effect, evaluate the new code as an "economic Constitution"? Is that comparison justified?

[Masarskiy] It is dictated by worldwide historical experience. Take, for example, the well-known Napoleonic Code or the German Civil Code. On the basis of these documents, capitalism was formed in the largest European countries. As for the Russian code, after decades of totalitarian authority its importance is revolutionary. For the first time the base principle of the equality of the state, the citizen, and the legal entity has been proclaimed in the country. I recall that the similar 1964 code established the priority of social property and the planned economy, and of state interests over the interests of the individual. The citizen could not ask for compensation of the damages inflicted on him by the actions (inaction) of agencies of state management. It was impossible, for example, for citizen Ivanov to sue the Russian Federation for seizing his garden plot in order to put in a highway. But now that is possible.

[Krushinskiy] But, so far, most Russians are far from worries of that kind.

[Masarskiy] Then let's take another example: because of the negligence of the city authorities (the streets were not sanded), and I slip and break my leg. This is not regulated at all by the norms of criminal law. No one attacked me, and presumably the mayor did not have anything to do with this. Well, according to the new civil legislation, I can sue the city authority.

[Krushinskiy] But cases like this have already been handled in our courts, the newspapers have written about them...

[Masarskiy] That used to be perceived and is still being perceived as something out of the ordinary. For example, in New York a tremendous item in the city budget is intended specifically for payments of this kind.

Here are additional examples from daily life: the code has proclaimed the right to conclude a marriage contract and to have reciprocal property claims. At such time it is precisely explained under what conditions the person is entering into the civil legal relations, and under what conditions he or she can avoid that. The individual retains the right of choice. The constitution does not grant that choice. It is of a directive nature: not only can you not violate the Basic Law, but you cannot escape from its application. But the Civil Code — a document that is considerably more voluminous than the Constitution — gives a person broader scope space in this sense.

Previously, in order to resolve any conflict, it was necessary to turn to the state as the mediator. Now the sphere of direct state regulation has been sharply reduced. From the point of view of the overall theory of systems, the code introduces the principle of the "parametric administration" of society, when the assigned parameters start operating, as it were, automatically. And that, properly speaking, is the law-governed state. But "manual administration" — edicts and decrees of the executive authority — arises only during periods of upheavals and all kinds of disturbance. Why, for example, was there a continuous series of decrees under the Bolsheviks? Because there were no parameters that would have led the ship of state along the assigned course. Not only was there no course, but it changed every 24 hours!

The new Civil Code encompasses all the conceivable nuances of property relations and describes the various types of commercial and noncommercial structures, and the legal entities and individuals, who are engaged in production or commercial activity. In addition, the citizen's nonproperty rights have also been touched upon. For example, an originator's right [copyright] or the right to protect one's honor and dignity. So what we have before us is not only a "constitution," but also an encyclopedia of modern life.

[Krushinskiy] How do you personally, as an entrepreneur and the manager of a construction organization, intend to apply the new code in practice?

[Masarskiy] For a start I will adjust the contracts that have already been concluded for work to be performed, as well as the charters of the joint-stock companies that I head, and the leases for the nonhousing accommodations. For example: previously the lessee could do whatever he wanted, and the lessor could evict him for any reason that he invented. Now his rights have been protected. The Civil Code is a powerful instrument, a defensive weapon for the entrepreneur. It is also important that a large number of its articles are direct-action laws which do not require legally binding or other norm-creating acts. Having described all the possible nuances of relations, the code has in general sharply narrowed the opportunities for the departments to produce instructional guides.

[Krushinskiy] Do you mean, then, that the enacted document is irreproachable?

[Masarskiy] It is a tremendous folio. So, alas, it does include principles that require polishing up. For example, I am troubled by Article 550, which stipulates a simple form of buying-selling operation for real estate by means of drawing up a single document with the signatures of the transaction participants. Thus, the need to have a notary certify the transaction is precluded. This approach, proceeding from the constitutional principle of protecting private property, is unacceptable. It narrows the guarantees that assure the implementation of that principle. Because the notary not only verifies the legality of the transaction, but also serves as the guarantor of the observance of the rights of all its participants.

[Krushinskiy] Can one say that the enacted documents make the reforms irreversible?

[Masarskiy] I would not hasten to make such an assertion. If only because the code is vulnerable for amendments and even for annulment by parliament: all that is needed is a simple majority of votes (the same situation that prevailed when it was enacted). True, the presidential veto can somewhat complicate the procedure.

[Krushinskiy] Incidentally, a very large parliamentary faction —the Communists — has come out, as is generally known, against the code. Why?

[Masarskiy] It came out against it because it has a self-interest in the lack of legal restrictions on the state apparatus or officials with respect to citizens and society. The Communists, when speaking out against private property, encroach upon the natural human rights. If they were to come to power, the first thing they would hasten to do would be to repeal the code and reexamine the Constitution, which intentions they are not even concealing today. But our society, unfortunately, is too poorly protected by the law against such encroachments. So the question arises: should society, like a rabbit facing a boa constrictor, freeze in its tracks and wait to be swallowed by that part of the population that does not need any constitutions or civil codes?

In this regard one might note that democracy is a two-edged weapon, since it contains within itself the legal possibility of its own dismantling and the sliding into totalitarianism.

[Krushinskiy] Let us, however, return to the problems of the Civil Code. Doesn't the misfortune that is customary for Russia await us: everything looks very nice on paper, but in practice... Because in order to implement this heap of new rules and orientation markers, it is necessary to have a well trained corps of legal experts. Does our country have such a corps at its disposal?

[Masarskiy] Unfortunately, there are difficulties involved with this. We have an acute shortage of specialists on civil law. They simply were never trained. In addition, the number of lawyers in Russia is smaller, by an order of magnitude, than, say, in the United States, although the number of various conflicts in our countries is definitely not less. The bold showdowns, with the use of explosions and gunfire, among criminal clans is the result (among other things) of the unregulated state of civil legislation. When the state, for example, refused to assume the work of collecting debts, actually encouraging the creditors to turn to professional racketeers for help.

There is also a problem with the courts. Who will handle civil suits if our judges have definitely not always been trained for this, and, in addition, are dependent upon the executive authority? So the legal norms that have been included in the new code have defined both the proper time and the level of development of civilian society. Over a certain period of time they will be "dead," unused ones.

But there is yet another catastrophe. The same situation is also being observed with the criminal code. For example, Article 77, concerning gangsterism, also was "dead" until recently, but life forces and, I hope, will continue to force its inclusion in the work to the extent that this is necessary. In addition the Civil Code will "get moving" more rapidly specifically as a result of the mass need for it that is felt by millions of citizens. There is no way that one can take advantage of the criminal articles by bypassing the state or the militia, but as for the civil ones, go right ahead! I open up the code and I conclude a contract dealing with work to be performed, a loan, a gift of property to someone... And I do not need any state intermediator. The entity that applies the law is the citizen himself.

That is why I advise everyone to study this document carefully and always keep it at hand.

Russia: Russian Neglect of Muslim Community Scored

964F1580A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by Farid Asadullin, specialist in Oriental studies: "Muslims Outside the Field of Vision: It Is Too Early To Speak of Religious Pluralism in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the beginning of the last 10 days of February the Muslim world celebrated one of its most important religious holidays, Id al-Fitr, which marks the end of a 30-day fast and, along with it, the holy month of Ramadan. In many countries its arrival has always been a convenient occasion for the secular authorities to give attention to the religious feelings of millions of followers of one of the three world religions.

In the United States and other Western democracies, the tradition of public celebration of the religious holidays of Muslims, like those of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, has existed for decades. But Russian politicians have not gone overboard in their signs of attention to the followers of the Prophet Mohammed. The present regime at first sincerely tried to do something—and to some extent did do something—for Russian Muslims (according to the Metfrazis religious information service, they number 23 million in the country). That includes eliminating all obstacles to the free celebration of religious rituals and ceremonies (especially the hajj), allocating funds in 1993-1994 for the construction of new mosques and restoration of old ones, registering new parishes and communities, which include such large associations as the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Russia's Central European Region (the Moscow muftiat), and so forth. Lately though, the authorities have stinted on their concern and have not been disposed to address Muslims' problems on a par with those of Christians. Out of the many billion rubles' worth of subsidies allocated by the RF Ministry of Culture in 1995 for implementation of the program, "The Study, Preservation, and Restoration of the Russian Federation's Cultural Legacy," only a few tens of millions of rubles was allocated for existing Muslim temples (for Orthodox Christian churches—8.5 billion).

Religious pluralism—a cornerstone of any democracy—appears not to be withstanding the test of time in the

Russian situation. It is more and more obviously being supplanted by protectionism shown by the authorities toward one religion that is endowed with all state privileges. For all practical purposes, the recent Muslim holiday was ignored by the president, but that is by no means the main argument. Ultimately, you can't be forced to be nice, although, even from the standpoint of election strategy, an appeal to Muslims' religious feelings during Ramadan would have allowed the president to remind them, a little more than 100 days before the election, that he remains, for all Russia's civil population, "first and elected by all the people." Instead, Russian Muslims were congratulated by his political opponents: Gennadiy Seleznev, chairman of the State Duma; Amangeldy Tuleyev, member of the Federation Council; Viktor Zorkaltsev, well-known Duma figure, and others. Several presidential candidates also paid a visit of respect to the main Moscow mosque and showed a lively interest in Muslims' attitudes toward the changes taking place in the country.

Today it is not just on religious holidays that Muslims feel a lack of attention from the government: for lack of financing, the construction of the capital's third Muslim temple, the Memorial Mosque on Poklonnaya Hill, has for all intents and purposes been frozen since the beginning of the year; the allocation of parcels of land for the construction of new mosques in areas of concentrated Muslim populations is proceeding very slowly, and the fate of the famous Asadullayev House, the historical abode of Moscow Muslims, remains unresolved. Moreover, Muslims dream of the day when they might at least to some extent share the experience of the Russian Orthodox Church in receiving state subsidies and privileges, in order, for example, to put the capital's principal Muslim temple, the main mosque, which celebrates its 90th anniversary this year, into proper order, or to restore unique Muslim buildings in Yaroslavl, Tver, and certain villages.

It would be no exaggeration to say that the very fact of the establishment, in the very heart of Russia, of a supreme Muslim body—a muftiat—which in a short period has, for many believing Muslims, become an actually functioning all-Russian Islamic center, has not been adequately appreciated except on the level of the Moscow government (this is not to mention foreign recognition). Yet today in Moscow, according to the capital city mayor's office's department of information, there are 2 million Muslims, which is not a bit fewer than in such European megalopolises as London and Paris. Therefore, Russian authorities on the federal level should also learn to see the followers of Islam as a constituent part of society, especially since Muslims' "historical residence permit" in Moscow dates back centuries, and on the eve of the capital's 850th anniversary, the multiethnic Muslim community is preparing for that celebration with a sense of full participation.

In conclusion I shall site an eloquent example. During their visit to Moscow, at a reception at the residence of the American ambassador, both U.S. Secretary of State Christopher and President Clinton himself managed in the course of a few minutes to ask Sheikh Gaynutdin, the head of the Moscow Muftiat, about himself, the number of Muslims and mosques in Russia, and his attitude toward the Palestinian and Bosnian problems. The mufti managed to interject just one question: "How are American Muslims doing?" "The United States accepts Muslims just as it does the followers of other great religions. In general, I feel the support of my Muslims," the U.S. President said.

Of course, it is not a fact that such support is guaranteed Clinton in the year of a presidential election, but I dare say that he has more grounds for hoping for the confidence of "his Muslims" than Yeltsin does.

From NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's Files

The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Russia's Central European Region (SAMRCER) was founded 29 January 1994 on the basis of the Islamic Center of Moscow and Moscow Oblast by decision of the heads of the Muslim communities of Moscow, Nizhniy Novgorod, Tver, Kostromo, Yaroslavl, Ivanovo, Smolensk, Vladimir, Kaliningrad and other oblasts. There are 67 parishes (mosques) and religious associations totaling 3.5 million persons under the jurisdiction of SAMRCER/the Moscow Muftiat. The apparatus of the Moscow Muftiat includes a department of science and relations with RF state services, an international department, a madrasah, a Higher Islamic Theological College, etc. SAMRCER's official publication is the newspaper ISLAM MINBARE (the ROSTRUM OF ISLAM).

Since the Moscow Muftiat was formed, the chairman of SAMRCER has been Sheikh Ravil Gaynutdin, who holds the highest religious rank of mufti. Sheikh Gaynutdin belongs to the RF president's Council for Cooperation With Religious Associations.

Russia: Statute on Human Rights Administration

964F1550A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Mar 96 p 4

[Statute on the Russian Federation President's Main Administration for Constitutional Guarantees of Civil

Rights, ratified by 7 March 1996 edict of the Russian Federation president]

[FBIS Translated Text] **I. General Provisions**

1. The Russian Federation president's Main Administration for Constitutional Guarantees of Civil Rights (hereafter referred to as the Main Administration) shall be an independent subdivision of the Russian Federation president's Administration.

2. The Main Administration shall be governed in its activities by the Russian Federation Constitution, federal laws, edicts, and directives of the Russian Federation president, directives of the Russian Federation president's Administration, and this statute.

The statute on the Main Administration shall be ratified by the Russian Federation president on the basis of a representation by the director of the Russian Federation president's Administration.

II. Functions of the Main Administration

3. The Main Administration shall take necessary measures to create the conditions for:

—the Russian Federation president's exercise of his powers as guarantor of human and civil rights and liberties;

—the Russian Federation president's resolution of questions pertaining to Russian Federation citizenship and the granting of political asylum;

—the Russian Federation president's awarding of Russian Federation state awards, conferring of Russian Federation honorary titles, and awarding of Russian Federation State Prizes;

—the Russian Federation president's granting of pardons;

—the Russian Federation president's protection of the interests of persons residing on the territory of the Russian Federation and outside its borders upon their appeal to him.

III. Tasks of the Main Administration

4. The Main Administration's principal tasks shall be as follows:

—drafting edicts and directives of the Russian Federation president on matters of citizenship, the granting of political asylum, the granting of pardons, the awarding of Russian Federation state awards, the conferring of Russian Federation honorary titles, and the awarding of Russian Federation State Prizes;

—overseeing the implementation of edicts and directives of the Russian Federation president on matters of citizenship, the granting of political asylum, the granting of pardons, the awarding of Russian Federation state awards, the conferring of Russian Federation honorary titles, and the awarding of Russian Federation State Prizes;

—providing organizational, informational and legal support for the activities of consultative and advisory bodies of the Russian Federation president created to address the questions of constitutional guarantees of civil rights;

—receiving citizens and providing assistance in restoring their violated rights;

—organizing work related to the reception of citizens by the director of the Russian Federation president's Administration and his deputies, deputy chairmen of the Russian Federation Government, and other persons belonging to the Russian Federation Government;

—considering the proposals, complaints and appeals of citizens addressed to the Russian Federation president, the Russian Federation president's Administration and the Russian Federation Government, and providing assistance in resolving the issues raised in them;

—informing the director of the Russian Federation president's Administration of the number and content of citizens' appeals and of actions taken in regard to them;

—considering petitions regarding the awarding of Russian Federation state awards, the conferring of Russian Federation honorary titles, and the awarding of Russian Federation State Prizes;

—considering petitions regarding admission to Russian Federation citizenship and the granting of political asylum;

—considering petitions regarding the pardoning of citizens convicted by Russian Federation courts;

—providing practical assistance to federal executive-branch agencies and executive-branch agencies of components of the Russian Federation, and organizing oversight over their activities in dealing with matters having to do with citizenship, the keeping of records on citizens, the provision of documents attesting to persons' identity as citizens of Russia, the granting of political asylum, the granting of pardons, the awarding of Russian Federation state awards, the conferring of Russian Federation honorary titles, and the awarding of Russian Federation State Prizes, as well as the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of persons who appeal to the Russian Federation president;

—cooperating, on instructions from the director of the Russian Federation president's Administration, with foreign and international organizations and the embassies and consular institutions of foreign states in the preparation of decisions aimed at restoring citizens' violated rights;

—cooperating with associations of Russian Federation compatriots and citizens in foreign states for the purposes of developing proposals for protecting the interests of the Russian Federation and the interests of Russian Federation compatriots and citizens living abroad;

—preparing analytical materials for the drafting of federal laws, edicts and directives of the Russian Federation president, as well as directives of the Russian Federation president's Administration, on the basis of generalizing the Main Administration's practices and studying foreign practice with respect to pertinent issues;

—cooperating, with respect to organization and methods, with subdivisions of the Russian Federation president's Administration and the Russian Federation Government Apparatus in matters pertaining to the consideration of citizens' appeals;

—cooperating with central, regional and local mass media on matters within the Main Administration's jurisdiction.

5. The Main Administration shall perform the tasks assigned to it in cooperation with aides to the Russian Federation president and with independent subdivisions and state agencies belonging to the Russian Federation president's Administration, providing them with the necessary analytical, informational and reference materials prepared within the limits of the Main Administration's jurisdiction.

IV. Support for the Main Administration's Activities

6. In order to perform its functions, the Main Administration shall have the right:

—to request and obtain, according to established procedures, the necessary materials from the executives of subdivisions of the Russian Federation president's Administration; the Apparatus of the Federation Council and Apparatus of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly; the Apparatus of the Russian Federation Government; the apparatuses of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court, the Russian Federation Supreme Court, and the Russian Federation Higher Court of Arbitration; the Russian Federation General Procuracy; and federal executive branch agencies, the executive branch agencies of components of the Russian Federation, local government agencies, institutions, organizations and officials;

—when necessary, to verify information concerning mass or flagrant violations of human and civil rights and liberties, and to obtain explanations on these matters from any officials;

—to send to the pertinent state agencies and officials conclusions regarding identified cases of violations of human and civil rights and liberties, with recommendations for the restoration of violated rights and liberties, and to receive notification from them concerning decisions that have been taken, with arguments substantiating their positions in the event that they disagree with the recommendations;

—to study, including by direct visits to the pertinent locations, the practice of working with citizens' appeals in federal executive-branch agencies and the executive branch agencies of components of the Russian Federation, to submit proposals for improving that work, and to disseminate information regarding successful practices;

—to utilize, according to established procedures, the data banks of the Russian Federation president's Administration, the Apparatus of the Russian Federation Government, and federal executive branch agencies;

—to utilize state, including government, communications systems;

—to enlist the specialists of federal executive branch agencies for drafting edicts and directives of the Russian Federation president;

—to enlist scholars and specialists for work on a contractual basis.

7. The provision of information, documents, materials, equipment and transportation in support of the activities of the Main Administration, as well as the provision of social, everyday and medical services to its personnel, shall be handled by the Russian Federation president's Administration of Affairs and pertinent subdivisions of the Russian Federation president's Administration.

V. The Officers of the Main Administration

8. The deputy director of the Russian Federation president's Administration/ director of the Russian Federation president's Main Administration for Constitutional Guarantees of Civil Rights (referred to hereafter as the director of the Main Administration) shall be appointed to and removed from office by the Russian Federation president on the basis of a representation by the director of the Russian Federation president's Administration.

9. The director of the Main Administration shall direct the Main Administration's activities.

10. The director of the Main Administration shall have a first deputy and other deputy directors of the Main

Administration/directors of administrations of the Main Administration.

11. The director of the Main Administration shall:

—present to the director of the Russian Federation president's Administration materials prepared in subdivisions of the Main Administration;

—examine for approval draft edicts and directives of the Russian Federation president's Administration and directives of the Russian Federation president's Administration on matters within the Main Administration's jurisdiction;

—present for approval by the director of the Russian Federation president's Administration the structure and size of the Main Administration's staff, as well as proposals for the allocation of financial resources out of the budget of the Russian Federation president's Administration to the Main Administration for payment for research and design work and expert opinions;

—define the functions of the Main Administration's administrations and departments, and approve regulations pertaining to them and job descriptions for their personnel;

—nominate, to the director of the Russian Federation president's Administration, candidates for appointment as officials of the Main Administration;

—submit, to the director of the Russian Federation president's Administration, proposals for the dismissal of officials of the Main Administration;

—submit, to the director of the Russian Federation president's Administration, proposals for rewarding officials of the Main Administration and imposing disciplinary penalties on them;

—make decisions with respect to sending personnel of the Main Administration on business trips within the Russian Federation's boundaries;

—conclude, on behalf of the Russian Federation president's Administration and according to established procedures, contracts with research organizations and specialists for the performance of work in accordance with the tasks assigned to the Main Administration;

—promulgate directives on matters pertaining to the Main Administration's work.

12. The director of the Main Administration shall represent the Main Administration in relations with subdivisions of the Russian Federation president's Administration; the Apparatus of the Federation Council and Apparatus of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly; the Apparatus of the Russian Federation Government; the apparatuses of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court, the Russian Federation Supreme Court and the Russian Federation Higher Court of arbitration; the Russian Federation Procuracy General; and federal executive-branch agencies, executive-branch agencies of components of the Russian Federation, and local government agencies.

13. Deputy directors of the Main Administration shall exercise certain powers of the director of the Main Administration in accordance with their job descriptions, including having the right to sign documents issued by the Main Administration;

VI. The Responsibility of Executives of the Main Administration

14. The director of the Main Administration shall bear personal responsibility for performance of the tasks assigned to the Main Administration, with due regard for the rights granted him by this statute.

15. The deputy directors of the Main Administration, directors of administrations of the Main Administration and their deputies, and the heads of other subdivisions of the Main Administration shall bear personal responsibility for performance of the duties assigned them, with due regard for the rights granted them.

Russia: Clergy Faction's Fear of 'Vatican Agents'

964F1501A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Mar 96 No 10, p 10

[Article by Aleksandr Nezhnyy: "The 'Meek' on the Warpath; Orthodox Bolsheviks in Search of Vatican Agents"]

[FBIS Translated Text] His Holiness Aleksiy II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, received a letter from 100 (approximately) of his "humble servants" from among the secular and regular clergy not long ago.

The letter made the rounds of the cathedrals in the capital and was discussed at a meeting of the clergy of Moscow and the oblast, so it is no secret.

What did it say?

It was in reference to the fatal infection that is being injected (as the "humble servants" described it) into the immaculate body of holy Russia. The name of the infection is Catholicism—namely, the contemptible Roman Catholic Church. The reckless declaration of freedom in our fatherland for other religions has led to the establishment of a Catholic administration in Russia. Furthermore, the Roman Catholic bishops here even include a Jesuit (in Novosibirsk), which, according to the "humble servants," is an indisputable sign of aggressive designs on a canonically Orthodox territory.

The main problem, however, is not that the Vatican is creeping up on us like a thief in the night, but that there are some members of the Orthodox clergy who are willing to betray the faith of their fathers. There are already enough of them to form a small fifth column, including, for example, all three of the priests from the Cosma and Damian Cathedral in Moscow—Aleksandr Borisov, the dean of the cathedral and president of the Russian Bible Society, Georgiy Chistyakov, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Vladimir Lapshin; staff members from the Religious Education Department of the Moscow Patriarchate—Father Superior Ioann (Ekonomtsev), the department chairman, and Father Ioann Sviridov, the dean of the Russian Orthodox University and one of the leading traitors; Father Superior Ignatiy (Krekshin), vice-regent of the Bobrinev-Rozhdestvenskiy Monastery and secretary of the Synod Commission for the Canonization of Saints of the Russian Orthodox Church; and other clergymen and church officials.

The "humble servants" have been wielding the anti-Catholic hammer mercilessly against the enemies of the faith of their fathers, and especially their accomplices, the Russian Esaus who sold their Orthodox birthright for the diabolical idea of unity with the damned Romans, smashing them flat and, excuse the expression, pounding them into jelly. This unity is also the goal of the "Life with God" publishing house in Brussels. During the era of the Soviet regime and of fierce atheism, it used every trick to send the sacred books of the Old and New Testaments, the works of the fathers of the church, the lives of the saints, and the works of Russian religious philosophers to our fatherland, which was supposed to have been protected by the "iron curtain," and it sent them to us for free, which may have been the slyest trick of all. The Catholic (according to the definition of the "humble servants") yearbook "Russkaya Mysl" was rarely issued here in the past, but now it comes out as regularly as PRAVDA or ZAVTRA.

Its chief editor, Mrs. Ilovayskaya-Alberti, a Russian by blood and, regrettably, a Catholic by religion, used Catholic funds to arrange for radio broadcasts here in Russia, which supposedly reek of Roman Catholicism. (That is where the aforementioned archpriest Ioann Sviridov works, compounding the incredible depth of his fall from grace by his position on the editorial board of "Russkaya Mysl.") The thought of all the heresies that are infiltrating our fatherland through the radio stations is terrifying! Father Lapshin, for example, equated Orthodoxy with Catholicism, although everyone knows that the members of the first religion will be saved while those of the latter are bound for an unknown destination. The learned clergyman Chistyakov even expressed some doubt that our Orthodox religion has always been the sole guardian of the truth.

I almost forgot another detail: The Catholic journal ISTINA I ZHIZN is also slandering Russia, and one of its editors is Father Georgiy Chistyakov.

He and his co-conspirators have been branded Catholicism-promoting neo-renewalists by the "humble servants." You could never come up with a more scathing accusation. Now all of the members of the exposed pseudo-clergy will either have to take a nosedive through the ice or go to Rome and live at the beck and call of the pope.

That is what the letter said.

I have made fun of it, but it is a case of laughter through tears, because it is difficult to express the distress the Moscow clergy's letter arouses.

Their sincerity (which we could never question) only makes the message more frightening. Like an elementary reader, it is a compendium of all of the distinctive elements of an outlook that is characteristic not only of much of the Orthodox clergy, but also of many of our citizens who do not believe in anything at all. (Although in this time of miracles, even Comrade Zyuganov, the leader of Russia's communists, has called himself Orthodox, which could be interpreted, in addition to everything else, as an affront to Ilyich, who must be spinning in his crystal coffin out of sheer rage.) The symptoms are an unconditional belief in the accuracy of one's own point of view, intolerance for the beliefs of others, and extreme arrogance.

Given this group of qualities, existence without an enemy is simply impossible. An enemy is indispensable as a means of giving a certain way of life meaning and of justifying a lifestyle devoid of any moral foundation or absolute values. The persecution of a common enemy does not require intelligence or virtue, and it certainly does not require compassion. It requires only the primitive notion that we will bring our fatherland closer to prosperity, peace, and Christ by getting rid of, for example, the Russian kulaks (the class enemy), the Jews (the racial enemy), or the Catholics (the religious enemy).

An ocean of blood has been shed in countless executions, and an equal number of tears have fallen, but our Russia has not flourished, has not experienced the joys of peace, and does not have a father-son relationship with Christ.

Meanwhile, the obsession with exposing the enemy at any cost has made even the priesthood shamefully indiscriminate in its choice of weapons and targets. The clergy believe they can attack everyone now and then sort things out later, and they are on the attack. They allege that a Jesuit bishop, according to the rules of his order, can only be appointed to a missionary seat, but this is not true. The Milan diocese, for example, is headed by a bishop from the order Ignatius Loyola founded, and no one has ever interpreted this as a sign that Milan is a missionary target. The Catholic (according to the definition of the "humble servants") journal ISTINA I ZHIZN has been an independent publication for all Christians for more than a year, and it has done its best to acquaint its readers with the spiritual and cultural wealth of the sister churches.

As far as "Russkaya Mysl" is concerned, Orthodox issues and the fate of Orthodoxy in our society (especially in the tragic 20th century) have always been of greater concern to it than religious events in the West, and some surprising recent changes have restrained its innate independence for the sake of the Moscow patriarchate. This veritable repetition of Abraham's sacrifice is connected with a project of amazing scope, in which Mrs. Ilovayskaya has been instrumental and which is supposed to deliver the Russian Orthodox Church from the clutches of its alleged dire need.

It would be almost impossible to overlook the construction project of the century, known as the Cathedral of Christ of Savior, the foreign luxury cars in which even monks cruise the streets of the capital, the enterprises connected with the church, which are exempt from taxes, but are not exempt from suspicions of unethical business practices, and the lifestyle of many clergymen, which does not correspond at all to the touching description of the poverty-stricken church. These cannot be overlooked and they certainly cannot be chalked up to the mysterious Russian soul. In spite of all this, our Catholic brethren have turned contributions, estimated at around 15 million dollars, over directly to our diocese.

In the final analysis, this could be seen as their idiosyncratic whim—to feed those who treat them with unconcealed contempt, openly displaying a sense of religious superiority, accepting the offering and then spitefully biting the hand that feeds them.

In our case, it appears that consciousness determines being.

Here is one description of that consciousness: "The Russians believed that members of the Orthodox faith were the only Christians in the world and had contempt for everyone else; they gradually drew closer to these others, however, accepting the common principles of the life of these others and their own life, but because they had a sense that they had much to learn from the others, they rewarded this unpleasant awareness with national arrogance."

It is bizarre and distressing that this description comes from historian Kostomarov's account of the morals of the 16th and 17th centuries, but it is also an accurate record of the inner motives for the letter of the "humble servants"!

Afanasyev's collection of Russian folk tales included one about a groom who visited a friend's grave on the way to his wedding and shared three goblets of sweet wine with the deceased. The refreshment the dead man offered him put the groom to sleep for 300 years, and when he woke up he did not recognize his surroundings or any of the buildings or people he saw.

Like the unlucky groom who slept for three centuries, the "humble servants" are walking the earth today with ideas dating back to the 17th century. Who was the dead man who offered them the wine, and what kind of wine was it? It certainly would take an extremely long and sound sleep for anyone living at the end of our tragic century to consciously forget the great works of the many national and foreign historians and philosophers who proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that the causes of the Great Schism were political, and not religious; to forget the Golgotha of the Solovetskiy Islands, where Orthodox and Catholic clergymen prayed and died together; and to ignore, with shocking insensitivity, the most important religious lesson of this century, which could be called the ecumenical nature of suffering.

Millions of members of different religions turned to ashes in the ovens of Auschwitz and to dust in the camps of Kolyma. During their lifetime they may have attached considerable significance to the dogmatic and canonical differences between the Western and Eastern churches. It is possible that some of them even believed, as Berdyayev put it, that all of the saints in Heaven speak only Russian. In that other place, however, when they were approaching the Throne of Glory, they developed an eternal love for one another, enlightened by their martyrdom and recognizing from their new existence that there is "one flock and one shepherd" (John 10.16).

There are certain truths that are common to all Christians.

These truths, which were brought to our world by our Savior, which are collected in the divinely inspired books of the New Testament, and which are acknowledged by the family of ecumenical councils, lie at the basis of both churches. Any member of the Orthodox religion who builds—or, to put it more precisely, tries to build—his life on this earth on the foundation of these truths will always react only with bewilderment to accusations of Catholic affinities.

The "humble servants," however, have their own point of view and their own court of religious judgment. For them, Catholicism is an indisputable synonym for anti-Christianity. In fact, they even call traitors neo-renewalists, displaying the completely Soviet passion for labels, combined with a misunderstanding of the meaning of this historical religious phenomenon.

The terrible sin the renewalists of the 1920s committed was not that some of them, for example, were conducting religious services in Russian, or that others—such as Bishop Antonin (Granovskiy)—even dared to make changes in liturgical canons. Sooner or later, these attempts will be studied with the necessary objectivity, if only because the divine service is a human creation, and the human being can touch it with a reverent hand to meet the requirements of the time and place. Furthermore, the renewalists were not committing a sin against God, the church, and Russia by allowing bishops to marry. The apostles and the first bishops, after all, were family men. It is probably better for a diocese to be headed by an active and intelligent bishop with a legal partner than a Filaret, who disgraces the holy monastic orders with his secret wife and secret children, or a Serapion, who profanes the sanctified ranks with his unnatural inclinations.

Monasticism is a special gift.

It is a narrow gate, and it must not be entered by anyone who would never have answered the call if the bishop's miter had not been held up as a temptation.

These are absolutely new wine-skins that are being filled, regrettably, with the sour wine of sordid cravings.

The sin and the failing of the renewalists consisted in their attempts to make friends with the regime that had banished the church to Golgotha and to serve this regime in every way possible, and in their unlimited and disgusting servile impulses, which caused their leaders to agree so quickly and readily to lick the boots of the State Political Administration.

From which angle, we wonder, do the priests who have been branded renewalists by the aforementioned "humble servants" seem to be supporting the cause of Aleksandr Vvedenskiy and Vladimir Krasnitskiy, the founding fathers of the renewalist movement? They are not currying favor with the authorities; they are not infatuated with the regime; they are not playing political games. The people who signed the letter to the patriarch, ineptly resorting to Russian pre-revolutionary grammar (one of the "humble servants" experienced such a strong outburst of nationalism that he spelled his name Iaann—neither fish nor fowl, as the saying goes), could be called renewalists with much more justification because of their peculiar outlook.

The idol of the "humble servants" is the state—a state with intimidating footsteps that strike fear into the hearts of people in countries far and near.

The banner that unites them is red, because the empire the Soviet regime created is the cherished object of their dreams.

They have no affection for the current regime and are nostalgic for the Soviet one. The current regime, like a submissive wife, forgives everything they do and then helps them take cathedrals away from Orthodox communities with other tenets and canonical affiliations.

The "humble servants" should have thought long and hard before they cast the stone of renewalism at anyone else.

The strongest and most shameful expression of their spiritual callousness, however, may have been the angry shouts with which they responded to the news of the appointment of a representative of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Catholic commission for the canonization of Doctor Friedrich Gaaz. In a word-for-word repetition of a statement published earlier in MOSKVA, the "humble servants" said: "This participation in the canonical undertaking of another religion is the most scandalous event since the Roman Catholics fell away from Christ's church in 1054."

The Catholic Gaaz was known as Fedor Petrovich in Moscow.

He spent 50 of his 73 years of life in Russia. There are not that many Orthodox Russians in our fatherland who love Russia as sincerely and who serve the unfortunate of Russia—and Christ himself through them—with as much devotion as Fedor Petrovich Gaaz did. His life, which was chronicled so expertly by Anatoliy Fedorovich Koni, is enough in itself to suggest to any person—religious or non-religious, as long as he is unbiased—that a saint once lived in our land.

He comforted prisoners.

He ministered to the afflicted.

He gave all of his property to the poor.

He was always eager to do good.

He died in poverty and was buried at public expense.

His life and his deeds can be summed in a single sentence: He was a great Christian.

The Russian people called him a "man of God," but the "humble servants" are ranting and raving because the Russian people's church sent its priest to work with the Catholics for the glorification of Fedor Petrovich.

"Alas for you, lawyers and Pharisees, hypocrites! You clean the outside of the cup and dish which you have filled inside by robbery and self-indulgence!" (Matthew 23.25).

Russia: Kulikov on Difficulties in Crime Control

964F1545A Moscow MILITSIYA in Russian Jan 96 No 1, pp 4-14

[Article by General of the Army Anatoliy Kulikov, RF minister of internal affairs: "'The Stable Development of the State System Is Impossible Without the Bridling of Crime.'" Speech at an expanded session of the RF MVD Board; published as given]

[FBIS Translated Text] The criminal situation continues to be complicated and has become one of the basic problems of national security. The tendency toward the intensification of the social danger of criminal manifestations is not only being preserved, but is also receiving further development. Criminal violence is taking on the nature of criminal terror. More and more frequently it is becoming a means of making reprisals against difficult business competitors or the result of the settling of scores among criminal groupings. There has been an increase in the frequency of attacks and other especially dangerous criminal encroachments, including armed attacks against dwellings and kidnappings of citizens. A problem that continues to be an acute one is the problem of the creeping spread of firearms, which have become the catalyst for the aggressiveness and ferocity of criminal manifestations. Organized crime is penetrating into the sphere of the economy at accelerated rates. The criminal community continues to develop and to make active use of corrupt contacts in the structures of state authority and administration, and attempts to exert an effect on the political processes in the regions and at the federal level.

Factors linked with the social and moral costs of the economic reforms are exerting an increasingly noticeable influence on the state of crime. The criminal environment is being intensively augmented by individuals who do not have a permanent source of income, and by teenagers and women. It is partially for this reason that recidivism is increasing at high rates and that drug addiction has been given an additional impetus.

Chechnya continues to be the generator of political and criminal tension. That is the scene for the active replenishment of the potential of illegal armed formations that are oriented toward disrupting the peaceful settlement of the crisis in the republic and toward the attainment of separatist goals by the use of methods of terror and guerrilla warfare.

RF Ministry of Internal Affairs is monitoring the criminal situation. Last year the best results in the basic areas of official-operational activity were achieved by the MVD in the Republics of Tatarstan and Sakha (Yakutia), the UVD [Administrations of Internal Affairs] of Amur, Belgorod, Vladimir, Murmansk, Nizhniy Novgorod, Penza, and Tambov oblasts, the Volgo-Vyatka, Central Volga, and Southeast UVDT, the Vyatka ULITU, the 63rd Separate Brigade and the 67th Division of the Northwest District, and the 624th and 98th separate battalions of the North Caucasus Internal Troops District.

We did not succeed in providing a fundamental improvement of the criminal situation in the country. We continue to carry out a seriously insufficient amount of work to counteract organized crime, corruption, and drug business, and to stop economic crimes. We have not moved far ahead in the comprehensive use of manpower and means to guarantee law and order and to expose crimes. Our efforts to establish order in the streets and to protect the citizens' safety have been inadequate to the situation that is developing. The preventive function of the militia is being restored at an inadmissibly slow rate. There is an alarming state of law and order on our highways. It is not accidental that, in the awareness of broad segments of the population, the conviction has been formed that people's personal and property security are unprotected. Practically half the total number of citizens who have become victims of criminal encroachments do not turn to internal affairs agencies, basically because they consider it to be useless to do so. On the whole, however, only one-third of the citizens are, to one degree or another, satisfied with our work; and another third feel that the internal affairs agencies are completely incapable of guaranteeing the proper public order or the personal safety of the citizens.

The negative evaluations of our work are the result not only of subjective reasons that depend upon the internal affairs agencies, but also of the objective ones that are linked with the difficulties of the transitional period. Despite all these factors, I am convinced that the MVD system has preserved its ability to be administered, and, consequently, the potential possibility of acting adequately to the situation and the forecasted tendencies of change in that situation. Judged on the basis of their professional and moral qualities, the personnel are capable of decisively counteracting the criminal manifestations.

The resolution of these tasks under the conditions of the increasingly complicated operational situation and the limited nature of personnel, financial, and material-technical support is impossible with the improvement of administrative activity. The item that will become the basis for putting the structure and practice of administration into conformity the present-day requirements is the implementation of the Concept of the Development of the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs System. In that Concept it as possible to observe the necessary parity between innovation and justified conservatism, which guarantees the stability of the MVD system, and to resolve a number of fundamental tasks. In particular, the contours of the entire MVD system have been clearly designated, and this provides the possibility to stop the idle discussions and the recommendations for slowly dismantling it which do not correspond to today's real-life situation. In addition, the place and role of all the services and subdivisions have been defined. That will make it possible to put an end to the heating up of nervousness, the waverings within the system itself, and the attempts to "tighten the rope" between the services.

The Concept guarantees the comprehensive approach to establishing order in the system of the RF MVD and the mechanisms of administering its structural links. It stipulates the efficient distribution of the functions and powers in the sphere of administering the MVD agencies at the federal, regional, and local levels.

The first step in implementing the Concept will be the creation of a new staff-organizational structure — one that more flexible and receptive to changes in the criminal and social situations. The structure of the central apparatus of the RF MVD has been approved and we are beginning to form it. Within the near future we will have to carry out similar work in the apparatuses of the MVD, GUVD, UVD, and UVDT, and to develop and est the promising models for the staff-organizational structure of the city-rayon agencies.

The Concept must become the pivot of all the organizing work of the MVD and UVD apparatus both for the near future and in the long term. The responsibility of monitoring to see that the ideas in this document are perceived along the entire vertical line in the MVD apparatus as guide lines for practical action and find their legal, organizational, and resource resolution by the established deadlines, has been entrusted to the deputy ministers and the chiefs of the main administrations and administrations of the federal ministry.

Organizing activity at the present-day stage cannot be imagined without the object lessons and conclusions from the events in Chechnya and Budennovsk, which received their acute political evaluation as an example of crisis phenomena in the MVD system and as an emergency situation that harmed Russia's state interests. The blame for everything lay in the irresponsible attitude taken by a number of administrators of RF MVD and the UVD of Stavropol Kray with regard to the execution of their official duties, and in the lack of monitoring of the work performed by the internal affairs agencies and subdivisions.

The events in Budennovsk must become a stern lesson for each associate of the internal affairs agencies irrespective of the position that is occupied.

Rigid monitoring has been established over the fulfillment of the plan for urgent measures to intensify the fight against terrorism and gangsterism. The degree of readiness of the personnel for effective actions in emergency situations will be checked regularly and will become one of the basic criteria when judging the leaders' conformity to the positions that they occupy. We cannot allow any possibility that this kind of tragedy will be repeated.

Something that remains a very important task is the guaranteeing of the series of steps to restore constitutional order in the Chechen Republic.

The center of practically all our problems is the insufficiently successful work of uncovering the most dangerous crimes. Impunity opens up a vast area for the criminal elements, creates an environment that promotes the reproduction of crime, and discredits the very idea of a law-governed democratic state.

Without a doubt, certain positive shifts in guaranteeing the principle of the irreversibility of punishment of the guilty individuals have occurred. During the first ten months of last year the number of crimes falling within the competency of the crime militia was 54,000 more and the exposure rate increased from 51 to 56 percent.

But there is a completely different situation with heinous crimes, primarily previously planned ones, which must be exposed "not by number, but by ability" and which demand high professionalism on the part of the operational workers and investigators. For Russia as a whole, half of such cries have not been exposed. In Tyva and Udmurtia, Maritime and Khabarovsk krays, Irkutsk, Moscow, Sakhalin, Sverdlovsk, Tomsk, Tyumen, Chelyabinsk, and Chita oblasts, and the cities of St. Petersburg and Moscow the exposure rate for heinous criminal encroachments constituted on 39-44 percent.

The guilty persons were not established for more than 40 percent of the murders and heinous bodily assaults committed with the use of firearms and two-thirds of armed robberies. The exposure rate for burglaries, robberies, and armed robberies with the purpose of stealing large amounts of money from banks, communications centers, and the cash offices of enterprises and institutions, as well as thefts of artistic, historical, and cultural treasures does not exceed 38 percent. And this is not even taking into consideration the "contract" murders of major entrepreneurs and well-known journalists, or other crimes that have evoked a broad public response. Individual examples of exposing very dangerous boldly planned and skillfully executed crimes are incapable of changing the overall discomforting picture.

The impression is created that individual administrators of internal affairs agencies have become accustomed to this situation and are not averse to justifying their own errors in organizing the work to prevent and expose crimes by referring to so-called "objective difficulties," primarily the high work loads and the shortage of experienced associate. I do not deny the negative affect of these factors. However, I feel that if one cannot eliminate them completely, then it is completely realistic at least to reduce substantially the degree of their influence by improving the organization of the work to expose crimes.

For example, the UVD of Tambov Oblast succeeded in creating a system of administering the manpower and means which, together with other factors, makes it possible to maintain an exposure rate for the crimes within the competency of the criminal militia at the level of 80 percent. The essence of that system is that the UVD succeeded in assuring that every associate of the internal affairs agencies, irrespective of the service to which he belongs, has a self-interest in the final results of the activities to prevent and uncover crimes.

Why is it that in nearby oblasts, even with a consideration of the regional peculiarities, the picture is completely different and the disclosure rate of crimes in this category is 22-25 percent lower?

Frequently the basic reason for failures with the disclosure rate of crimes is not in the high work loads and the lack of professionals, but in the irresponsibility of the administrators and their subordinates. I would like to give a typical example. The problem of the discovery rate for motor-vehicle thefts is extremely acute. A procedure for actions based on operational "Interception" plans has been developed everywhere. It would seem that the services and subdivisions of the internal affairs agencies of Dagestan, where during the current year the number of motor-vehicle thefts has increased by a factor of more than 1.5, ought to attach special attention to the practical implementation of those plans. Actually, everything is done in a completely different way. A special inspection carried out in August of last year showed that, despite the fact that the units of GROVD and GAI [State Motor-Vehicle Inspectorate] that were on duty were informed of the hijacking of motor vehicles, their license plate numbers, and their distinguishing features, a hijacked vehicle drove several times without hindrance past three permanent stations of the UVD GAI in the city of Makhachkala, mobile stations of the PPS [patrol-post service] and the DPS [road-patrol service], and stopped in front of the buildings of all three rayon departments in the city. However, no one undertook any steps to detain it or to check it. Obviously, it is not accidental that the discovery rate for motor-vehicle thefts in the republic constitutes only eight percent.

I am convinced that definitely not all the reserves and possibilities for revealing crimes have been exhausted. It is necessary to increase our demandingness, to intensify the personal responsibility borne by the administrators and their subordinates. It is necessary to put under special monitoring the duty units and the practice of resolving the citizens' statements and reports on crimes. It is necessary to implement additional measures that are aimed at reinforcing the interaction between the operational services and the investigative apparatus. This is a vast area for work both in the center and in the outlying areas.

Investigators bear responsibility equally with the operational services for the fact that the persons guilty of committing 741,000 criminal encroachments have not been established or have hidden from justice. The investigators' contribution to revealing crimes can and must be more meaningful. A substantial reduction in the work load placed on investigators had practically no affect on the time periods or the quality of the preliminary investigation. Last year, as had been the situation in the year before that one, every fifth criminal case had been investigated with a time period exceeding the established one, and there was an increase of almost 13 percent in the number of cases returned for additional investigation.

Special attention must be devoted to the investigation of criminal cases in which the persons who are guilty of perpetrating the crimes have not been established. As a rule, the investigation is carried out without the showing of any initiative, and the necessary investigative actions and operational-investigative measures are not carried out in full volume. Every fourth inspection of the scene of the crime in instances of burglaries, robberies, and armed attacks is carried out without the participation of professional criminalists. As a result, the inspections rarely reveal footprints, tire prints, microscopic substances, or biological evidence without which it frequently is simply impossible to prove a person's guilt.

It is no less important to establish monitoring over the use of confiscated material evidence. An analysis of the practical situation has shown that one-fifth of that evidence is not submitted by the investigators for expert study. As a rule, the reason is elementary irresponsibility.

An inspection of the UVD of Kemerovo Oblast at the EKO of the Central ROVD of the city of Novokuznetsk revealed more than 200 findings by experts in 1993-1994 that had not been requested by the investigators, including fingerprint-analysis findings with positive conclusions.

The underevaluation of the importance of expert practice is largely engendered by the fact that many administrators have a poor idea of its present-day capabilities.

The first-priority tasks include counteraction against organized crime. Unfortunately, the subdivisions responsible for fighting it rarely catch the truly dangerous criminal formations that have been secretly organized, or they limit themselves to bringing to responsibility the rank-and-file criminals, while allowing the basic nucleus to continue their criminal activities with impunity.

It is not by accident that last year every fifth criminal case involving crimes perpetrated by organized criminal groups was procedurally discontinued. As has been the situation previously, every other criminal grouping for which a criminal case has been sent to the court consists of only two or three persons.

To a considerable degree this is explained by the fact that the subdivisions dealing with organized crime frequently are unable to guarantee the carrying out of the operational measures that are necessary to stop the activities of the major criminal groupings that create the "criminal weather" in the regions, and do not know how to document efficiently the criminal actions taken by the leaders of those groupings and their corrupt protectors.

What kind of effectiveness in the fight against organized crime can we expect if no use is made of such a basic instrument for exposing and accumulating evidentiary information as operational elaboration! Last year, in 57 regions, not a single case of operational registration was implemented with the bringing of members of gangster groupings to criminal responsibility.

As a result, the fight against organized crime is losing its aggressiveness, and, at worst, there has been a sharp reduction in the effectiveness of its work.

No one is demanding the impossible — the putting of an end to organized crime once and for all overnight. We are talking about the need to carry out the decisive removal of criminal groupings from the positions that they have occupied, in order to disorganize their activities, to make as narrow their "living area: as narrow as possible, to limit the sources of illegal enrichment, to destroy corrupt ties, and to deprive the criminal "elite" of their immunity against criminal responsibility.

The basic task of the subdivisions responsible for fighting organized crime must be work that has been coordinated both at the regional and the interregional level to stop the activities of the most dangerous criminal groupings and gangs, organizations, and communities, including those formed on an ethnic basis.

It is extremely important to establish interaction among the subdivisions responsible for fighting organized crime and the other services of the crime militia, and to avoid misunderstandings. In conformity with the Concept for Developing the System of the Russian MVD, all the subdivisions dealing with organized crime (RUOP, UOP, OOP) will be subordinated along the vertical line. However, with the rigid federal subordination of the RUOP, other specialized subdivisions — in particular, the administrations and departments for fighting organized crime in the republics, krays, and oblasts — will be simultaneously part of the MVD and the UVD of subjects of the Federation, with rights of structural subdivisions of the crime militia. The competency of the RUOP with regard to administering them will be defined by a special normative act of the Russian MVD.

Today a lot is said about the need to achieve a fundamental improvement in the practice of the fight against economic crime. That work has been increased in a number of sectors. The number of crimes that have been revealed in the economic sphere has increased practically everywhere, and a third more heinous encroachments have been revealed. In the structure of the crimes that have been stopped, there is a reduced percentage of relatively unimportant ones, and an almost doubling of the number of criminal cases that have sent to the courts.

At the same time not all the subdivisions dealing with economic crimes have been able to guarantee an aggressive fight against the most dangerous encroachments. For example, in Moscow Oblast, which is definitely not the worst oblast in this regard, last year 3800 crimes of an economic nature were revealed, for which preliminary investigation is mandatory. Of that number, only 1300 are heinous ones. Of the total number of criminal cases initiated, only one-third were sent to court. In the first half-year, for half of the heinous encroachments the cases were discontinued because of lack of a *corpus delicti* or *locus delicti*.

A similar situation has developed in a number of other regions.

The fight against disguised thefts of freight has weakened. The proper attention is not being devoted to revealing criminal manifestations in the activity of client organizations or commercial structures that use the services of rail transportation. The West Siberian and North Caucasus UVDT are working at a rate that is obviously below their capabilities for stopping thefts of freight.

In the fight against economic crime, the interaction between the operational and investigative apparatus is frequently constructed without a consideration of the commonality of the tasks to be fulfilled. No provision is made for operational support of preliminary investigation. Discrepancies in evaluating the completeness and quality of the inspection materials give rise to claims against one another, and to the unfounded initiation of criminal cases directly by the operational workers, which has an extremely negative effect on the results of the investigation of economic crimes. It is not accidental that for more than 40 percent of the crimes of an economic nature the criminal cases are discontinued at the investigative stage. And in every third situation because of the lack of a *corpus delicti* or *locus delicti*.

The contradictions between the interests of the investigative apparatus and the subdivisions dealing with economic crimes must be eliminated. The lack of coordination among their actions, and the hasty and unfounded initiation of criminal cases with their subsequent discontinuance on the ground of rehabilitation, can be very expensive to us in the direct sense.

In conformity with the norms of the new Civil Code, the state is obliged to compensate a citizen or legal entity not only for the direct damage incurred as a consequence of the illegal actions of state agencies, but also the lost benefit.

You can imagine the amounts of money that may pour out of the treasury as the result of a suit by some joint-stock company, even one with limited responsibility, if it is admitted that we operated illegally with respect to its administrator.

It is necessary to think a bit about the desirability of making changes in the statistical reports, and to resuscitate the Instructional Guide concerning the organizing of interaction between investigative apparatuses and the operational and criminal-expert services of the internal affairs agencies during the disclosure and investigation of crimes, which was approved by USSR MVD as long ago as 1989.

One of the reasons for the poor results in the work of the subdivisions dealing with economic crimes is the fact that the level of knowledge and experience of a considerable number of the associates does not correspond to the nature and complexity of the crimes being committed in the economy. The administrators of the MVD and the UVD are falling seriously behind in heir work in this regard and must engage seriously in the training and retraining of the personnel.

It is necessary to take additional measures to localize the negative processes in the links of the economy that are most important and most vulnerable from the point of view of criminal penetration. We have in mind the spheres of financial-credit and foreign-economic activity, currency circulation, and privatization.

The guaranteeing of the integrity of the state's strategic raw-materials resources requires more decisive actions. It is no less important to eliminate the reasons why, with the entire seriousness of the problems of the "exporting of capital" abroad and the shortage of funds for investment in the domestic economy and reducing the budgetary deficit, the article in the Civil Code that stipulates the responsibility for concealing funds in foreign currency, practically speaking, does not operate at all.

In order to improve the situation, it is necessary not in words, but in deeds, to improve the operational-investigative work, and to establish rigid monitoring over the fulfillment of the requirements of the Russian MVD with regard to reinforcing the operational positions in the financial-credit system, the agencies of authority and administration, and the non-state sector of the economy, and with regard to introducing into practice new forms for obtaining and collecting information on criminal processes.

It is necessary to improve the interaction with other law-enforcement departments. Unity of approaches has been achieved with the General Procuracy with regard to many questions of the fight against crime, including problems of exposing and investigating murders, the prevention of economic crimes, and the stopping of occurrences of corruption. It is necessary to implement the same kind of unity both in the approaches and, most important, in the interactions between the internal affairs agencies and the agencies of the procuracy of all subjects of the Federation.

Jointly with the territorial agencies of the FSB, GTK, DNP, and the RF Federal Service For Currency and Export Control, on the basis of the regular exchange of information, the expansion of the practice of the joint carrying out of special operations and control inspections, it is necessary to work persistently to resolve the task of undermining the financial basis of organized crime groupings operating in the economy.

The activity of the subdivisions dealing with economic crimes must be evaluated mainly on the basis of the results of stopping heinous crimes, the effectiveness of the operational accompaniment of the investigation of criminal cases initiated with regard to them, and the number of crimes for which cases have been sent to judicial review.

Something that represents a very serious danger for the processes of the stabilization of the sociopolitical situation in Russia and the successful implementation of the economic reforms is the corruption that has affected the economic structures and the agencies of authority and administration. The close interaction between officials and shady and openly criminal business is continuing.

At the same time, the impression is created that the only places that are worried about this problem are Krasnodar Kray, Moscow, and Stavropol Oblast. The share of these regions is more than half the corrupt officials exposed in the country, the criminal cases against whom were sent to court during the current year. In most of the other republics, krays, and oblast, people appear, rather, to be engaged in simulating that activity.

Can the internal affairs agencies of Altay Kray, Bryansk, Moscow, Leningrad, Samara, Saratov, and Ulyanovsk oblasts count on an effective fight against corruption if the number of cases of operational registration of corrupt officials that were initiated by them last year was reduced by a factor of 1.5-4? The number of interdicted instances of bribery in Mordvinia, Tyva, Khakasia, and Arkhangelsk, Kemerovo, Penza, and Chita oblasts was reduced by half or more. One would scarcely think that the administrators of the corresponding MVD and UVD will take upon themselves the boldness to assert that in those regions the representatives of officialdom have been imbued with high awareness of the law and have stopped taking bribes.

According to the available information, the practice of extorting bribes has affected privatization, the licensing of entrepreneurial activity, the regulating of foreign-economic relations, the distribution of budgetary funds in the form of subsidies and credit, the leasing of real estate, etc. Bribery and extortion have become widespread in the system of higher education, public health, and the municipal services.

I cannot fail to touch upon questions of the fight against the illegal turnover of narcotics. The drug situation in Russia is becoming increasingly acute. The geography of the spread of narcotics is broadening, and drug business is actively feeding the overall crime situation.

At the same time, in every fourth region there has been a reduction in the number of interdicted crimes that are linked with the spread of narcotics. Practically everywhere the work has stopped with regard to the identification of thefts of narcotics by persons who have access in connection with the execution of their official duties. For a number of years poor results in the fight against the illegal drug trade have been achieved by the MVD of Karelia and Mordvinia and the UVD of Orel and Yaroslavl oblasts. MVD of Kalmykia and the UVD of Vladimir and Volgograd oblasts have been working unsatisfactorily to unmask drug dealers.

The basis for the fundamental improvement of the work to stop crimes linked with narcotics is the Federal Special Program for comprehensive measures of counteraction to the abuse of narcotics and their illegal turnover. The Administration for Illegal Drug Turnover is required to guarantee the implementation of the measures stipulated by the program, and to strive more persistently to achieve from the other ministries and departments the complete execution of the measures that have been entrusted to them. It is required, if necessary, to initiate the bringing up of questions concerning the reasons for the nonexecution of specific points in the program for review by the Russian Government.

The operational-investigative efforts of the internal affairs agencies should be concentrated in identifying and eliminating the sources and channels of the penetration of narcotics into Russia. They should guarantee the reliable operational cover for transportation centers, as well as the financial and commercial structures having contacts with companies in the drug-producing countries, and should strengthen the interaction with agencies of counterintelligence, customs control, and the border troops.

The guaranteeing of public order continues to be a very important task. Concealed behind the figure of the reduction of street crime on the whole are alarming tendencies of the growth of heinous forms of crime. There has been a sharp decrease in the aggressiveness of the militia in combatting street hooliganism, thefts and hijackings of motor vehicles, and armed robberies in the street and criminal explosions do not evoke the proper reaction.

The situation has been influenced by miscalculations in the work performed by the administrators of the public-security militia. With their direct permissiveness, the patrol-post service is being broken up into pieces in order to execute various economic, technical, and other auxiliary functions. Associates drive large and small chiefs wherever they want to go, and are used to run errands. There has been an increase in the number of "desk" militia men and administrators, and the number of militia men on the streets is becoming smaller and smaller. Practically no foot patrols are assigned, at a time when the crews in patrol cars that are supposed to monitor the most likely crime areas practically do not even get out their cars. Monitoring of the organization of the work performed by the details has been weakened.

The numerous services and subdivisions of the public-security militia operate in isolation from one another, executing their narrowly departmental tasks. The system of the single deployment of posts and routes, and the comprehensive use of manpower and means in protecting law and order, continue to exist only on paper.

Despite the acute shortage of the militia on the streets, incomplete use is being made of the potential of the special motorized military units of the internal troops of the Russian MVD. On the average, ten servicemen who were assigned to the protection of law and order last year stopped one crime and one administrative violation. The instructional sessions for military details are frequently disrupted, and the servicemen are not provided any orientation or other information concerning the crimes that were committed or the individuals who are being sought.

It is necessary to return to work in the sectors, posts, and routes being serviced the sector inspectors of militia and the PPS militia men who are being used improperly, and to guarantee the optimal combination of permanent militia posts and patrols. It is desirable to transform some of the vehicular patrols to the system of patrolling their beat on foot. Also, the work performed by the immediate-response groups that are attached to the duty units should be organized in the mode of vehicular patrols that are ready to depart immediately in response to reports of violations of the law.

It is necessary to assign to each detail of PPS, OMON, the municipal militia, and GAI DPS a specific territory, route, and post, and to put into practice a daily report on the results of their work and their personal responsibility for the state of the law and order in the sector assigned to them.

It is necessary to guarantee the mandatory weekly conducting of joint instructional sessions for the details that have been activated in a system of single deployment; to stipulate the participation in them of the administrators of the crime militia and investigation; and to develop a system of announced and secret monitoring of the work performed by the patrol-post details, especially in places of market trade and the concentration of criminal elements.

I would also like to discuss another important problem that pertains to the functions of the public-security militia. At the present time a question that is being reviewed is the question of expanding the monitoring of the agencies of inquiry to whose competency it is proposed additionally to transfer the investigation of more than 50 *corpora delicti*. In this regard the forecasted work load placed upon the public-security militia with regard to the guaranteeing of inquiry will almost double. The specialized inquiry subdivisions alone will scarcely be able to cope with this kind of work load.

With a consideration of these circumstances, it is necessary for the Main Administration of Personnel and the Main Administration For Guaranteeing Public Order, and the administrators of MVD and UVD to engage immediately in the instructing of all the officers in the public-security militia, to provide them with the solid professional work habits required for investigating these crimes. In particular, they should organize courses at our educational institutions and training centers; should form groups of instructor to conduct classes in the outlying areas themselves; and should involve in that work the most experienced associates from the investigative apparatuses. Simultaneously, they should conduct coordination conferences with the agencies of the procuracy and the courts to develop uniform approaches to the application of the method of using minutes in the pretrial preparation of the materials.

The complication of the criminal situation is linked to a significant extent with the insufficiently aggressive preventive work. The restoration of its potential has been proceeding at an inadmissibly slow rate.

One continues to observe the completely unjustified assignment of the militia's sector inspectors to various services and subdivisions. They are being assigned the duties of investigators and *ad hoc* investigating officers, and are being used to replace staff associates at duty units; they participate in the convoying of prisoners, and are assigned to immediate-response groups. All of this leads to a loss of the already weak contacts with the population in the assigned sector, and lowers the level at which people are informed about the crime-producing processes that are occurring in the housing sector. Preventive work with individuals requiring permanent surveillance on the part of the militia, including by means of the establishment of administrative oversight of prior convicts, is being pushed into the background.

The negative consequences of this are obvious. The rates of increase of recidivism as compared with last year have quadrupled. In Khabarovsk Kray, Kaliningrad, Murmansk, Novgorod, Sakhalin, Tyumen, and Yaroslavl oblasts the percentage of convicts who have been taken under administrative oversight is half the average for the country, and recidivism has increased by 43-70 percent.

In a number of regions the reduction in the effectiveness of preventive work has had a negative effect on the state of juvenile crime. In this regard the situation is especially alarming in Leningrad, Perm, Sverdlovsk, and Chita oblasts, where the number of crimes committed by minors has been continuing to grow since last year.

I feel that the organizing of the work performed by the specialized subdivisions to prevent violations by minors needs substantial adjustment. It is necessary urgently to re-examine the approaches to the selection and manning of personnel in that service. In order to fill the vacancies, it is necessary to train skilled associates who have already had experience in operational-investigative and preventive activities. And it is necessary to stop assigning associates from the service to execute tasks that are not consistent with their normal duties.

It is necessary to take steps to strengthen the interaction between the subdivisions responsible for preventing violations by minors and the apparatus of criminal investigation, inquiry, and the other services. The task of preventing juvenile crime must be resolved in a comprehensive manner, with the close coordination of the operational and overall preventive measures.

There continues to be a large number of unresolved problems in the sphere of guaranteeing the safety of traffic on the roads. Lack of discipline, the frank ignoring of the traffic rules, continues to be the distinguishing feature of a considerable number of drivers. Pedestrians have to "compete" with them, and every fourth DTP [automobile accident] involves a pedestrian. The safety of passenger hauls is unsatisfactorily provided for. A large number of recriminations have been leveled at the low efficiency of GAI inspectors, and one encounters everywhere disgraceful instances of bribe-taking that undermine the authority of the militia as a whole.

It is necessary to increase the demandingness toward officials in the regional agencies of the executive authority and toward the administrators of enterprises, institutions, and organizations who ignore the observance of the norms and standards in the sphere of guaranteeing the safety of road traffic.

The road-patrol service will have to operate in a more time-responsive and clear-cut manner. In a number of regions the deployment of its posts is not adjusted promptly and frequently it does not conform to the situation that is developing, and no provision is made for maneuvering manpower and means depending upon the daily intensity of the transportation traffic. The inspector staff is passive in eliminating the increasingly frequent traffic jams, and ignores numerous instances of the improper writing up of reports on violations and accidents.

The internal affairs ministers and the UVD chiefs will take under their personal control the conducting of announced and secret inspections of how the personnel of Gosavtoinspektsiya [GAI] are performing their duties, and will guarantee the use of operational-technical means for those purposes, and involve other services of the internal affairs agencies in carrying them out.

It is no less important to increase the effectiveness of the work involved in investigating hijacked motor transportation and motor vehicles whose drivers have left the scene of automobile accidents. The exposure rate of such crimes remains extremely low. More than 87 percent of motor-vehicle thefts have not been uncovered, and every fourth driver whose disdain for the traffic rules has led to people's deaths has not been established.

It is necessary to take specific steps to overcome the lack of coordination among the efforts of various services in this area of official-operational activity. It is necessary to increase the intensity of the work to create and to provide the technical equipping of the control posts of the militia in the interregional defensive system, and to analyze the causes of the ineffective use of the already installed technical means and electronic systems.

The present-day realities of life have placed among the high-priority tasks the task of the personnel support of the official-operational activity of the internal affairs agencies. The measures taken during the current year have made it possible to reduce somewhat the understaffing of the rank-and-file and leadership complement. The accepting of people into the service on the basis of a contract is being introduced into the practice of personnel work, and the professional orientation of young people is developing.

At the same time the work with personnel does not yet conform to the requirements of the Federal Law entitled "Principles of State Service in the Russian Federation," and frequently that work is not tied in with the criminal situation or the volume and complexity of the tasks to be resolved by the internal affairs agencies. Questions of personnel policy are not always taken under the personal control of the administrators of the internal affairs agencies.

In the Buryatia MVD, the Moscow GUVD, and the UVD of Amur and Tomsk oblasts and Chukotka Autonomous Okkrug, it has not been possible to achieve the stabilization of the personnel complement, and personnel turnover remains problem No. 1 for the most important services: criminal investigation, inquiry, and the militia sector inspectors.

MVD and UVD administrators, you should pay the maximum amount of attention to problems of official and combat training, the shortcomings in the organizing of which have become of the main reasons for the inability of a considerable number of the personnel to counteract the increasing professionalism and organizational cohesion of the criminal world.

We are especially alarmed by the fact that today more than 43,000 associates who have been newly accepted into the service have not undergone initial instruction.

The fundamental restructuring of the work with administrative personnel is absolutely mandatory. The system of their interregional rotation and the exchange of personnel along the vertical line has ben violated. The writing of performance appraisals for administrators is done in a formal manner. Supervision of their work and their moral and on-the-job qualities has been reduced, and many administrators do not serve as proper role models for their subordinates.

The lack of consistent and purposeful work with administrators has become the reason for the high replacement rate of chiefs in the city-rayon internal affairs agencies. At the Ingushetia MVD, the UVD of Astrakhan and Murmansk oblasts, and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, from 30 to 70 percent of the administrators at that level have been replaced.

One of the well-tested levers for increasing the responsibility for the job that has been assigned is the institution of performance appraisals for associates and administrators at all levels. At the same time, during recent years no serious importance has been attached to this word. The managerial personnel did not receive performance appraisals for a prolonged period of time, and that promoted the appearance in some of them of a sense of irresponsibility and impunity for any omissions in their official-operational activity.

We will have to increase the intensity of that work in the subdivisions and to carry out in 1996 the writing of nonscheduled performance appraisals for the managerial component of the *nomenklatura* of the RF minister of internal affairs.

One cannot fail to take into consideration the fact that miscalculations in personnel policy, in addition to lack of a systems approach in carrying out educational work, and the lowering of the administrators' demandingness toward their subordinates, result in numerous violations of legality, and the increase of crime among the personnel. Every instance of crime or violation on the part of associates of the internal affairs agencies and the servicemen in the internal troops nullifies the efforts of entire collectives and undermines the authority of the MVD system. More than 2000 associates have already ben brought to criminal responsibility this year. We are especially concerned by the fact that approximately half of them committed heinous crimes. We have been observing the formation of closer ties with organized crime and gangs.

An official inspection of a number of blatant instances of abuse linked with the illegal sale of weapons and the improper registration of foreign motor transportation is continuing.

The steps to be taken to purify our ranks of workers who have compromised themselves, and of their protectors, have been approved by the President of the Russia Federation.

Purification is not a purge, but a process that is firmly regulated by legal norms. We shall not allow the shadow of suspicion to fall upon innocent people, much less entire collectives. But neither shall we make any compromises with dishonest administrators or associates.

For purposes of strengthening legality and protecting the MVD system from the influence of criminal communities and leaders of the criminal world, as well as all kinds of corrupted individuals, a system of our subdivisions for our own security is being created both in the central apparatus, and at the level of the MVD, UVD, and UVDT.

The line aimed at ridding the agencies and the troops of corrupted individuals, traitors, and bribe-takers will also be maintained firmly in the future.

The basis of the system of the internal affairs agencies is made up of healthy and able-bodied forces. They are completely capable of resolving the complicated tasks, and are able to restore the trust that Russians used to have in the militia, to increase the authority of the MVD agencies, and, most important, to guarantee reliable law and order.

Success in resolving the tasks that have been assigned depends upon our ability to organize our work efficiently and to create a situation of increased demandingness for its final results and rigid monitoring of the implementation of the planned measures.

Russia: Imports of Contraband Narcotics Increasing

964F1623A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 19 Mar 96 p 14

[Article by Aleksey Gerasimov: "They Are Bringing Tonnes of Marijuana Into Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The Administration for Combatting Customs Violations of the GTK [State Customs Committee] of Russia has prepared an analytical report devoted to narcotics contraband. In 1995, there was a significant increase in the amount of synthetic drugs such as LSD, metadone, amphetamines and others brought into the country, as well as cocaine. At the same time, the import of contraband heroin declined. According to the estimates of the**

customs officials, most of the drugs come into Russia from Ukraine, as well as from Central Asia and Western Europe.

According to the data of customs officials, it is primarily persons from Nigeria who engage in the contraband of strong-acting narcotics in Russia. They generally hide small batches (up to 1-2 kg) of heroin or cocaine in double-sided suitcases, as well as in various packages disguised as food products (in coffee and tea cans, etc.). The strong-acting narcotics are confiscated predominantly in Moscow and St. Petersburg airports.

However, it is a different situation with poppy straw, which comes into Russia from the countries of the near abroad, most often from Ukraine. As a rule, it is brought in by automobile transport or by rail, and sometimes in rather large batches (up to several tonnes). Then again, narcotics of plant origin come into Russia also from Western Europe.

Thus, GTK associates, working together with their colleagues from the FRG [Federative Republic of Germany], in 1995 detained a shipment of marijuana (2.5 tonnes) which was found on the steamship Bremer Uranus, en route to St. Petersburg from Antwerp. The cargo was intended for the Moscow firm, "Gloria." Upon arrival of the narcotic in the capital, operatives of the FSB [Federal Security Service] and the GTK of Russia detained two citizens of Russia (representatives of "Gloria"), as well as citizens of the Netherlands and Ecuador. An investigation is currently underway in this case.

Customs officials have the most problems with the hallucinogen LSD, since it is most difficult to detect. LSD is used by placing a piece of paper impregnated with it on the tongue. It is shipped in ready-to-use form. But even here the customs agents have had some success. Thus, in April of last year associates of the postal-baggage customs office of the Moscow International Post Office seized a large shipment of the hallucinogen (500 doses), packed in a parcel. This time a sheet of stamps, hidden between the pages of a book, had been impregnated with the narcotic.

As compared with 1994, the amount of detained narcotics has increased on the whole by 1.9 times. Moreover, there were 4.4 times more cocaine shipments detained last year as compared with 1994. The number of smugglers caught with marijuana has also increased sharply. However, other tendencies are also being observed. Thus, as of 1993 there has been a steady decline in the contraband import of heroin into Russia.

Russia: RUOP After Diamonds, Passports, Narcotics

964F1622A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 6 Mar 96 p 14

[Article by Dmitriy Kuybyshev and Fedor Maksimov: "Armenian Diamonds, Azerbaijani Drugs, and Vietnamese Passports"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Officers of the Moscow RUOP [Regional Administration for Organized Crime] carried out several operations on 4 March. During one of them, the militia officers confiscated more than 400 cut and uncut diamonds from Armenian jewelers, the value of which is estimated at $7.5 million. Nine Chinese attempting to fly out of Russia on forged Vietnamese passports were arrested at the Sheremetyevo-2 International Airport. During subsequent investigative actions the officers uncovered an underground shop producing foreign passports and visas from various countries. The last operation carried out by the organized-crime fighters on the day before yesterday cannot be called successful. During the arrest of active participants in the Lenkoran gang, Jr. Lt. Aleksey Fominov, an intern with Moscow's Southern District ROOP [Regional Department for Organized Crime], was fatally wounded.

RUOP Did Not Allow Fraternal Bonds To Be Broken

It could be called an accident that the officers were put on the trail of the jewel merchants. On 1 March an Armenian ran into the RUOP office (6 Shabolovka) scared to death. He said that his brother, a jeweler from Yerevan, had been kidnapped. Bandits were demanding $30,000 to free him. "I would pay," the man lamented, "but I don't have the money, and I'm afraid that the money won't help and they'll kill my brother anyway."

Over the next two days the officers investigated the brothers' business relations and acquaintances. Ultimately they learned that the hostage was being hidden in an apartment at No. 24 Isakovskiy Street. On the afternoon of 4 March the organized-crime fighters broke into the apartment. The expectation that the hostage would be held by bandits armed to the teeth proved wrong. There was just one guard, and he was easily disarmed—the appearance of the RUOP officers was so surprising that he had no time to show resistance. Soon the hostage was able to meet with his brother.

An examination of the apartment produced the most unexpected results. The militia officers uncovered several packages containing 36 cut and 400 uncut diamonds. By preliminary estimates alone, the value of the gemstones is more than $1 million. In addition, the officers confiscated equipment for cutting and appraising diamonds, and $8,000 in cash.

The arrested man (who, incidentally, is a native of Yerevan), offered no explanations as to where the diamonds in the apartment had come from, but the officers conjecture that the diamonds they found had been brought to Moscow from Yakutia. Since the beginning of this year, RUOP officers have already removed uncut and cut diamonds totaling approximately 160,000 carats from illegal circulation. Their value is estimated at $7.5 million, and as a rule, the gemstones have been confiscated from members of Moscow's Armenian diaspora.

KOMMERSANT-DAILY: *The illegal gemstones market developed in Soviet times. It was controlled by the well-known Armenian crime boss Rafik Bagdasaryan (Svo). After his death the profitable business remained under the control of the Armenian criminal community. Acquiring huge amounts of money, the criminals would transfer it to the accounts of Armenian commercial structures in California. Then the laundered money would return to Russia and Armenia in the form of investments or it would be used to acquire real estate in the United States. Things reached the point that this February top RUOP officials officially announced that the "diamond business" was controlled by leaders of the Armenian Community gang and that officials of the RF Committee on Precious Metals and Precious Stones and of internal affairs agencies were involved in it.*

Bandits Shot the Visiting Officer

On Monday officers of the Southern District Regional Department for Organized Crime carried out an operation to arrest drug dealers. At about 6:00 pm two officers headed for a bus stop (34 Dmitriy Ulyanov Street) where Caucasians frequently gathered. There they arrested five active members of the Lenkoran crime gang. The Azerbaijanis were found to have 17 grams of the powerful narcotic methadone in their possession. In order to deliver the arrested men to headquarters, the officers requested help over the radio.

Half an hour later, instead of the militia vehicle, a rather new Volvo 850 drove up, from which two Caucasians emerged. Seeing that men holding portable radios in their hands were standing next to their fellow countrymen (the officers were in civilian clothes), they shouted: "Hey you, we'll finish you off." Then they pulled pistols out of their pockets and opened fire. The militia officers started shooting back. In all, about 30 shots were fired, but the bullets didn't hit anything. At the very peak of the shoot-out, the vehicle that the organized crime fighters had called for to carry away the arrested men drove up. In it was the unarmed ROOP intern, 32 year old Aleksey Fominov. Seeing that help had come for the militia officers, the bandits started to flee. The criminals continued to fire while on the run, and one of their bullets hit Fominov in the stomach. The bandits didn't get away. (In fleeing, one of them discarded a leather coat, in which the militia officers found a passport in the name of Ruslan Ibragimov, a 21-year-old native of Groznyy). A few minutes later Fominov died from heavy loss of blood in the emergency squad vehicle. He had served two years as a precinct inspector in the Zagorodnyy Municipal District Internal Affairs department and in the last month had applied for work in the ROOP.

"The murder of a militia officer will not go unpunished for the drug dealers," said a RUOP spokesman.

KOMMERSANT-DAILY: *The Lenkoran crime gang, consisting mainly of natives of Azerbaijan's Lenkoran Oblast, controls at least half of the Moscow drug market. Just last year officers from various subdivisions of the Moscow City Internal Affairs Administration arrested about 20 gang members, from whom they confiscated a large amount of heroine, cocaine, methadone and other powerful narcotics. In addition, more than $1 million in profits was confiscated from the Lenkoran gang members.*

Chinese Pretending To Be Vietnamese

On the very same day, the organized crime fighters also did some work at Sheremetyevo-2. They arrested eight Chinese who proved to be carrying forged Vietnamese foreign passports, while the latter were passing through a border control post. The Chinese had intended to use the forged passports to fly to the Czech Republic. Instead of the Czech Republic, a few hours later they found themselves in a holding cell in the RUOP building. For a long time the Chinese could not figure out how the militia officers had managed to tell them from Vietnamese.

KOMMERSANT's correspondent wondered the same thing. In reply, the RUOP officers told how they had been purposefully following Asians. The thing is, the organized crime fighters had information about the activities of an underground print shop that was turning out forged passports. The Chinese would stamp the forged passports and then sell them to their fellow countrymen who wanted to travel through Russia to Western Europe. At one such print shop, set up in a residential apartment on Vernadskiy Prospect, militia officers confiscated equipment, 24 forged passports of Vietnamese citizens, and the official stamps of the Moscow City Internal Affairs Administration's Department of Visas and Registration, the Vietnamese consular service, the Czech Republic police, and various Russian and Ukrainian higher schools.

The eight arrested false Vietnamese had acquired the products of precisely that print shop. Now criminal proceedings have been initiated against them for the use of forged documents and the attempt to illegally cross the Russian state border. Once the investigation of the criminals is completed, they will evidently be sent back to China.

KOMMERSANT-DAILY: *The production of forged exit documents is just a part of the criminal business that numerous Chinese gangs in Russia engage in. According to the information of law-enforcement agencies, the so-called Beijing gang, headed by several recidivist criminals with multiple convictions (most of whom are presently fugitives in the People's Republic of China) is especially active in Moscow. The most well-known of them is the crime boss Nyu Tun (who is presently serving his latest sentence). The "Beijing" criminals collect tribute from wealthy Chinese living in Moscow and Moscow Oblast, and they do not fear retribution since the victims generally do not go to the militia because of their poor knowledge of Russian and fear of retribution. Chinese who are living illegally in Moscow are, for the most part, subject to the same racket. Other sources of income for the Chinese gangs include the supply of drugs to Russia and prostitution.*

RUOP spokesmen note that Chinese gangs in Moscow are not yet as dangerous as Caucasian or Slavic gangs. On the other hand, in the Far East the Chinese are on a par with local bandits in terms of the number of serious crimes they have committed.

Regional Affairs

Russia: Autonomous Okrugs Problem for Federation

964F1583A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by Ivan Vorotynskiy: "Is Sovereignization Moving in Deeper?: Financial-Economic Monsters May Privatize Autonomous Okrugs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It might have seemed that the "parade of sovereignties," when various regions of Russia began to declare their claims to independence or special status, was a thing of the past. They were mainly large national-state formations—republics belonging to Russia, which counted, as a result of the Novoye Ogarevo process, on enhancing their status within the USSR and, after its collapse, within Russia. Their claims caused serious concern among the territorial-state formations—Russia's krays and oblasts, in which the population was predominantly Russian. The rivalry between those types of components of the Federation, sometimes latent and sometimes heated, represented a serious threat to the country's integrity as a state.

The Federal Treaty—and then the series of agreements between Moscow and the components of the Federation—have made it possible, on the whole, to form a system of relations between the center and the regions that have provided for the preservation of the federal state. The sole dramatic exception has been Chechnya, where matters reached the point of a bloody war and there is not yet any prospect of settlement in sight.

However, there is a whole group of components of the Federation, each of which is potentially capable of creating serious problems for Russia's state system. These are the autonomous okrugs—national-state formations that are relatively small in terms of population but occupy substantial territory and are part of Russia's krays and oblasts. They have a dual constitutional status: on the one hand, they are independent components of the Federation and in that capacity signed the Federal Treaty; on the other, they are part of the administrative systems of krays and oblasts and are territorial structures of them. Consequently, they belong to two systems of subordination: directly to Moscow, and to kray or oblast bodies of authority.

Naturally, this duality of subordination contains the seeds of possible conflicts: it is hardly likely that the leadership of an okrug, which in constitutional status is equal to the leadership of a kray or oblast and belongs to the Federation Council on equal footing with them, will willingly subordinate itself to a kray or oblast. Yet in ordinary situations conflicts on this score generally do not arise. It is another matter when disputes arise on other issues; the debate about the rights and status of okrugs immediately begins to assume a dangerous thrust.

Until recently, the oil-rich okrugs of Tyumen Oblast—the Khanty-Mansi and Yamal-Nenets okrugs—were the lamentable leaders in the struggle for status. It was the right to control extremely rich natural resources that was the object of the dispute, while the question of status was its outward form and pretext. Today it appears that the Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenets) Okrug, whose claims to a redrawing of the Russian Federation map have an even more distinctive economic basis, is moving to the fore.

The initiator of the okrug's fight for special status and secession from Krasnoyarsk Kray, to which it belongs today, was not the leadership of the okrug itself but the management of the Norilsk Nickel Russian Joint Stock Company and the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Combine. The reason was a desire to gain even stronger political positions in the fight for control over the state bloc of shares in the Russian joint stock company, which the state turned into collateral in a November 1995 auction. As we know, that auction was won by ONEKSIMbank, one of Norilsk Nickel's long-standing creditors.

There were a good many disputes about the auction's results, but at the time the company's management did not oppose the bank, evidently assuming that it would continue simply to provide credit to the combine. However, after the court confirmed the rights of the collateral-holder, the combine's management changed its position and started to argue for a revision of the auction's results. Specialists say that the sole reason for this was that ONEKSIMbank had demonstrated an intention to intervene in matters of production policy and replace the management with a new one capable of leading the Russian joint stock company out of the hole in which the present management had put it.

Evidently, in fighting for their jobs the company's executives counted on the support of the Krasnoyarsk Kray administration but did not receive it. Therefore, the idea of granting independence to the Taymyr Okrug has the clear purpose of getting a compliant local leadership that is prepared to defend the interests of the local directors' corps in Moscow. It is only in a formal sense that the okrug's capital is Dudinka. In reality it is in Norilsk, in the management of Norilsk Nickel. That, incidentally, is what accounts for substantial deviations from the Russian Federation Constitution in the status of residents of the city of Norilsk. That status violates 12 articles of the Constitution and even an entire chapter on self-government that the all-powerful combine management does not want to accept.

A similar problem exists in many Russian cities with large enterprises on which the cities are based, but only in an autonomous okrug can that problem take on the aspect of a constitutional crisis. The problem of to whom the state bloc of shares in the Russian joint stock company belongs can be solved (in principle, the court of arbitration has already issued a decision), but the more general, constitutional problem will await the next occasion like a delayed action bomb.

The forms of Russia's state system do not yet even suggest a model course of solution. Granted, there is still foreign experience. There, too, territories on which indigenous ethnic groups reside have a special status: the status of zones of direct administration—not for economic development but for the support and protection of the indigenous groups—from the federal center. Foreign reservations and territories allow the resolution of issues having to do with economic activity to be submitted to the judgment of the population, and not the local leadership. The industrial "barons" have to court favor not with federal and provincial capitals but with the indigenous population itself. If we had such an arrangement, we might not be hearing calls today from Norilsk for the creation of a small, albeit bloodless, Chechnya in the North.

Russia: Yaroslavl Governor on Regions' Role in Elections, Reform

964F1537A Moscow OGONEK in Russian Mar 96 No 11, pp 28-29

[Interview with Anatoliy Lisitsyn, head of the "Central Russia" Association and co-chairman of the Union of Governors of Russia, conducted by Pavel Nikitin, OGONEK correspondent in Yaroslavl: "The Province Is Terra Incognita; Fate of Reforms and Presidential Elections Will Be Resolved in the Regions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **1991 proved to be a year of breakthrough for Anatoliy Lisitsyn. He went from being mayor of the small town of Rybinsk to being the head of Yaroslavl Oblast. Today, 49- year old Governor Lisitsyn is one of the most influential regional leaders. He heads up the "Central Russia" Association, which includes all the oblasts of the Center, including Moscow Oblast. At the same time, he is also co-chairman of the Union of Governors of Russia.**

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Ivanovich, the enigma of today's elections is the absence of a regional leader among the candidates. How do you explain this?

[Lisitsyn] By the disunity of the regions and the regional elite. And the provinces are disunited not without participation of the Center. In general, Moscow has never strived to truly unite us.

[Correspondent] But there is a Union of Governors, as well as various regional associations. You yourself head up the "Central Russia" Association, which includes 11 central oblasts. How can you speak of disunification? Is this not a force?

[Lisitsyn] These associations, including the Union of Governors of Russia, on which, I might add, we pinned particular hopes, do not represent a force capable of influencing the polities of the government and the president. They are disunited, as is the entire provincial region as a whole.

[Correspondent] What are the reasons for the regional disunity?

[Lisitsyn] First of all, the absence of a clear ideology of reform and an equally clear course for its implementation. Each region is pulling in its own direction. Some support and actively implement reforms, others seem to be in the middle, while still others actively oppose reforms.

How can I, the governor of Yaroslavl, a proponent of market reforms and head of executive power of Ulyanovsk Oblast—where the card system, the basis of militant communism, is still thriving—seriously agree on a unified policy and unified influence on the Center?

[Correspondent] How would you characterize the policy implemented by the Center in regard to the provinces?

[Lisitsyn] I would characterize it as the absence of any policy whatsoever. For the Center the province is "terra incognita" [unknown territory]. Moscow, which continues to believe that the fate of Russia lies and will continue to lie within the boundaries of Sadovoye Koltso, is stewing in its own juices. For it, the provinces may as well not even exist. And if it remembers them, it is exclusively for propagandist purposes, when it is necessary to emphasize the fact that the authorities are attentive to the needs of those who live in the provinces. The somnolent lack of information by the Center is evidenced, specifically, by the memorable appointment of the conservative leader of Amur Oblast, Polevanov, as chairman of Goskomimushchestvo [State Committee for Administration of State Property] of Russia. And when, in his new capacity, Polevanov began spouting outright anti-reform rubbish, only then did the capital personnel managers realize that they had made an error, that they had picked the wrong man.

And you may recall the last elections to the Duma! What kind of blocks they created within the boundaries of Sadovoye Koltso! How many spears were broken to get onto the lists of the fabricated, non-viable electoral associations! They all quarrelled and squabbled amongst themselves. In order to seriously, wholeheartedly, engage in this, one must be sure that the regions will follow the block that you are trying to get into. Apparently, there was such confidence, moreover it was blind confidence. How this all ended, everyone knows very well today.

[Correspondent] Yet there is much discussion today in Moscow about the processes taking place in the heartland. They are investigating, for instance, what happened to the money allocated for wages...

[Lisitsyn] I agree that part of the money does not reach the working man in a timely manner because it is being "turned over" somewhere by dishonest leaders and officials. But we cannot reduce the problem to this alone! The reasons for this phenomenon are much deeper. They lie in the imbalance of budget relations between the Center and the regions. For example, during Soviet times the entire social sphere of the cities was artificially tied to industrial enterprises, which included in their complement boiler room facilities, a housing fund, hospitals and other so-called social-cultural domestic provision. Moreover, this was all financed by federal budget funds. In the course of reform, social- cultural domestic provision went to the cities—a measure corresponding to civilized standards. Yet this cannot be done in a barbaric fashion, in a single swoop, without providing a single kopek (!) from the federal budget for these needs.

The money had to be taken from the lean local budget, which was not intended for additional superimposed loads. It had to be obtained from the monies which previously went for payment of wages. After all, you cannot close down the boiler rooms. They have to keep operating!

I recently spoke at one of the highest level conferences, depicting in great detail how the budget money is burning up in the boiler room furnaces, and I could see on the faces of the country's leaders that this was all news to them. Meanwhile, the indebtedness on labor wages in Yaroslavl Oblast last year has snowballed, and on 1 January of 1996 on the whole exceeded 173 billion rubles (R)!. And no one wanted to deal with the problem and get down to its roots. Thank God the elections are near. Now they have suddenly remembered and stopped to think—what and from where.

[Correspondent] Why can the provinces not declare themselves in full voice through the Federation Council? After all, the upper house today is entirely staffed with leaders from the regions.

[Lisitsyn] Here too there is no unity. The budget relations are built in such a way that the regions are fully dependent on Moscow. First the province credits the earned funds to the federal budget, and then goes to beg for this same money, trying to get it back for federal programs. They are asking for what is due to them under the law! Yet to one they will give a full bucket, while to another they will barely cover the bottom. The Center's generosity toward a regional leader is directly proportional to his obedience.

In a year, when the authorities throughout all of Russia will become popularly elected, the Federation Council, I believe, will be able to stand up for the provinces. But for now it is still too early to speak of this.

[Correspondent] Will the formulation of the Federation Council not lead to destructive anti-centrist tendencies, to the flourishing of such an ugly phenomenon as separatism?

[Lisitsyn] For the present time, Moscow itself is stirring up destructive processes with its ill-planned regional policy. Evidence of this is the campaign on signing of treaties and agreements by subjects of the Federation. There is more politics here than essence. Instead of establishing uniform rules of the game for all, providing Russian citizens with equal economic rights regardless of their place of residence, and thereby realizing total equality of subjects of the Federation as secured in the Constitution, once again it is a race for who will bargain out the most privileges for oneself. This sows dissention and mistrust of the regions toward each other, as well as toward the Center as the implementer of such policy.

[Correspondent] According to the results of the last elections to the State Duma, the communists have been victorious in Russia. Why, in this case, at the meeting in Moscow when the president was holding council with the regional leaders, were you the first to announce your support of the president? With such an arrangement of forces, do you believe that he will be victorious?

[Lisitsyn] The situation is not as hopeless as the capital's political scientists, who fear and do not understand the provinces, would have us believe. I am judging this by the results of the elections to the Yaroslavl Oblast State Duma, which were held literally in the last few days. The communists, having presented their candidates in almost all 50 districts and expecting to win at least a third of the mandates, in fact received only six. Although even back in December of 1995 at the elections to the RF [Russian Federation] State Duma they had a majority in the oblast. The 10-11 percent of the votes won by the communists, in my opinion, represent their real base. And no more than that. These people are going to vote for the communists under any arrangement. Everything else that was received by the communist party at the elections of 17 December is the foam, stirred up by the sorting out of the capital bureaucrats from the policy which sees in them the sense and way of life.

The fate of the elections, and along with them the fate of reforms, is resolved not in Moscow, but in the provinces. If the Center, seriously realizing this fact, changes its regional policy, introduces corrections into the course of reform, and unifies all the reformist forces under its banners, it will be successful in achieving a breakthrough in the situation.

Results of sociological surveys conducted by the Governor's Analytical Center of Yaroslavl Oblast

What principle of state arrangement do you most favor? (In percent of number of respondents)



Key: 1 - Did not respond; 2 - Makes no difference to me; 3 - Union of practically independent territories with coordinating center; 4 - State with relatively independent regions, with strong central authority; 5 - Unified indivisible state with strong central authority

What do you think about possible changes in your life in the coming year (In percent of number of respondents)



Key: 1 - Confident of change for the better; 2 - Confident of change for the worse; 3 - Presume changes for the better; 4 - Believe that everything will remain the same; 5 - Presume changes for the worse

Do you consider your personal participation possible in the following actions?

	Oct 94	Apr 95	Oct 95
Meeting, demonstration	20.18	7.64	10.51
Distribution of appeals, collection of signatures		3.61	1.87
Picketing organs of authority		1.85	1.29
Strike	12.30	5.80	5.81
Armed resistance, terrorist act or other active violent forms of resistance	3.09	1.37	1.41
Political dialogue, discussion	27.09	8.80	4.89
Will not participate in any actions		53.17	76.47
Decline to answer		23.73	

Russia: Nizhniy Novgorod Adopts NEP-2

964F1468B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA (BIZNES V ROSSII SUPPLEMENT) in Russian 12 Mar 96 p 15

[Article by Yuriy Shchukov, Nizhniy Novgorod: "NEP With a Nizhniy Novgorod Accent"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The authorities of Nizhniy Novgorod have developed a new economic policy [NEP] for the next four years. The basic areas in the program, which has been given the local name NEP-2 (by analogy with the NEP of the 1920's) were recently submitted for review by the deputies to the oblast Legislative Assembly.**

As was emphasized by the persons who developed the program —specialists in the oblast administration — the concept that was made the basis of the oblast's economic policy for 1996-1999 was the concept of bringing the oblast out of the extended depression, of increasing the effectiveness of production, and of guaranteeing the complete financing of social programs. That noble goal, of course, could not evoke anyone's objections. But how to achieve that goal is another question.

In NEP-2 one can discern several key factors that can be considered as levers for the future economic rebirth. According to the oblast administration, the oblast's industry is in critical need of a reduction of the tax burden. People are awaiting that, incidentally,not only in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast. Can anything be done in this direction by any individually taken territory? The team of specialists feels that it can. The proposal is to reduce the profit tax for enterprises that take disciplined consideration of the oblast budget — reducing it from 21 to 17 percent. According to the computations of the oblast's financial specialists, if all the enterprises paid the 17-percent tax promptly, the oblast's treasury would receive more money than it is collecting currently by attempting to enforce the legal 21-percent rate. For example, the largest taxpayer in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast — the Gorkiy Automobile Plant —currently makes settlements with the oblast budget... by means of motor vehicles. The administration's business office has urgently undertaken the organizing of auctions to sell the "tax trucks," offering "Gazel" [Gazelles] to rural residents at a ridiculous starting price of one to two million rubles, and even in installment payments.

The originators of the program see another lever for encouraging business activity in the recently enacted law on the taxation of small business, the initiators of which were, incidentally, Nizhniy Novgoroders themselves. Now the total number of taxes in the sphere of small business is being replaced by one — the income tax, which has a maximum limit: 30 percent of the enterprise's total income.

The program has also prepared a pleasant surprise for enterprises in the military-industrial complex [VPK]. The legislators have been asked to confirm the freeing from local taxes of export-ready output that has been produced at converted production entities in the oblast. That measure will provide more favorable conditions for reorienting the former defense industry, will ease the nonpayments crisis, and will weaken the dependence upon state production orders, the volume of which has been falling catastrophically. And, no less importantly, it will finally force the oblast's substantial scientific-technical potential to enter the competitive struggle with the producers of foreign output.

The experiment will be continued in the free territorial production zones that were formed on the basis of three enterprises in the Nizhniy Novgorod VPK last year. At the enterprises that were given a tax vacation, approximately 60,000 square meters of production area are still empty. One cannot explain simply by the sluggishness of the local entrepreneurs the fact that, despite the mode of untaxed existence and the duty-free importing of components, completely efficient production entities have not yet started up. It is most likely, the experts feel, that the procedure for the functioning of enterprises in the tax-free zones has proven to be excessively complicated.

It is obvious that it is impossible to achieve any economic spurt without "long" money. But the maximum periods for the granting of credit, as practiced by the local banks, do not exceed six months. In order to encourage investments in industry, the oblast administration proposes reducing the rate of the tax on bank profits (naturally, insofar as pertains to payments to the local budget), with the proviso that the banks provide long-term credit to industry.

According to the developers of the "new economic policy," the program must define the priorities that are aimed at the technical retooling of the enterprises and the involving in the administration of the privatized enterprises of the best-trained personnel who are selected only on a competitive basis. In this regard, in a number of the branches that pay for themselves most quickly, it is proposed to shift the emphasis to investment auctions. And to evaluate the activity of the rayon and city administrations primarily on the basis of the volumes of investments that have been attracted to the territories that are subordinate to them.

In agriculture it is planned to make wider use of credit and leasing, and to partially subsidize pedigree and seed management. The state support system will also include personal plots owned by Nizhniy Novgoroders. Taking into consideration the fact that the local model of reorganizing agricultural enterprises has proven its viability, it is planned to take the following step in Nizhniy Novgorod: to change over from developing a network of peasant markets operating in various rayons in the city and the oblast to the creation of a wholesale network and the organizing of agricultural exchanges.

An undisputed find for Nizhniy Novgoroders is the program for constructing housing for military personnel. Now the same scheme will be used to build homes for workers in the militia and employees of the internal troops.

A special question is housing-construction cooperatives [ZhSK]. At the present time 45 ZhSK homes have been interrupted at various stages of readiness because the cooperative members have encountered the problem of being provided with their own investments. Soon the development of a program for subsidizing the cooperatives and for completing as quickly as possible that which has been begun will be completed. Lying at the basis of the program is the principle of shared financing both by the cooperative participants and the local budget. And it will be on a parity basis. The deadline for completing the construction is three years.

The basic areas in the "new economic policy" developed by the oblast administration have already been approved by the oblast Legislative Assembly. However, in its final form the program will be approved once again by the deputies.

Russia: I. Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Elections Viewed

964F1459A Nizhniy Novgorod NIZHEGORODSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 28 Dec 95 p 2

[Report on "round table" with Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Sergey Viktorovich Borisov, chairman of the Council of the Nizhniy Novgorod Research Foundation, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Andrey Vasilyevich Dakhin, Candidate of Historical Sciences Aleksandr Anatolyevich Iudin, docent, head of the Department of Applied Sociology of State University, et al by K. Denisov: "Nizhniy Novgorod Elections-95"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Immediately after the publication of the preliminary election results Nizhniy Novgorod political scientists and sociologists gathered in the editorial department of NIZHEGORODSKIYE NOVOSTI without delay. Elections to the State Duma and the gubernatorial and mayoral elections, undoubtedly, are the main political events of the outgoing year. Many scientific publications will be devoted to them. However, this will be later. Now it is important to record the first impressions, the first stage in the comprehension of the democratic expression of the will of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast residents. Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Sergey Viktorovich Borisov, chairman of the Council of the Nizhniy Novgorod Research Foundation, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Andrey Vasilyevich Dakhin, Candidate of Historical Sciences Aleksandr Anatolyevich Iudin, docent, head of the Department of Applied Sociology of State University, Candidate of Political Sciences Mikhail Anatolyevich Kazakov, docent at the Department of Social Philosophy and Political Science of Technical University, member of the Council of the Nizhniy Novgorod Research Foundation, and Candidate of Historical Sciences Andrey**

Stanislavovich Makarychev, senior instructor at the Department of Political Science of Nizhniy Novgorod University, took part in the work of the "round table."

[Denisov] Before we begin the discussion of the first election results in terms of your scientific specialty, I would ask that, literally in three words, you express the first feelings, which arose in you at the moment when you heard the most preliminary voting results.

[Borisov] Predictable. Not fatal. Regrettable.

[Dakhin] Concerning communists and democrats: That's what it is.

[Iudin] Little unexpected.

[Kazakov] Elections were predictable.

[Makarychev] A poorly hidden disappointment.

[Kazakov] The aim of our "round table" is to give the first evaluations of the election results and a political commentary. Translated from Latin the word "commentary" means "interpretation." The political commentary is intended to explain the meaning of a specific sociopolitical event and objectively at that, without a propaganda tinge and the juggling of facts. In my opinion, places of political commentators in the mass information media of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast remain vacant. The omnivorousness of some authors, who undertake this complex work, is understandable. First, some of them are politically engaged. Second, the existence of financial interest can be assumed. The substitution of a newspaper reporter's verbiage for a scientific and political forecast is not unusual. Such a mixing of styles is not in the reader's favor. We must make up for the shortage of current analytic materials to some extent in the course of today's "round table."

[Dakhin] Forecasts have been very popular recently. Many try to guess how events will develop. However, the main task of the political science specialist is to comprehend the meaning of events that have taken place.

[Borisov] Forecasting is part of the duties of people engaged in applied political science. However, this, in fact, is not the first task. The time of actions of political scientists comes now, when there are sufficient materials for an analysis of the past elections.

[Denisov] How do the results of voting in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast differ from the average Russian results?

[Borisov] If we compare them with the elections in our oblast in 1993, the differences in voting results are insignificant. Our oblast voted two to three percent less "communistically," with all the conventionality of this term. In 1995 we repeated these indicators, only we gave one percent more votes to Zhirinovskiy than, on the average, in Russia. Most likely, this is due to our governor's special relations with the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. Some anti-Nemtsov voters, to spite him, decided to vote for Zhirinovskiy. On the whole, however, Nizhniy Novgorod residents vote like most Russians do, only they shift a little toward the right of the political spectrum.

[Dakhin] As compared with 1993, in Novyy Novgorod Zhirinovskiy followers picked up two percent more votes and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, 6.7 percent more. In 1993 against the general Russian background Novyy Novgorod looked more "democratic," more reformist than now.

[Kazakov] The fact that elections were democratic both in terms of the organization of voting and the number of voters who came to the ballot boxes should be noted. The main result is not so much the victory of leftist forces as the realization by Russian voters of two alternatives to social development: traditional and innovative. The emerging shift toward the traditional path is by no means so terrible. First, this choice was made within the framework of the democratic procedure, which in itself is an achievement for Russia. Second, the present government, indeed, received what it deserved. Third, all political forces without exception acquired the grounds for the correction of their subsequent actions. The strengthening of the communists' positions increases the responsibility placed on them.

[Denisov] If our oblast, indeed, is the leader of Russian reforms, the positive results or the feeling of the dynamics of these reforms in some way could more obviously be manifested in the voting results, in particular in the support of Yabloko and other reformist parties. Obviously, the lack of such pronounced support can be assessed as meaning that reforms are not considered a blessing by the mass of our voters.

[Iudin] There is no mass of voters as such, voters are very heterogeneous. There are rayons where the support of the liberal wing of the voting list is quite pronounced. First of all, these are rayons of Nizhniy Novgorod. Balakhna, Kotovo, and Dzerzhinsk are also more liberally oriented than the "red crescent": Pilninskiy, Gaginskiy, Vadskiy, Diveyevskiy, Kulebakskiy, and Buturlinskiy rayons. They voted in Rasteryayev's favor.

[Dakhin] In 1993 rural rayons gave votes to Zhirinovskiy, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and the Agrarian Party of Russia. In December 1995 this trend remained. In reality, not so much Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast as Nizhniy Novgorod itself is the sphere of dissemination of reforms. Reforms and their results are poorly discernible outside the city limits. They are noticeable only on individual farms, not even in individual rural rayons. Therefore, the orientation toward liberal, democratic forces is manifested only in Nizhniy Novgorod and in its vicinity.

[Borisov] It can be assumed that the scale of reforming does not affect the deep motivation of the people of our region. Therefore, they vote, on the average, as in other regions. It is also logical that, in principle, local Nizhniy Novgorod reformation cannot affect voting results too strongly. It should also be noted that reforms have now become almost completely the business of regional authorities themselves. The public is aloof. A considerable number of voters, who began reforms together with the governor, now feel a certain alienation and uselessness for the cause of reforms. This weakens the motivation of the potential democratic electorate.

[Kazakov] The distinction of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast as a "proving ground of reforms," which, in my opinion, is too exaggerated in its scale, was manifested precisely in the gubernatorial elections. This is also an indicator of the attitude of Russian out-of-the way places toward the transformations carried out by the capital's leadership. The elections demonstrated whom the provincial voter trusts and why. The low percent of votes for "Russia Is Our Home" and the high for Nemtsov is another confirmation of this.

[Denisov] Many consider B. Nemtsov an energetic conductor of Yeltsin's reforms and Moscow politicians can interpret the results of voting for the present governor as support by Nizhniy Novgorod residents of the present president's political course.

[Borisov] Yes and no. In this election campaign B. Nemtsov carefully removed reformist elements from his program. Conversely, he placed the emphasis on current operational activity, the solution of urgent social problems, and other aspects. In principle, a moderate communist or a big manager, for example, Pugin, could come out with such a program. Therefore, in my opinion, to say that voting for Nemtsov is voting in support of reforms is not very correct.

[Kazakov] In these elections B. Nemtsov appeared not so much as the mouthpiece of the policy conducted by the capital's leadership as its constructive opponent.

[Iudin] Moscow commentators can regard Nemtsov's victory as a support of reforms by Nizhniy Novgorod residents—they can do anything. For what, in fact, the population voted is another matter. Let us recall the abundance of papers that the voter received before he entered the voting booth: 18 to 20 candidates for the Duma, a list of 43 electoral associations, four candidates for the post of governor, and four candidates for the post of mayor. I will risk assuming that not only the names of most electoral associations, but also the personalities of most candidates were simply unknown to 95 percent of the voters. Will you find many political scientists, who under these conditions will be able to make any intelligent and competent choice? Basically, however, not professional political scientists voted. In principle, the population is unable to analyze such an abundance of political programs. They voted for a certain known image. It could not have been otherwise.

[Dakhin] During the preelection campaign B. Nemtsov was oriented neither toward Yeltsin, nor Chernomyrdin, nor Yavlinskiy. Nor did he express his liking for any federal force whatsoever. This is a correct tactical move. It makes it possible to expand the spectrum of political support in the very near future. He eliminated from his program all the problems that must be solved only at the federal level; for example, the war in Chechnya. This explains the phenomenon that the same voter could vote for the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, but for Nemtsov, at the regional level.

[Kazakov] Gubernatorial elections were the first in the history of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast. Nevertheless, they did not display any special innovation, or heat of passions, or previously unseen fervor to the voter. Although there were some "surprises." A gamble was made mainly on Boris Nemtsov's personal qualities and only to a lesser extent, on his election team. Possibly, Oleg Maslov is right, saying that Nemtsov does not have a team, but has a kitchen cabinet. Such qualities of the governor as youth, ability to converse with and to intelligently answer everyone, and image regularly nurtured by the mass information media worked. A well-worked out legal position played its role: Nemtsov was the first to come out with a declaration of his income and so forth. The style of communication with his rivals was also chosen correctly. Nemtsov showed that he was able and could fight. In turn, the opposition showed that it could neither play nobly, nor lose nobly.

Russia: II. Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Elections Viewed

964F1459B Nizhniy Novgorod NIZHEGORODSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 29 Dec 95 p 2

[Report on "round table" with Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Sergey Viktorovich Borisov, chairman of the Council of the Nizhniy Novgorod Research Foundation, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Andrey Vasilyevich Dakhin, Candidate of Historical Sciences Aleksandr Anatolyevich Iudin, docent, head of the Department of Applied Sociology of State University, et al by K. Denisov: "Nizhniy Novgorod Elections-95"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Borisov] The Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia occupied first and second places among party lists here. These are parties that have departments outside Nizhniy Novgorod. I think that this is not a coincidence. Another remark: The gubernatorial and mayoral election campaign seemingly had a nonparty tone. Let us recall that a "gubernatorial list" (a list of the "Choice" Foundation), which included six candidates supported by the governor, existed during the 1993 elections. Four of them won a victory in the elections. This time the governor and the mayor conducted themselves in a very aloof manner and we see that former deputies of the State Duma (Chertoritskaya, Bushmin, and Voronov) occupied second and third places, that is, they came out in a fitting manner, but, perhaps, for a victory they were short of the five or six percent, which the governor's support ensured in 1993. Only Seslavinskiy won a victory in his district.

[Dakhin] People aspiring to elective offices very obviously face the following question: How to affect voters' behavior on election day? The law now prohibits officials from giving support to specific candidates. The following question arises: How can B. Nemtsov support people who work with him? Hence the need to overcome the distancing from party-mindedness and from party structures. Active politicians and public opinion leaders can affect election results only through party structures.

[Denisov] In this connection the following question is appropriate: How do participants in the debate evaluate the experience in the establishment of the political structure, which Mr. V. Rasteryayev presented to us?

[Borisov] Taking into consideration that V. Rasteryayev did not demonstrate any special political abilities (not everyone, including a strong manager, is endowed with this), apparently, he took everything that he could. However, in the case with "Nizhniy Novgorod Kray" a problem was revealed: The support of the top association of leaders of public organizations and parties does not yet give an automatic increase in people's votes.

[Kazakov] For a victory in elections in the region party structures on an oblast scale are needed. In this case, however, I would not begin using the experience of Mr. Rasteryayev and, especially, of the chief of his campaign staff, who showed his insolvency as a political manager, but would take advantage of the experience of foreign countries, where election technologies are realized much more professionally and efficiently. Undoubtedly, however, "imported" developments must be adapted to our conditions.

[Denisov] If we are to briefly describe the results of gubernatorial elections, is this B. Nemtsov's big success, or modest result?

[Kazakov] Here the result is quite weak.

[Borisov] Yes, Nemtsov "scraped the bin," as they say. He fully exhausted the image of the manager and champion of his region, who lacks a proper ideological orientation. His preelection tour to rayons virtually gave nothing in 16 rayons, where he lost to Rasteryayev. Of course, B. Nemtsov confirmed the high class of a public politician. He knows how to win an audience. However, in order to make the voter give his vote precisely to this candidate, more powerful resources are needed. I am not confident that Nemtsov possesses them today.

[Dakhin] I am inclined to consider Nemtsov's victory a continuous tempestuous applause after the speech by an important person.

[Kazakov] It seems to me that the election result is adequate to Nemtsov's labor expenditures. The oblast and the governor became more closely acquainted with each other, but this is only the beginning of the path. What is good today, tomorrow may play a negative role. The region, like its leader, needs a strategy, a perspective. In a concrete case Nemtsov used the limits of his capabilities.

[Borisov] Nevertheless, Nemtsov' rivals turned out to be rather weak. They did not set for the governor complex tasks in the course of the election campaign.

[Iudin] Both Nemtsov and Sklyarov did not have rivals before the elections. Voters learned a little about Rasteryayev, but Sokolov and Maslov remained little known to the majority of voters even in the oblast center. Therefore, there was no serious alternative. The election results fully coincide with the expected results. It is important to note that people's attitude toward politics is changing very rapidly. B. Nemtsov's image as an independent regional figure began with his debate with Ye. Gaydar in connection with nonpayments in the summer of 1992. After that "nemtsovki" appeared. They were conceived as oblast money and later were converted into an oblast loan. Then there was a memorable holiday—City Day. Nizhniy Novgorod residents never saw such holidays. Suddenly, airplanes demonstrate stunt flying not in the capital, but here. Nemtsov's image is separated from the president's image. Until the end of 1993 Nemtsov's political activity, his participation in political actions, and mention in the foreign press—all this greatly impressed Nizhniy Novgorod residents. Since the end of 1993 the interest in this has diminished and, in general, after October 1993 politics is beginning to cause a certain irritation among the population and Nemtsov's former image ceases to work.

[Denisov] Have the preelection forecasts of Nizhniy Novgorod sociologists proved to be correct?

[Iudin] Generally speaking, there were no forecasts. Sociologists studied the evaluation of the situation in public opinion. A forecast is quite a different and highly expensive job, which requires a series of large structural investigations. A forecast is by no means a simple matter, as it seems to some who write on these topics, in particular to "Provintsiya," which performs such an awkward analysis.

[Borisov] Many of those who work in the field of political journalism, perhaps, quite sincerely do not understand the difference between a poll among the population and a poll among experts. When we talk about the current political reality and elections, when the very publication of the results of sociological research is already becoming a fact affecting people's political consciousness, then professional respectability and verifiability of data become totally necessary. In a professional circle it is possible to express negative remarks against the "Provintsiya" agency and, partially, the "Pragma" group, which did not publish the list of experts.

[Iudin] If we talk about the reliability of the conducted sociological research, basically, the data have coincided. Only the "splash" of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia was unexpected. Polls did not give figures that revealed the voting results. Questionnaires had the following version of an answer: "I do not want to answer this question." Such people comprised 10 to 12 percent of all those questioned, among whom there were also some followers of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. That is, the attitude toward this party is quite intimate and some did not want to reflect it in the questionnaire.

[Denisov] Nevertheless, how to evaluate the result of gubernatorial elections for B. Nemtsov's political career?

[Makarychev] This is not an achievement and not a success. This was the only candidate, who could calmly get elected in the first round. The election campaign was built quite professionally. However, these results are not a spring-board. In the very near future I see B. Nemtsov primarily as a figure at a regional level. It seems to me that the time, when regional leaders can seriously aspire to higher offices at a federal level, has not yet arrived in Russian politics.

[Denisov] What new things can be learned about voters from the voting results? What factors have had the greatest effect on the election results?

[Iudin] Two factors, which determined the outcome of the elections, can be discussed. The first factor is connected with the liberal orientation. People voted for Yavlinskiy, Gaydar, and Fedorov. Opposition is the second factor. It is of a dual kind. Opposition based on irritation. For example, the share of votes for Maslov and Sokolov and against all candidates has increased here and there. Here, however, there are more Zhirinovskiy followers. This is characteristic of Kulebakskiy, Lukoyanovskiy, Sosnovskiy, and Ardatovskiy rayons. The other kind is deliberate opposition based on adherence to communist views. It is expressed in voting for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and in these districts the percent of those who vote for Rasteryayev is higher. This is characteristic of Pilninskiy, Gaginskiy, Krasnooktyabrskiy, Perevozskiy, and Buturlinskiy rayons.

The reason for Nemtsov's loss in opposition rayons lies primarily in the fact that it is more difficult to live in these rayons.

[Kazakov] The conclusions of local sociologists, basically, have proved to be correct. It seems to me, however, that the results of sociological research would be more adequate to the situation if the state were its customer. This order would be of a permanent and a priority nature. The new thing that has appeared in the political behavior of Nizhniy Novgorod residents is interest in election results and their "fitting" with respect to themselves.

[Iudin] If professional sociologists conduct research, results are of a reliable nature irrespective of the customer. If they are not sociologists ("Provintsiya," for example), the results are appropriate. The fact that sometimes customers demand a certain result and there are sociologists, who agree to these terms, is another matter. However, this is on their conscience.

Organizers of election campaigns spend money on sociological research not in vain if they work with professionally conscientious sociologists. Moreover, there simply is no other tool for an analysis of the situation in an electoral district. What gets into the press and television is only the upper part of the iceberg. Real analytic material and recommendations—only the customer receives all this. Practice shows that we can make a very objective and useful analysis. We have every reason to be satisfied with the results of our work.

[Dakhin] The voter kept in his field of vision the parties and electoral associations that have existed for more than one year, that is, in all, five to seven such associations. A "red displacement" of electoral preferences has occurred. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation has diverted part of the electorate of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and of the Agrarian Party of Russia to itself, because it expresses more universally and fully the orientation toward the restoration of the stable, good, and not very distant past.

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia are obviously conservative forces opposed to the present regime. Thirty-one percent of the votes are here.

"Russia Is Our Home" and "Yabloko" can be considered centrist-liberal parties. Approximately 21 percent of the votes are here.

In 1993 only 12 percent of the people voted for parties that did not enter the State Duma. In 1995 approximately 47 percent voted for parties that will not receive a single seat in the State Duma.

Russia: III. Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Elections Viewed

964F1459C Nizhniy Novgorod NIZHEGORODSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 30 Dec 95 p 4

[Report on "round table" with Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Sergey Viktorovich Borisov, chairman of the Council of the Nizhniy Novgorod Research Foundation, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Andrey Vasilyevich Dakhin, Candidate of Historical Sciences Aleksandr Anatolyevich Iudin, docent, head of the Department of Applied Sociology of State University, et al by K. Denisov: "Nizhniy Novgorod Elections-95"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Borisov] I would like to give a compliment to our voter. He has mastered the tool of democratic elections in a strikingly rapid manner. With all the complex circumstances he finds the possibility of expressing his position quite accurately. And the multiplicity of voting papers only helps him. According to one, he can vote in this way and, according to another, in that way. He has his reasons for everything. Our voter will always respond to good propaganda. But if he is asked [for his vote] in a bad and incompetent manner, if he is not respected, he will not respond. Examples? Certainly. "Russia's Democratic Choice" hardly carried on propaganda in our oblast. It put forward a weak list. Ilya Zaslavskiy did not appear in the region. The voter felt that he was not respected and he gave this party a smaller percent of the votes than, on the average, in Russia. Another example: The Congress of Russian Communities flooded everyone with its printed advertising, which was quite dull and drab. Skokov's referendum, which was understood by no one, played its negative role. The voter did not respond. A third example: In the Avtozavodskiy district Veselkin, in fact, had no serious rivals. The voter also reacted to this decrease in alternatives—the percent of those who voted against all candidates was twice as high as in other districts (17 percent). Another compliment: The voter did not support "freeloaders"—those who gambled on some one argument. Five rich men, five military men, and five "guest performers" (from the center)—all of them were not elected. That is, a gamble on money, shoulder straps, and coming from the capital proved to be groundless.

For the sake of fairness it should be said that our voter is still too yielding to demagogy and to mythology. He forgives many lies by those whom he supports. He is insufficiently demanding (otherwise, communists, who, in my opinion, lied much more than all the rest taken together, would not have received such a high percent).

[Denisov] Can you prove the last thesis?

[Borisov] Certainly. The speculation around Belovezh agreements is outrageous. However, we remember that the Supreme Soviet, where most deputies were communists, ratified these agreements and, so, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation must fully share the responsibility for these decisions. To make the demand for the denunciation of Belovezh agreements with a shock slogan means to consider us forgetful. This is a little improper. Such things would not happen in a country with democratic traditions.

[Makarychev] I cannot share at all the complimentary tone with regard to voters, since the election results disappointed me in many respects. I did not see a direct relationship between political advertising and the election results. In my opinion, the advertising of the Congress of Russian Communities was not bad. A certain political style was expressed there. On the other hand, communists did not have political advertising in the classical sense of this word. They had complete demagogy. Nevertheless, they were elected. The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia had the propaganda of Zhirinovskiy personality, which was developed in every possible way and was presented from different points of view. This can be attributed to the fact that this level of the population's political standard is characterized by a low susceptibility to the political style, to the characteristics of "presentation" of individual candidates, and so forth.

Parties, which formulated their preelection program in quite a simple and accessible manner, were elected to the Duma. None of the so-called hybrid electoral associations won a victory. That is, a synthesis, let us assume, of patriotism and social ideas in the person of "Power" and the Congress of Russian Communities did not take place. This is too complicated for our voter. A synthesis of market liberalism and moderate nationalism in the person of Boris Fedorov ("Forward, Russia!") did not take place.

Many voters understand: Communists—this is cheap sausage, vodka, guaranteed jobs, and so forth. The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia—this is boorish nationalism. "Russia Is Our Home"—this is government power. "Yabloko"—this is a mild version of the market. That is all! Our voter does not perceive big ideological complexities. In fact, he expressed distrust of all the nuances, shades, and half-tones that we had.

I think that the presidential election campaign will be build around several simple ideas, which can be perceived by voters.

In what did the elections disappoint me? In the fact that what is happening in the country, that is, people dying in Chechnya, corruption, and so forth, suits one out of 10 people. These are the 10 percent that supported "Russia Is Our Home." One out of five people, which is even worse, wants to return to the well-known delights of communist construction.

Two myths collapsed in the course of the election campaign. The first myth, which was inculcated in an intensified manner by certain circles, is the myth that the people want to see a strong leader in a general's shoulder straps. In the elections generals missed and in a major way: Rutskoy, Lebed, and Gromov.

The second myth is the myth that the people want to entrust individuals, who have already done something and who have concrete achievements, with governing them. Entrepreneurs and businessmen also missed no less than the military. This reflects the distrust of entrepreneurial structures by part of the population and the inability of the "new Russians" to correctly use their money for the purpose of achieving success in elections. The problem of the professionalism of consultants and organizers of election campaigns and the problem of expert analytic support arise here. It is useful for those who aspire to seats in the Legislative Assembly of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast to take this into consideration.

[Denisov] How can the results of voting be rated according to Khafizov? He conducted, perhaps, the most concentrated advertising campaign in the mass information media.

[Makarychev] Here we observe voters' relative conservatism and their unwillingness to entrust the deputy mandate to new people on the political scene. On the other hand, this is a problem of an efficient use of money in an election campaign. The use of journalists as political consultants, which has occurred often, seems to me unjustified.

[Borisov] Yes, money can do a great deal, but not everything. In particular, money cannot replace being used to someone. It is not merely a question of being known (one can become known literally in one day). In order that people get used to you, in order that they know what they can expect from you, they must know you for several years.

[Denisov] Consequently, one must learn how to build a political career under our conditions if one decides to embark on the political path. No storms will bring success here.

[Dakhin] Businessmen have now tried to enter politics in approximately the same manner as in 1990-1991, when self-promoters could swiftly fly up to the political Olympus. This unique moment is already in the past. The development of a healthy conservative trend, which is quite normal in a society tired of decades of continuous reforming, will demand from the political leader a certain gradual rise on the political ladder. Consequently, there should be certain steps, on which, for example, a businessman enters—openly and publicly—politics. Businessmen must give thought to what structures can become a bridge connecting their present position in the world of business and their desired future position in the world of politics. Such structures exist in Europe and the United States. Then money will not be lost in such an incompetent manner.

[Dakhin] The election results set for federal and regional authorities a serious problem—the problem of democratization of structures of executive power and the ability to work within the framework of a coalition government. Today a coalition as such does not exist. In Moscow power is monopolized in presidential structures and in the oblast, in the governor. The election results require a coalition. Only in this case will power be democratic and capable, only in this case will there be stability in the capital and in the province.

[Borisov] Something must be done with mass information media, especially with television. Such a lightweight attitude toward the most responsible elections, which national and regional television demonstrated, simply is inadmissible. I have in mind the fact that the vast capabilities of mass information media were not utilized to help the voter to make a free, well-founded, and conscious choice.

[Makarychev] Politics should become the lot of professionals to an ever greater extent. A dizzying political career in several weeks—this time will hardly be repeated. And second. Despite the governor's obvious victory, certain questions connected with the election result cannot fail to arise for him. Communists and Zhirinovskiy followers occupied first and second places in Novyy Novgorod. If the governor intends to play on the democratic field, he cannot ignore this reality.

The result of presidential elections will also directly affect the alignment of forces in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast. This is quite obvious and we must think about this right now. If today we fall into euphoria from the victory in gubernatorial elections, events not very pleasant for our oblast can occur in June. After all, it turned out that in Nizhniy Novgorod there is no democratic environment as such—it has eroded. Some democrats have gone into socio-patriotic structures (for example, O. Maslov) and others have left the political scene completely. Krestyaninov did not become a strong political figure. Bednyakov was ousted. It is a fact that the democratic environment of the end of the 1980's and the beginning of the 1990's has dispersed. This is the thorn in the flesh that can draw the governor's attention to itself. These problems can affect the structural foundations of our regional policy this summer.

[Kazakov] The shift in public consciousness toward habit and tradition, not toward innovation and modernization, is one of the election results. Political scientists and sociologists will perform their task if on the eve of the presidential elections they correctly detect the leitmotif that will determine the outcome of the historical voting in the summer of 1996.

[Denisov] Thanks to all the participants in the "round table."

*Russia: Nizhniy Novgorod Duma, Gubernatorial Election Statistics

964F1460A Nizhniy Novgorod NIZHEGORODSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 29 Dec 95 p 2

[Article: "Percentages of Confidence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Many of our readers want to know not only who won in the difficult fight for power, but also in what percentages the oblast voted for each of the participants in the election. Today we are printing information obtained from the oblast electoral commission.**

State Duma. Federal District (Information for Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast)

	Percent
"Women of Russia"	5.1
SPD "Power"	2.9
"Duma-96" movement	0.1
"Transformation of the Homeland"	0.2
"Tikhonov-Tupolev-Tikhonov" bloc	0.2
Russian All-National Movement	0.1
OMOD "NUR"	0.3
Federal-Democratic Movement	0.1
"Cause of Peter the Great"	0.3
International Union	0.1
"Stable Russia"	0.2
"Generations of the Line" bloc	0.1
"My Homeland"	0.6
"For the Motherland" bloc	0.5
"Common Cause"	0.6
Independents bloc	0.1
NDR	10.5
"Pamfilova-Gurov-V. Lysenko"	2.1
"YABloko"	10.6
"Forward Russia"	1.3
"89" bloc	0.1
"Cedar"	1.2
DVR - United Democrats	3.0
PRES	0.3
KP RF	18.7
Stanislav Govorukhin bloc	1.8
Russian Lawyers Association	0.3
Russian NRP	0.3
Social-Democrats	0.1
"Power to the people!" bloc	1.5
KRO	4.9
"Union of Labor"	1.8
LDPR	12.1
"Dzhuna"	0.3
Workers Self-Government Party	2.5
Communists — Working Russia - For the Soviet Union	4.4
Beer Lovers Party	0.6
Ivan Rybkin bloc	1.1
Economic Freedom Party	0.1
"People's Union" party	0.3
Russian Agrarian Party	3.1
KhDS - Christians of Russia	0.3
Roszhilkommunsoyuz	0.1
Against everyone	2.8

Voting by single-mandate districts

	Percent
Avtozavodskiy District No. 117	
Vasilyev, Aleksey Alekseyevich	3.4
Veselkin, Pavel Mikhaylovich	38.5
Gladkikh, Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich	2.4
Ivanov, Vladimir Mikhaylovich	3.8
Mikhaylov, Viktor Georgiyevich	3.7
Rumyantsev, Gennadiy Matveyevich	6.4
Ryabov, Nikolay Fedorovich	9.9
Svetlichnyy, Aleksey Ivanovich	4.9
Cherkunov, Vyacheslav Borisovich	3.8
Chirkov, Lev Mikhaylovich	3.0
Against all candidates	15.6
Arzamasskiy District No. 118	
Belozerov, Vladimir Alekseyevich	6.8
Voronov, Sergey Vasilyevich	19.2
Yermakov, Mikhail Fedorovich	1.5
Zaytseva, Zoya Savvovna	5.6
Katayev, Genrikh Grigoryevich	5.1
Kulagin, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich	4.2
Lemeshev, Mikhail Yakovlevich	2.0
Leonov, Yuriy Yuryevich	2.8
Naumov, Sergey Vasilyevich	5.0
Nikitchuk, Ivan Ignatyevich	23.1
Levitskiy, Boris Vladimirovich	4.2
Savin, Vladimir Mikhaylovich	4.2
Slyusarev. Anatoliy Sidorovich	1.7
Khven, Petr Aleksandrovich	4.8
Against all candidates	7.0
Dzerzhinskiy District No. 119	
Artemov, Igor Vladimirovich	11.7
Gagut, Luiza Dmitriyevna	4.8
Gushkov, Aleksey Vladimirovich	1.5
Dyukov, Igor Vasilyevich	5.7
Koterev, Vladimir Yuryevich	0.8
Leskov, Sergey Aleksandrovich	12.6
Nefedov. Mikhail Gennadiyevich	0.7
Purusov, Aleksey Afrikanovich	1.3
Sannikova, Yelena Aleksandrovna	2.3
Seslavinskiy, Mikhail Vadimovich	17.7
Tarasov, Anatoliy Vladimirovich	14.2
Usov, Boris Alekseyevich	10.5
Tsvetov, Sergey Vladimirovich	3.7
Against all candidates	9.4
Kanavinskiy District No. 120	
Beklemishcheva, Olga Alekseyevna	18.1
Bulavinov, Vadim Yevgenyevich	11.0
Zaslavskiy, Ilya Iosifovich	2.4
Zakharov, Veniamin Sergeyevich	3.0
Kim, Oleg Chanbokovich	2.6
Klimentyev, Andrey Anatolyevich	9.7
Kronskiy, Vyacheslav Sergeyevich	2.2
Kruglov, Nikolay Konstantinovich	2.9
Malyshko, Aleksandr Antonovich	8.7
Mitrofanov, Anatoliy Alekseyevich	1.0
Mikhaylovskaya, Irina Sergeyevna	1.8
Polozkov, Sergey Alekseyevich	6.6
Sabashnikov, Yevgeniy Viktorovich	1.9
Savin, Aleksandr Borisovich	3.9
Tipakaov, Petr Mikhaylovich	1.8
Trubnikov, Vladislav Mikhaylovich	2.0
Khvorostukhin, Vladimir Ivanovich	1.4
Chechevichkin, Yuriy Aleksandrovich	3.5
Chumak, Viktor Ivanovich	0.6
Yudin, Vladimir Ivanovich	1.5
Against all candidates	9.6
Semenovskiy District No. 121	
Vigrasov, Granit Fedorovich	2.4
Vishnepolskiy, Vladislav Morisovich	1.6
Ivashko, Nikolay Nikolayevich	2.6
Mamontov, Yevgeniy Vasilyevich	2.4

Voting by single-mandate districts

	Percent
Sedov, Vladimir Ivanovich	12.4
Sochnev, Dmitriy Vasilyevich	3.9
Tarasov, Yuriy Igoryevich	11.2
Tolstov, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich	1.6
Khodyrev, Gennadiy Maksimovich	27.1
Chertoritskaya, Tatyana Vladimirovna	21.4
Shamov, Viktor Andreyevich	2.9
Against all candidates	7.6
Sergechnyy District No. 122	
Anoshchenkov, Vasiliy Nikolayevich	3.5

Voting by single-mandate districts

	Percent
Bushmin, Yevgeniy Viktorovich	16.6
Yeliseyev, Valeriy Petrovich	4.3
Maystrenko, Vladimir Konstantinovich	1.4
Maltsev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich	27.7
Moiseyev, Anatoliy Sergeyevich	2.9
Morev, Andrey Vitalyevich	3.7
Sysoyev, Aleksandr Vladimirovich	2.7
Tuzin, Gennadiy Yakovlevich	2.2
Khafizov, Nadir Mansurovich	21.8
Shurygin, Gennadiy Vyacheslavovich	2.0
Against all candidates	8.0

Gubernatorial election (number of votes in percentages)

Rayon	B.Nemtsov	V. Rasteryayev	O. Maslov	V. Sokolov	Against everyone
Ardatovskiy	35.5	43.4	8.9	6.0	4.8
Arzamasskiy	56.0	22.2	8.4	5.1	6.3
Balakhninskiy	71.2	14.5	6.0	1.8	4.3
Bogorodskiy	52.1	34.1	6.2	2.4	3.9
Bolsheboldinskiy	42.2	46.7	4.1	2.7	2.6
Bolshemurashkinskiy	40.8	45.4	6.4	2.3	3.1
Borskiy	61.6	24.0	5.7	2.1	4.0
Buturlinskiy	42.2	49.5	3.0	1.0	2.2
Vadskiy	32.2	56.9	3.4	1.7	4.3
Varnavinskiy	58.1	28.0	4.7	2.5	5.4
Vachskiy	52.8	29.4	7.5	3.5	5.0
Vetluzhskiy	62.2	23.4	6.2	2.0	4.5
Voznesenskiy	41.0	41.0	7.7	3.4	4.9
Volodarskiy	69.7	15.3	5.4	2.3	5.7
Vorotynskiy	40.5	39.0	9.4	4.3	4.7
Voskresenskiy	60.2	28.3	4.5	2.1	3.2
Vyksunskiy	45.7	38.3	6.0	2.0	5.9
Gaginskiy	26.3	6.3	1.4	2.0	1.5
Gorodetskiy	62.5	21.3	6.4	2.5	5.4
D.-Konstantinovskiy	49.9	39.3	4.1	2.3	3.2
Diveyevskiy	29.2	57.7	4.3	2.5	4.3
Knyagininskiy	41.3	47.4	3.2	2.2	3.2
Koverninskiy	57/6	22.9	8.6	4.4	5.1
Krasnobakovskiy	59.6	28.3	4.7	1.7	3.9
Krasnooktyabrskiy	39.6	49.4	4.0	2.0	2.1
Kstovskiy	66.4	21.2	5.5	1.8	3.4
Kulebakskiy	28.8	53.5	7.5	3.3	4.7
Lukoyanovskiy	30.9	53.8	4.5	4.0	5.0
Lyskovskiy	60.7	26.3	5.1	2.0	3.7
Navashinskiy	47.3	36.6	7.0	2.2	5.2
Pavlovskiy	44.1	33.3	11.1	3.1	6.0
Pervomayskiy	41.4	38.7	7.9	3.8	5.7
Perevozskiy	34.9	54.7	3.4	1.6	2.5
Pilninskiy	19.8	73.6	2.2	1.0	1.5

Rayon	B.Nemtsov	V. Rasteryayev	O. Maslov	V. Sokolov	Against everyone
Pochinkovskiy	51.3	31.6	6.6	4.9	3.8
Semenovskiy	66.1	19.5	5.6	2.4	4.1
Sergachskiy	51.8	36.5	4.1	2.0	2.5
Sechenovskiy	57.7	29.7	4.9	3.9	2.9
Sokolskiy	74.1	14.3	3.9	2.9	3.3
Sosnovskiy	38.7	42.0	8.4	5.0	3.9
Spasskiy	38.4	47.6	5.5	3.4	3.3
Tonkinskiy	47.8	42.9	2.7	1.7	2.6
Tonshayevskiy	59.9	26.2	5.2	2.5	4.6
Urenskiy	43.6	46.5	3.2	1.4	3.0
Chkalovskiy	62.9	25.7	4.1	1.7	3.8
Sharangskiy	54.9	28.7	7.3	2.5	5.0
Shatkovskiy	44.2	39.5	5.9	3.4	5.2
Shakhunskiy	50.6	36.0	4.7	2.0	4.0
city of Arzamas	57.7	18.9	10.7	2.4	8.2
city of Dzerzhinsk	71.4	14.2	5.0	1.9	5.1
city of Sarov	50.3	18.0	13.1	3.3	12.4
city of Nizhniy Novgorod, city rayons					
Avtozavodskiy	65.9	15.7	6.5	2.2	6.9
Kanavinskiy	66.3	19.7	5.0	1.5	5.0
Leninskiy	65.1	19.3	5.7	1.6	5.1
Moskovskiy	63.7	21.7	4.9	1.7	5.4
Nizhegorodskiy	64.3	21.7	5.0	1.2	5.7
Priokskiy	62.3	22.2	6.0	1.9	5.5
Sovetskiy	63.4	21.1	5.6	1.5	6.0
Sormovskiy	64.9	19.2	5.3	2.8	5.6

*Russia: Nizhniy Nogorod Mayoral Election Results

964F1457A Nizhniy Novgorod NIZHEGORODSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 26 Dec 95 p 1

[Summary of results of mayoral election for city of Nizhniy Novgorod, signed by chairman of the district electoral commission D. I. Korolev]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Report of the district electoral commission on elections of head of local self-government of the city of Nizhniy Novgorod (mayor of city)

1. The results of the elections by city electoral districts are as follows:

No.	Name of territorial commission	Number of registered voters, including voters supplementally entered in roster	Number of electoral ballots issued to voters		Number of valid electoral ballots	Number of electoral ballots deemed to be invalid
			Total	in % of p. 3		Total
1.	Avtozavodskiy	254932	147504	57.86	144926	3249
2.	Kanavinskiy	129358	74790	57.82	72748	1153
3.	Leninskiy	126983	72335	56.96	70291	1501
4.	Moskovskiy	112633	66907	59.40	65029	1306
5.	Nizhegorodskiy	108088	67909	62.83	64773	901
6.	Priokskiy	81969	50772	61.94	49530	950
7.	Sovetskiy	132538	84331	63.63	80999	1304
8.	Sormovskiy	139325	82762	59.40	80319	1441
Total:		1085826	647310	59.61	628615	11805

No.	Name of territorial commission	Number of valid votes case for each of the candidates							
		Bednyakov, D. I.		Kamaldinov, V. P.		Sklyarov, I. P.		Chechevichkin, Yu. A.	
		Total	% of p. 4	Total	% of p. 4	Total	% of p. 4	Total	% of p. 4
1.	Avtozavodskiy	51929	35.21	1044	0.71	77606	52.61	3711	2.52
2.	Kanavinskiy	18599	24.87	1013	1.35	46097	61.64	3449	4.61
3.	Leninskiy	20076	27.75	663	0.92	43407	60.01	2213	3.06
4.	Moskovskiy	16222	24.25	593	0.89	41589	62.61	28.30	4.23
5.	Nizhegorodskiy	15785	23.24	578	0.85	44363	65.33	2175	3.20
6.	Priokskiy	14295	28.16	385	0.76	30586	60.24	1396	2.75
7.	Sovetskiy	21169	25.10	756	0.90	51981	61.64	3358	3.98
8.	Sormovskiy	19996	24.16	671	0.81	51642	62.40	3462	4.18
Total:		178071	27.51	5703	0.88	387271	59.83	22594	3.49

No.	Name of territorial commission	Number of votes cast against all candidates	
		Total	in % of p. 1
1.	Avtozavodskiy	8874	6.02
2.	Kanavinskiy	3668	4.90
3.	Leninskiy	3728	5.15
4.	Moskovskiy	3545	5.30
5.	Nizhegorodskiy	3404	5.01
6.	Priokskiy	2796	5.51
7.	Sovetskiy	4790	5.68
8.	Sormovskiy	4862	5.87
Total:		35667	5.51

2. In accordance with Article 40 of the Statute on the Order of Holding Elections for Head of Local Self-Government of the City of Nizhniy Novgorod, the district electoral commission has decided:

To recognize Ivan Petrovich Sklyarov as the elected head of local self-government of the city of Nizhniy Novgorod.

Chairman of the district electoral commission D. I. KOROLEV

Russia: Nizhniy Novgorod Crime Situation Detailed

964F1455A Nizhniy Novgorod NIZHEGORODSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 96 p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General Vitaliy Potapov, chief of the Nizhegorod Oblast Internal Affairs Administration, by Olga Kasyanova: "We Not Only Have Not Allowed Crime To Increase, We Have Reduced It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **NIZHEGORODSKAYA PRAVDA has a tradition of meeting twice a year with Lt. Gen. Vitaliy Potapov, head of the oblast's Internal Affairs Administration. The occasion for the meetings is to sum up results of our militia's activity.**

Today we discuss the work of internal affairs organs in 1995. We begin with figures for this reason.

An objective indicator of the amount of crime is calculated by the number of crimes per 100,000 members of the public. In 1994, 1,70[illegible].4 crimes were recorded in the oblast per 100,000 people, as compared with an average of 2,234.5 in Russia; in 1995, these figures were 1,795.2 and 1,861.9, respectively. This is 8.5 percent less than in Russia and 40th place among the regions.

The distribution of places and the crime pattern are significant. Nizhegorod Oblast holds 46th place among the 80 regions in crimes against individuals, including 50th place in premeditated murder, 45th in premeditated serious bodily harm, 31st in crimes against property (21st in thefts, 64th in assault and robbery), and so forth.

The extent of crime solved is also an indicator. It was 52.1 percent in 1993, 64.2 percent in 1994, and 69.5 percent in 1995. Over the past year it was five percent higher than the average for Russia, and compared with the 12 other large regions, only Krasnodar Kray was higher (74.4 percent).

Over the past three years, there has been a decrease in the number of crimes recorded in Nizhegorod Oblast: by 8.6 percent in 1993, 8.0 percent in 1994, and 3.1 percent in 1995, a total of 19.7 percent compared with 1992.

This trend is not seen in one of the 12 largest regions in Russia.

In 1992, the oblast held fourth place in the number of crimes committed, after Yekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk), St. Petersburg, and Moscow oblasts; in 1993, it held ninth place (after St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg and Novosibirsk oblasts, Moscow, Krasnodar Kray, Moscow Oblast, Maritime Kray, and Perm Oblast); in 1994 it held 10th place, and in 1995 it was in 13th place.

The Prediction Was Realized

[Potapov] If you ask about the feelings left with the Internal Affairs Administration from 1995, General Potapov would say: a sense of satisfaction. We had a forecast, and we arranged our work accordingly. And our assumption of events was realized practically for the entire pattern of crime. Indeed, we predicted that events would develop in a complicated fashion: the number of heinous crimes would increase, not so much in number as in their "intensity"—their brutality and severity. I am referring to robbery assaults, threats, the use of explosives and weapons, torture of victims, the seizure of hostages... All the same, we have not seen this on such an immense scale as in other oblasts. We stopped these crimes in their earliest stages, and if they were committed, we solved them. But most importantly, we not only did not allow an increase in crime, we reduced it. And the extent of crime solved was higher.

The Crime of the Year

[Potapov] I would call the crime of the year the murder of three citizens from Ryazan in our oblast. They were shot and their bodies were burned. It turned out that the criminals were not ours, either. This involved a large amount of gold.

The robbery of over 700 million rubles [R] from the "Dialog-Bank" was not the crime of the year. We solved this quite rapidly, by the way. I do not recall anything like this in my 30 years of service. About 20 years ago a safe was robbed in Post Office Branch B of Kozino, in Balakhninskiy Rayon. They took R3,000. And at that time we rushed there as if to a major crime. We solved this crime finally after a year's work.

The Operation of the Year

[Potapov] I would probably call the operation of the year the arrest of an interregional gang (it is now under investigation) led by the criminal Alakhverdiyev. There were about 30 persons in it. The gang committed several murders in Nizhniy Novgorod's territory, including five members of the Pikin family at the automotive plant. Our operations forces worked together with those in Tatarstan and other oblasts. I think this was one of the most successful operations in 1995.

Detective of the Year

[Potapov] That is 35-year-old Vladimir Sharovatov. A junior lieutenant in the militia, he heads the Interrayon Operational Investigation Division of the UVD [Internal Affairs Administration] Criminal Investigation Administration. He specializes in pickpocket thefts. He solved 73 crimes in 1994 and 50 in 1995. Solving so many crimes means being highly professional. Incidentally, he is studying in the Cheboksary Militia Higher School. And even attending sessions there in Cheboksary he caught three pickpockets. This is some detective! Incidentally, Vladimir Sharovatov is one of Russia's 100 best detectives. But he is not the only one in this category from Nizhegorod Oblast. There is also dog specialist Vladimir Salnikov and Viktor Bratanov, head of the Antique Thefts Division. I would also add Yuriy Kryukov, chief of the UVD Criminal Investigation Administration, to the list of detectives of the year. Criminal investigation labored selflessly this year, we must say.

Shock of the Year

[Potapov] This, of course, was the death of our collague, Dmitriy Bureyev, a lieutenant in the internal affairs service. He was sent on official business to Chechnya, where he was fatally wounded. It was also a shock for me when 20 of the 120 sent to Chechnya returned wounded. Altogether, seven persons were killed and 46 received various kinds of wounds in the performance of their official duties during 1995.

Unexpected Event of the Year

[Potapov] There were no unexpected events in particular. We have learned how to predict and foresee.

Annoyance of the Year

[Potapov] I would not say an annoyance, but a disgrace. Our disgrace is when collagues commit crimes. I. Fayzdrakhmanov, a sector inspector from Dzerzhinsk, was convicted for bribery and sentenced to five years in prison. N. Mukin, a lieutenant in the Internal Service from Priokskiy Rayon, was sentenced to 2.5 years in prison. And M. Zimin, a sector inspector from the Nizhegorodskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Administration, was sentenced to two years in prison.

And 16 colleagues in internal affairs organs were convicted for exceeding their official authority—inflicting bodily harm on citizens. I will name a few: K. Salugin, a junior sergeant from Bogorodsk, sentenced to three years in prison; A. Balabin, a master sergeant from Dzerzhinsk, sentenced to five years in prison; and A. Meshalkin, a sector inspector from the automotive plant, sentenced to three years in prison.

Visit of the Year

[Potapov] The visit of the year, naturally, was by the new minister of internal affairs, Anatoliy Kulikov, who was here for two days. This did not take place without some concerns, although the actual state of affairs in the UVD did not give me much cause for worry. But a minister is a minister, especially a new one. The result of the visit? Confirmation of the directions in our work which we selected. Moreover, introduction of our working uniforms throughout Russia. Well, for example, the working uniform with the public, and ceremonial guards in the central square. The minister supported our request that GAI [State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate] employees and sector inspectors work in pressed uniforms and white shirts on days off. Kulikov even liked this, and he gave directions to adhere to this rule throughout Russian territory. The minister also supported the work of militia posts, and he was particularly satisfied with the results of their work. He gave high marks to the GAI's preventive work and protection outside the department.

The Forecast for 1996

[Potapov] We have familiarized ourselves with the forecasts of special institutions, which predict an increase in crime in Russia. And we are predicting this ourselves. Crimes will become more violent, and the criminal element will continue to be consolidated in criminal gangs. All the traditional forms of crime—apartment burglaries, auto thefts, and hooliganism in public places—will not decrease in number. But there will be no rapid increase in crime in Nizhegorod Oblast. If it exists, it will be insignificant. And we will try to maintain this situation, even if only at the 1995 level. We have enough professionals for this. The fact that we have not permitteed an increase in crime for three years is also a source of confidence. It will be harder to achieve this in the fourth year: the economic situation continues to be difficult and unemployment is growing. The situation will heat up, in my view, but we have worked out a number of preventive measures which I am confident will keep crime in check.

Russia: Nizhniy Novgorod Production Declines

964F1458A Nizhniy Novgorod NIZHEGORODSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 96 p 1

[Article by Valentina Melnikov, Oblast Committee on State Statistics, under "First-Hand" rubric: "How Have We Been Working?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Despite the officially promoted goal of stabilizing total production volume, its decline in 1995 at the oblast's large and mid-sized industrial enterprises was 7.7 percent of the 1994 level (in comparison: the level of decrease in relation to 1993 was 37.4 percent).**

Of all branches of industry, only in timber, wood-processing and pulp and paper could an increase of 22.8 percent be observed: compared to January-December of 1994, production of wood shingles rose by 7.8 percent, technologically treated chips for pulp production and lumber mass—by 16.1 percent, wood blocks—by 1.3 percent, paper—by 1.8 times, box sets—by 2.6 times.

In a branch that determines modern economic growth—machine-building,—a complicated situation developed in 1995. The fall in production volumes at enterprises in this branch reached nearly five percent. Most of all, this affected diesel-and machine-tool construction, the products of which were earmarked mainly for refitting machine-building, itself. For the year, the production of diesels and diesel generators was 97.1 percent of 1994's output, of highly-effective machine tools, such as special, specialized,—66.1, and for numerically controlled—89.2 percent. A certain amount of animation was observed in the production of wood-processing machines: here, the 1994 production level was exceeded by two times.

A relatively stable demand on the heavy and light automobile market allowed GAZ [Main Automobile Plant] workers to keep up product output volumes. On the whole for last year, output of light automobiles rose by 0.4, and heavy—by 13.6 percent.

The tendency towards a drop in the production of basic types of industrial construction materials, which has been developing in the branch since 1989 under conditions of decreasing capital construction, continued throughout all of 1995. Production of precast reinforced concrete articles and structures fell in comparison with 1994 by 11.6 percent, of soft roofing—by 6.8, of mineral batting—by 10.4, of construction glass—by 87.1 percent, of lime and dolomite powder—by 76.6 percent.

The greatest drop in production volumes was seen in enterprises engaged in light industry. The drop in comparison with 1994 in this branch was 45.2 percent. The situation here is extremely complex, and is the result of several negative factors. A lack of raw resources and difficulties in selling finished product were the main reasons for the drop in most of the products made by the joint stock companies "Mayak," Vesna," "Voskhod," "Ton." Besides this, the swift progress of technological obsolescence in industrial enterprises leads to their loss of ability to compete. And as a result, the market is lost. Now, the domestic market in light-industry goods is practically lost. In 1995, close to half of the 1994 level of dresses and bags were produced; a third—of raincoats, artificial soft leathers; a fifth of knitted articles, bed linen, film materials.

Food production is also lagging behind the 1994 level. In 1995, 23 percent less was produced than in 1994. Meat production was down by over 21 tons, bread and bakery goods production—by 44 tons, sausage—by eight tons, margarine—by five tons, butter—by three tons.

As before, losses of work time due to factory stoppages had a significant effect on the output of industrial product. The main reasons were difficulties in selling finished product and a lack of material resources. As the result of stoppages in December, alone, over 80 thousand people were sent on leave without pay or with partial pay, 197 people were laid off. Last year, for each worker in industry, there were about 13 lost days.

However, perhaps the most negative aspect is salary indebtedness: on January 1 of this year, 221 industrial enterprises had past-due indebtedness of over 136 billion rubles, including over 73 billion rubles at machine-building enterprises.

Russia: Inflation Slows in Nizhniy Novgorod

964F1458B Nizhniy Novgorod NIZHEGORODSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 96 p 1

[Article by Larisa Irkhina, oblast committee on statistics department of price statistics head: "What, Where, How Much: Uneven Step for Prices"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Over the course of 1995, a tendency was noted on the consumer market towards a slowing in inflationary processes. For example, in the first quarter of 1995, the average monthly growth in consumer prices was 12.1, in the second—6.4, in the third and fourth quarters—3.9 percent.**

In December, the smallest growth in prices for goods and services was registered for the entire period of price liberalization. A summary index of consumer prices characterizing the inflation level was 102.6 percent for December and in comparison with the preceding month.

On the whole, for all of the past year, prices for consumer goods and services grew by 2.1 times. (In comparison: 1994—3.2 times, 1993—8.3 times).

The greatest rise in prices, both over the year and for the entire year, was noted for flour (four times) bread and bakery goods (3.6-4.2 times).

Of nonfood items, the cost of firewood and gas grew the most (3.8-3.9 times).

On the average, prices for nonfood goods grew over the last year by two times.

Growth rates for prices on children's and school supplies remained higher than the average level over the year. For example, children's clothing and footwear became more costly by 2.1-2.2 times; school notebooks—by 2.7 times, school writing articles—by 2.8 times.

A substantial and monthly growth in prices over the course of 1995 for medications should be noted. On the whole for the year, their cost grew by an average of 2.3 times.

The most substantial growth, compared with consumer goods for the preceding year, took place in fees for paid services to the population, although the intensity of their rise in comparison with 1994 also slowed. On the whole, for the past year, prices rose by 2.6 times, in 1994—by 6.4 times.

Fees for the use of city transportation rose significantly in the oblast (by 2.7 times), for suburban trains (by three times), communications services and water transport (by 3.3 times).

The average growth in prices for utilities services in the oblast was also 3.3 times, of which prices for gas supply rose to a greater degree—by nine times.

The rise in prices for utilities services in the cities and rayons of the oblast in 1995, as well as over 1994, occurred in a varied manner. Here, the differentiation among most prices and household utilities fees is 15-17 times, except for heating, where the difference is nearly six times.

The leading place among the 18 oblast cities and rayons investigated for the cost of housing and utilities belongs to Gorodetskiy Rayon, which was one of the first not just in Nizhegorod Oblast, but in the Russian Federation to switch over to the new payment system for housing and utilities services.

In housing and utilities services payments, Nizhniy Novgorod holds average positions in the oblast and among neighboring regions.

Of consumer services in 1995, the greatest growth had to do with fees for dry-cleaning, bathing services, ritual services (2.5-4.5 times).

The costs of health resort and treatment facility services, as well as physical culture and sports grew least of all over the past year.

Russia: Kuban Governor Reports on Chernomyrdin Talks

964F1712A Krasnodar VOLNAYA KUBAN in Russian 21 Feb 96 p 1

[Interview with Yevgeniy Kharitonov, under rubric "Pertinent Interview": "'Nothing Has To Be Destroyed...': Kuban governor Yevgeniy Kharitonov answers questions asked by VOLNAYA KUBAN and KRASNODARSKIYE IZVESTIYA."]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Question] Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich, recently you had two meetings with Premier V. S. Chernomyrdin when he was on vacation at the seaside in our kray...

[Kharitonov] Yes, he was vacationing in Sochi, but the meetings were working meetings and were devoted to the acute problems of life in the kray. For example, Tuapse is the only city in the kray where there is no gas-supply system. How should that problem be resolved? So I expressed my ideas to V. S. Chernomyrdin.

It is possible to run the gas from the line that is in Afipskiy, or it is also possible to run it from Lazarevskoye. From Lazarevskoye it is necessary to lay 40 km of gas pipeline, and from Afipskiy, 120. The Lazarevskoye alternative is preferable in that it is cheaper in cost and in implementation, on the basis of the construction periods. There is a possibility within the current year to bring in gas to Tuapse. All of this is graphic and simple that it does not require any special arguments.

There was also discussion with the premier about carrying out work in parallel on the Afipskiy-Tuapse line. The gas supply on the Maykop-Lazarevskoye-Sochi line is unstable. There are frequent landslides, emergency situations... What is needed is overinsurance. What will be that kind of overinsurance not only for Tuapse, but also for Greater Sochi, is a gas pipeline from Afipskiy. An electric-power plant will be built near Tuapse that will operate on gas, and that will make it possible to improve the energy supply of that rayon.

The construction is being carried out by "Tyumengazpromstroy," and the understandings have been achieved. The work of laying the pipes has been begun. Nevertheless the premier's prompting of the "Gazprom" leadership is definitely not excessive.

[Question] What other problems linked with Kuban wee discussed by you?

[Kharitonov] Once again, we spoke about power engineering. I told him, "Viktor Stepanovich, there is no need to raise the tariffs on energy carriers any more — you should lower them by 20 percent. Then the money will get into the budget more quickly."

We made a flight around some of the rayons in the kray — the premier himself was convinced that the spring field operations must be begun very soon. What's the snag? In being provided with fuels and lubricants. We discussed the situation, and currently we are working out, both at the governmental level and by way of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the questions of the accelerated shipment of GSM [fuels and lubricants] to the kray's farms.

I informed V. S. Chernomyrdin that not only Kuban, but the entire country, may be left without its seed fund. We have accumulated a year-and-a-half reserve of hybrid corn seeds, and no one will buy them. Now the farms are refusing to grow seeds. We may prove to be without sugar beet seeds. And this has already almost happened with seeds for vegetable crops. Soon we will also not be able to provide vegetable seeds to the public. The "Sortsemovoshch" system that used to exist is practically destroyed. Also, what are major seed-producing farms supposed to do if no one will pay them for the seeds?

We discussed questions of purchasing agricultural produce to be put into the federal fund. The food-products corporation under Minselkhozprod [Ministry of Agricultural Produce] is operating extremely unsatisfactorily. Requisitions are made, but then the money is not provided. And even that money that is allocated sometimes takes a long time to arrive. It took three months for the funds released for the purchase of grain to get from Moscow to Krasnodar! And that was 51 billion rubles. So what happens is that all the arrows are being shot at the government, but the government did not have anything to do with that — the money had been allocated promptly.

[Question] "Man does not live by bread alone." Certainly there must be other questions that are currently worth discussing with the premier...

[Kharitonov] Naturally, we also talked about the presidential election. And not just about specific individuals. I am troubled by the fact that we may shake the country apart by using the preelection situation. And I mentioned that to him. As the administrator of a complicated borderland kray, I obviously sense that danger. It is necessary, by specific steps, to smooth over the negative consequences of the sharp political struggle among the candidates, parties, and movements.

[Question] How do you evaluate VOLNAYA KUBAN's action — "Let's Stop the War!"?

[Kharitonov] Today I reviewed a request from the commanders of the military subdivisions that are in Chechnya concerning the rendering of humanitarian aid to them. Wild things are happening there! They want the state to give them everything: soap, socks, cigarettes, etc.

Soon Homeland Defenders Day will be here. I shall attempt to visit the military hospitals. And you can imagine how ashamed I will be when talking to the participants in the Great Patriotic War [World War II] to whom I cannot explain what is happening. Why I cannot create the proper conditions for them, the victors. But I was not even able to tell 19-year-old boys at another hospital what their future would be like.

V. S. Chernomyrdin and I spoke about the fact that the problem of Chechnya has to be resolved in the timeliest possible way, but also in a comprehensive, complete manner, with a consideration of the interests not only of the center and the region, but also, most importantly, of people.

As for the newspaper's action, people have the right and they must have the opportunity to express their attitude toward the Chechen war. But it must be understood that the levers for stopping the war in Chechnya are not in your hands or mine. But by way of such actions showing an active civic position we can exert an influence on the federal agencies of authority.

[Question] You are a conscientious person and you feel people's pain. Your position in the rigid vertical line of executive authority does not always allow you to express your personal position. But why don't our elected officials do this with all definiteness? After all, they have been allowed to do this. By the people!

[Kharitonov] Without a doubt, the chain of ethnic conflicts that stretches over a long period of time — Sumgait, Baku, Osh, Tbilisi, Karabakh, Abkhazia, Chechnya — must be broken. We must appeal to our political leaders and parliaments of all the sides participating in the conflicts in the vast post-Soviet space. Everyone who is responsible for anything to even the slightest extent must take part in this matter.

[Question] What does V. S. Chernomyrdin think about this?

[Kharitonov] From my conversation with him, I understood that he is firmly convinced that it is necessary within the near future to find the paths for stopping the war in Chechnya.

[Question] Of all the results of your meetings with the premier, which one is the most important for you?

[Kharitonov] For me every meeting is important. Because, in the course of those meetings, various problems involving the kray are resolved in a concrete manner. As for our most recent meeting, there was a discussion of the construction of the gas pipeline to Tuapse. An important decision was made, and gas will be provided to people's homes.

[Question] Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich, what is your position with regard to the implementation of the idea of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (KTK)? Because the petroleum plan affects Kuban in the most direct sense. Have the economic and ecological consequences been computed? Also, to what extent is the government taking into consideration the opinion of the region's administrators and specialists?

[Kharitonov] The kray has its own position with regard to the KTK. As of today, no agreement has been signed, no route has been coordinated, no conditions have been accepted for laying the pipeline across Krasnodar Kray. We have requested a more detailed ecological and seismological impact study. We are asking the federal government to provide guaranteed payment for the passage of each ton of petroleum across the territory of Krasnodar Kray. There are major discrepancies in this. With regard to certain conditions (such as the obtaining of a share of the future profit, or "you just sign it, and we will finish the construction later on"), we shall not agree.

[Question] The people of Kuban completely support that approach. It takes into consideration the interests both of Russia as a whole and those of the five million people living in the kray. VOLNAYA KUBAN has organized an expedition that will follow the itinerary of the pipeline and will discuss the KTK primarily from this point of view: to what extent is the pipeline safe, invulnerable, and profitable? We are gratified that, in this important matter, our positions are close.

[Kharitonov] Everything that serves creation, rather than destruction, must attract supporters and form people who share the same views. Although there are others who have different scenarios. Everything depends on what goal you set. I understand my own task in this way: I have the task of bringing Kuban to the election of the kray administration head without any economic or social upheavals. For the time being, it would seem that we have been successful: the work of the Legislative Assembly has been activated, we are attempting in a timely manner to resolve the conflict situations, contacts between the authority and the Cossacks have been improved, and we are monitoring the payment of wages in the budgetary sphere.

[Question] But the teachers struck recently.

[Kharitonov] Yes, they struck, but as a sign of solidarity with the teachers in other regions. We gave them everything that we could allocate from the kray budget. Although I understand that many questions are being resolved unsatisfactorily.

But any conflict can be aggravated on the wave of populism. I personally try to distance myself from populism. It is necessary to proceed from the real situation and real possibilities. Nothing has to be destroyed: not human relations, not housing, not production. Because it is very difficult to restore all of these things later on.

And this is my position not because I want to preserve the current situation in the country. There are constitutional possibilities for getting out of it. We shall not allow any extremist forces to bring the situation to its limit. It is not to everyone's liking when the administration head is in tune with the presidential authority. And I understand: with them, if the president currently considered me to be recalcitrant, Kharitonov would become practically a national hero. I am in an unprofitable situation from the point of view of political speculators, but I have greater trust in the nation's common sense.

The election of the kray's administration head will be coming. The date and procedure for that election will be determined by the Legislative Assembly. Currently I would not want to speak in detail about the preparation for the election. That is something for the future, although not that remote a future. But I shall do everything to assure that the people of Kuban have the opportunity to carry out their carefully considered choice in a calm and stable situation.

Russia: Samara Governor To Chair Federation Council Committee

964F1519A Samara SAMARSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jan 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Vladimir Shikunov: "Gubernatorial Elections May Be Held 14 April"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Samara Governor Konstantin Titov was elected chairman of the Committee on the Budget, Financial, Currency and Credit Regulation, Monetary Emission, Tax Policy and Customs Regulation of the Federation Council. 136 members of the Council voted "for" his candidacy, three voted "against," and one abstained. The membership of this commission also included the chairman of the province duma, Leon Kovalskiy.**

The governor began his press conference held on Friday with information about the first meetings of the Federation Council in its new complement.

Having noted the high degree of organization of the upper house, the precision of its work, and the absence of political prattle, Konstantin Alekseyevich also expressed the opinion that the structure of the FC [Federation Council] committees, which takes into consideration the "sectorial principle," has become outdated. Nevertheless, it is still supported by the majority.

The governor told in detail about the course of formulation of the leadership organs of the Council, and predicted its successful work.

Speaking of the conditions of activity of the FC, K. Titov announced that, for example, he and L. Kovalskiy and two of their assistants have been allocated a room 12 square meters in size. This, of course, is clearly insufficient. It is therefore no accident that the current topic of discussion is about granting the Council a more spacious building.

In response to the question of whether the governor, as chairman of a most important committee, would lobby for the interests of the oblast, Konstantin Alekseyevich responded: "Yes, absolutely." But not through "benefits and privileges," but rather on the basis of equal rights of the subjects of the federation. There must be either a firm budget agreement, or an agreement on division of powers and authorities. Here the governor referred to the practice of paying federal expenditures in our oblast through the local treasury: It has proven its effectiveness.

And if, say, in St. Petersburg there were serious demonstrations by workers in higher education who did not receive their money, in Samara province such a problem does not arise. A draft law is currently being prepared on this topic, taking into consideration Samara's experience.

The subject turned to how much his work in the FC will distract the governor from the affairs of the province. K. Titov emphasized that a strong command has been formed within the oblast leadership, and he made special reference to his first deputy, G. Khasayev, characterizing him as an exceptionally strong economist. A great role in the work of the RF committee's chairman will be played by the apparatus, which must be competent, precise and decent.

The questions of the numerous journalists who took part in the press conference also concerned other problems. Konstantin Alekseyevich expressed regret that Anatoliy Chubays has been removed from the office of first vice-premier of government—it was good to work with him, and good business contacts had been established. At the same time, the fact that Vladimir Kadannikov has been appointed to this office instills optimism. I am glad to see, said the governor, that one of our own, a Samara resident, has deservedly come to this high post. Moreover, this is a man who possesses many wonderful qualities. It is fitting to recall that, during the difficult time at the start of reforms, V. Kadannikov did much for the oblast: At that time, the petroleum products, mineral fertilizers and, not the least important—passenger cars, which were received by the oblast fund made it possible to survive an extremely difficult situation. Today we may also hear such voices: Kadannikov, they say, destroyed the VAZ [Volga Automobile Plant], and now has hastened to leave it. But the facts testify to the contrary: Last year VAZ produced 60,000 more automobiles as compared with 1994. Is this destruction?

There was much interest in the governor's viewpoint regarding the announced sharp increase in the cost of municipal services and the rumors which have been circulating in recent days about the fact that the government supposedly intends to repeal this decision. Konstantin Alekseyevich said that he does not know anything about the proposed government steps. In principle, I believe, he remarked, that any increase in prices must be closely tied with the growth of public solvency. Here, of course, they have gotten ahead of themselves a bit. We must thoroughly get to the bottom of the matter. We should take such an important instance: If the payment for municipal services exceeds 10 percent of a family's income, then compensatory payments are in order. Thus, perhaps, first it should have been necessary to compile appropriate lists of those who have the right to such compensation, and not to worry people? There is an entire ZhEU [housing-operational sector] network, and other organizations which could have dealt with the problem well ahead of time, and not after adoption of the decision. In general, however, the law which provides for a transition to full payment for communal services by the population contains the concept of gradual implementation, "stretching out" of the process through time.

Once again emphasizing that measures of social protection have been provided for low-income families, the governor announced that questions of payment for housing must be determined within the plane of interests of the population, and not merely the interests of the budget.

On the subject of agreements of regions with the center regarding division of powers and authorities, Konstantin Alekseyevich noted that, in general, there is the Federative Treaty, signed by the subjects of the Federation. Perhaps with the adoption of a number of new laws and of the Tax Code, the need for certain individual agreements no longer applies.

Here are his responses to some other questions.

In regard to Chechnya: The war there must be brought to a close. It is already clear—nothing will be achieved through weapons.

On the gubernatorial elections: On 30 January, the province duma will adopt the appropriate law. The differences of opinion arise over the point of whether the elections should be held in one or two rounds. If the law is ratified, the elections may be held in 70 days, that is on 14 April. Although it would be more rational to hold them at the same time as the presidential elections. It would be cheaper. For now, however, there is a prohibition against such combination. In regard to the situation with the proposal on retirement of the president's representative in the oblast, Yuriy Borodulin: This is a manifestation of a web of intrigues. No decision has been made in Moscow on this question. The governor has formed good business relations with Yuriy Mikhaylovich, which obviously do not exclude the possibility of different approaches to various problems. But this is normal.

On the chances of the current president at the upcoming elections: "Boris Nikolayevich has not yet expressed his willingness or unwillingness to run. I do not evaluate the existing candidates very highly," noted Konstantin Titov.

Answers to certain other questions posed by journalists were also given in the course of the press conference.

* * *

As we have already reported, back in December Konstantin Alekseyevich Titov agreed to answer questions posed by readers of SAMARSKIYE IZVESTIYA. But in the first half of January he was on a short vacation, then he was "tied up" with the opening of work of the Federation Council. Now the questions posed by our readers have been forwarded to the governor, and we expect to publish his responses at the beginning of February.

Russia: Samara Political Movement Founded

964F1519B Samara SAMARSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Feb 96 p 1

[Unattributed article: "The Thunder Has Pealed. Are We Crossing Ourselves?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The results of the last elections have brought democrats closer together. And so, a new socio-political movement has been created—"Samara Democratic Unity," which will also act as an electoral block. It includes local representations of the following parties: "Russia's Democratic Choice," "Democratic Party of Russia," the "Onward, Russia" Movement, "Democratic Russia," and the "Party of Self-Government of Laborers." A press conference was convened to announce the creation of "Unity."**

According to the organizers, the as-yet small number of members of the new formation is a temporary phenomenon. The initiators expect that several tens of political movements will enter the association, as well as those who do not belong to any political structures, but who support democratic ideals.

The primary purpose of creating "Unity," it was announced, is to not allow a return to power by the communists. In connection with this, the organization intends to nominate one candidate from the democratic forces at the June elections. Moreover, still ahead are the gubernatorial elections and the elections to the local organs of self-government, and "Unity" also intends to take an active part in them.

The initiators of the movement are counting on cooperation with the NDR [Russia Is Our Home] and, naturally, will not accept communists or representatives of the LDPR [Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia] as their allies.

The association also intends to develop its own economic program, oriented toward the problems of the oblast, but its creation is not being placed at the cornerstone.

As yet, it is not quite clear how such an association will be perceived by the central organs of the parties which comprise the movement at the Samara level. And how the members of our "Unity" will act if, for example, a candidate for RF [Russian Federation] president from some party which enters into the block does not "coincide" with the candidate of the entire Samara movement. As before, an association of democratic forces at the federal level is still problematic.

Russia: Radioactive Accident Reported in Samara Oblast

964F1520A Samara SAMARSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Feb 96 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Without Consequences for Samara"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **On 31 January at around 11 o'clock in the morning, approximately one ton of vapor-gas mixture containing manganese isotopes was emitted into the atmosphere on the territory of the Scientific-Research Institute on Nuclear Reactors at Dimitrovgrad (Ulyanovsk Oblast).**

The vapor-gas mixture quickly dissipated, and the solid radioactive precipitates settled only on the territory of the institute. For information—the period of half-life of manganese isotopes comprises around two hours, and the contaminated territory is considered safe upon expiration of 10 half-life periods. Decontamination of the polluted territory was performed through the efforts of the NII [scientific-research institute] associates.

Immediately after the incident, the associates of the Samara Oblast Center for Medical Emergencies and the oblast and city centers of state sanitary-epidemiological inspection undertook the necessary control measures. Measurements of radioactivity were performed, and snow samples were taken on the territory of the oblast as well as in Samara itself. No increase in the gamma background was noted. The radioactive background throughout Samara (natural background is up to 20 microroentgens per hour) during these days comprised somewhere on the order of 11 microroentgens per hour.

The causes of the accident are being investigated, and the situation is under control. The RF Minatom [Russian Federation Ministry of Atomic Energy] has created a special commission for investigating the incident.

Russia: Samara Oblast Lobbying Effort in Moscow Detailed

964F1520B Samara SAMARSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Margarita Zhutova: "Andrey Kalmykov: 'An Informed Man Is a Gentleman, an Uninformed One—a Slave"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The representation of Samara Oblast has been operating for half a year within the Russian Federation Government in Moscow. Its chief, A. A. Kalmykov, has the status of deputy head of oblast administration. Yet Andrey Aleksandrovich is little known to the Samara resident. The representative of this province to the RF Government has himself undertaken the task of filling this gap. He held a press conference at which, first of all, he told about himself, and secondly—gave some rather frank answers to questions posed by Samara journalists.**

Andrey Aleksandrovich had this to say about himself: He graduated from Kuybyshev Medical Institute and did his graduate study at the Second Moscow Medical Institute, in the faculty of "Organization and Administration of Public Health." He is a candidate of medical sciences and was listed in the reserve of the World Health Organization. He worked as a consultant for the large American pharmacological concern "Evod" in Russia, and then as commercial director of a French firm in the CIS. He has received good schooling in Western management, and has himself taught management at the academy.

And about the representation. Samara Oblast organized such a representation in the capital with considerable delay, despite the fact that the decision was made back in '92. The representation's office is not yet ready but, judging by the words of A. A. Kalmykov, everything there will be "okay." To play on one's home field, even such a small one—748 square meters in size—is always easier.

The staff of the representation consists of 9 people: Eight work in Moscow, and one in Samara. All of them are from there, from Moscow. Yet Andrey Aleksandrovich, even though he has lived in the capital for 16 years, considers himself to be a resident of Samara, and at his own admission, has never lost interest in the affairs of the province.

Kalmykov considers the primary task of the structure which he heads up to be the provision of clearly defined interaction between the federal and regional power structures. Strategically—it is to facilitate the fulfillment of all federal programs on the territory of the province. In translation from the official language this means to hammer out funds and limits for those plans which the center makes up. And not the last of the representation's goals is that of attracting investments. Active work with the World Bank on Reconstruction and Development, other financial and credit structures and with financiers of various countries is being conducted on this question. "Our men in Moscow" also engage in purely representative functions, visa services, creation of a comfortable environment for high-level officials of the province (that is needed too), and cargo transit. This alone has saved millions of rubles for the oblast.

Predicting the journalists' interest in the effectiveness of the representation, A. A. Kalmykov cited the "monetary operations" in which his "department" is involved. Moreover, he emphasized repeatedly that the main achievements must be credited to the leaders of the oblast. And so, our representation in the capital is involved in the realization of an experiment in oblast management of the Federal treasury: Funds on accounts 95, 100 and 120 are not shuttled back and forth (from the territory to the capital and back), but the lawful part is kept in the province right away. Last year, 100 billion rubles (R) were not subjected to shuttling back and forth. Instead of the planned R40 billion for the construction of a metro, they succeeded in getting R162 billion. For ecological revitalization of Chapayevsk they received R20 billion. We might add that the money will be received this year, and not in '97.

In housing construction, financing has been increased from R60.7 billion to R147 billion. R1.5 billion were given for the oblast blood transfusion station. R25 billion were approved for the oncology center: "But this money is still not all we need, and we will continue working on this."

According to A. A. Kalmykov, the attitude toward Samara Province in the supreme corridors of power is quite respectable. In his opinion, the "aggressive style" of behavior by our governor facilitates the success of numerous negotiations. The election of K. A. Titov as head of the Budget Committee of the Federation Council, judging by all, will facilitate promoting the "process of opening heavy doors." Andrey Aleksandrovich illustrated this thought with the example of the recent contact of oblast leaders with the president of the "Menatep" Bank, M. B. Khadarkovskiy. He managed to make the time to see them in Moscow, and then flew to Samara, and in general was "ready to wait for Titov even for 24 hours."

The province leadership and the oblast representation in the capital are currently working with "Menatep" on the subject of revitalizing our banking-finance system. And also—with other capital banks. The ideology here is clear: To protect our monetary flows, and not to allow them to leave the territory of the oblast. We must defend our positions also with the oil company "YUKOS." Otherwise, that very same Novokuybyshevsk, which in essence is working for the company, will become an ever-begging and always poor city.

Then again, the head of the representation believes that the current monetary figure does not reflect the entire effectiveness of its operation. Future prospects are very important here, and for them there must be complete and broad informational provision and analysis of information. "An informed man is a gentleman; an uninformed one—a slave," is a favorite saying of Kalmykov.

* * *

All the participants in the press conference agreed that the head of our representation in Moscow is an open man, pleasant to talk to, with correct speech and quick reaction. He is, at his own admission, not a poor man, although he has taken a sizeable pay cut in changing over to his new position. Nevertheless, it is interesting for him here. Here, as Andrey Aleksandrovich says, he realizes his attachment to Samara.

Russia: Dagestan Council Tries To Extend Term

964F1534A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by M. Beybutov: "Constitutional Crisis: State Council Attempts To Prolong Its Term"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Council of Dagestan, a peculiar "collective president" of the republic, the highest rung of executive power, consisting of the chairman, his deputy—head of government of the Republic—and 12 members representing so-called "titular nations"—Avar, Agul, Azerbaijani, Darghin, Kumyk, Laktsy, Nogai, Russians, Rutultsy, Tabasarantsy, Tats, and Tskahury—decided to continue the tradition of extending the term of state leaders in numerous republics both in the CIS and in Russia.

The State Council is attempting to extend its term, which expires on 26 July, by two years. The ninth session of the People's Assembly of Dagestan, however, which took place on 29 February, in the course of which that issue was discussed, merely aggravated the political situation in the Republic in connection with the constitutional crisis that developed following adoption of the decree pertaining to the appeal by a group of deputies regarding extension of the authority of the State Council. A group of deputies consisting of more than 20 individuals, led by Magomed Sheykhov, director of the Dagestan Agency of the Federal Food Corporation, and representatives of the public, headed by Magomed Tolboyev, former deputy of the State Duma, created a Committee for the Protection of Constitutional Order in the Republic. It also included leaders and representatives of various national movements, political and social organizations, which will possibly unify around the For a New Dagestan movement.

Those supporting an extension in the term of the State Council may attempt to describe the situation that has developed as an interethnic conflict or "an aggravation of the situation as a result of the aspiration to power by forces capable of destabilizing the situation in the Republic." The essence of the crisis that has occurred consists of the fact that the State Council is striving to extend its term by another two years and there are no legal grounds for that either in the constitution or in the laws of Dagestan. In this manner, such a decision is a political one and to push it through extensive use is being made of the "Kizlyar-First of May card." All of the services provided by the Dagestan side in the course of the resolution of the situation, which developed at the time of the incident with the fighters, are being attributed to Magomedali Magomedov, chairman of the State Council, without full justification, at a time when all decisions that were adopted were in fact collegial in nature.

In that situation Mukhu Aliyev, chairman of parliament, stood against the inclusion of the indicated issue on the agenda, by-passing legal norms. He insists on the need to observe the Constitution and laws of the Republic. As a result an extraordinary session of the People's Assembly may be convened, in the course of which some of the deputies will attempt to adopt the law on the Constitutional Assembly since a similar document adopted earlier does not specify the order and procedure involved in extending the term of the State Council. In addition, attempts may be undertaken to shift the process into a legal channel by the adoption of appropriate amendments in the republic Constitution and laws. With such a frank forcing through of a disputed decision, the most active deputies could raise the question concerning the lifetime extension of the term of the current composition of the State Council. After all the principal motivation boils down to the fact that it is only the current chairman and those forming that collegial organ who are today capable of ensuring peace and stability in the republic

Russia: Tatarstan Nationalists Score Shaymiyev Achievements

964F1534B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by V. Postnova: "Nationalists Criticize President Shaymiyev While Calling for His Support in the Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the eve of presidential elections in Tataria, scheduled for 24 March, in which the only candidate for the post of head of the Republic is the current president Mintimer Shaymiyev, the Union of Tatar Nationalists-the All-Tatar Public Center (VTOTs) distributed a statement which expressed the attitude toward the forthcoming event and the republic leader. The five-year rule by Mintimer Shaymiyev, in the opinion of VTOTs, has indicated that he never managed to become a reliable guarantor of personal rights and freedoms, the sovereignty and the Constitution of the Republic, or even a leader of the Tatar nation.

In defining the attitude toward the sole candidate for a high government post, the nationalists, first of all, are placing the accent on the conclusion of an inequitable treaty with Russia, according to their conviction, diverging from the opinion held by the great majority of subjects of the Russian Federation, that "reduced the Republic to the level of an ordinary oblast." The authors of the declaration believe that since the signing of the treaty Shaymiyev has done nothing to revive the statehood of the Tatar people or achieve the recognition of Tatarstan by the various countries of the world and that he also failed to bring the law enforcement agencies, including the Committee for State Security, under republic jurisdiction, or nationalize the oil company and the VPK [Military-Industrial Complex]. In addition to that the president was accused of not defending his citizens against compulsory service in the Russian Army, as a result of which they found themselves in Chechnya, where many perished. "The absence of a strong presidential policy aimed at the protection of people's right to self-determination merely encouraged Russia in its bloody deeds" it is noted in the declaration.

The VTOTs leadership sees the reason for such troubles primarily in the fact that the Republic is still "ruled by a nomenklatura brotherhood using standard Communist methods," which was evidenced by the elimination of opposition of all stripes, from green to red opposition, from the State Council. Finally, in Tataria there are no democratic laws on the election of the head of government which led to a situation where Mintimer Shaymiyev found himself the only candidate in the forthcoming presidential elections "as if the multimillion Tatar people have no worthy candidates for the post of president of the Tatar Republic, except for Mintimer Shaymiyev," the authors of the declaration conclude.

The main position of VTOTs, however, which is "preservation and further democratic development of the institution of the presidency as a symbol of the statehood of Tatars and prevention of the annexation of Tatarstan," forces it to evaluate the current preelection situation soberly. Inasmuch as today no one in Tataria doubts that Mintimer Shaymiyev will stay for a second term, the VTOTs leaders, rigidly enunciating their complaints, called for the support of his candidacy but only if he clearly defines his position "with regard to issues concerning the statehood of Tatarstan and its further sovereign development."

Russia: Tatarstan's Economic Successes Highlighted

964F1642A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by A. Shmelev: "Why You Can Live in Tatarstan on a Single Income"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today's Russia is a disturbed sea of turbulent political passions and ambitions. The waves of empty and populist promises, squalls of mutual accusations, and promises that everything will certainly turn out fine in the event of a victory in the presidential elections are typical characteristics of the marathon 1996 election campaign. An attempt is being made to keep public attention off the main content of political decisions to be made in the future. Electing a president that would be best for today's society is not what is being focused on today. For practical purposes everything reduces to an extremely simple formula: Choose either reform, leading to a market economy, together with all of its situations, and vote in favor of freedom of labor, the society, and the citizen, or take a step backward to universal leveling and to forcible redistribution of the results of the labor of some in favor of others.

Analysts are doubtlessly trying to take a critical look at the years of Boris Yeltsin's presidency. Of course, a quick look reveals primarily his practical mistakes. Many of them could have been objectively avoided. And as a consequence the reform might have been more effective, and it would not have been as hard for the people of Russia. It is all the more important on the eve of the coming Russian presidential elections to reveal and understand these mistakes, and to reach the appropriate conclusions.

Still, in discussing the shortcomings, we must not forget that Yeltsin's team had to assume the burden of leading the country out of its dead end and begin moving it in the direction of a civilized society. Such a road is never strewn with roses for the government. And the criticism that followed the exhilaration of 1992-1993 is fully explainable. The Russian central government underestimated the experience of implementing reforms locally.

To the Russian president's credit, it should be said that he was one of the first to admit the error, and this revealed itself most graphically in Tatarstan. It was in many ways owing to Boris Yeltsin and his personal support to the efforts of Tatarstan's President Mintimer Shaymiyev that it was possible to direct the energy of the political struggle into a constructive channel of economic reform.

For a long time, Tatarstan was portrayed to society as some sort of special zone. First it was criticized for its sovereignty, for its desire to supposedly secede from Russia. Soon after, however, upon close inspection it was revealed that Tatarstan had no intention of "floating away" from Russian shores, and that on the contrary it even supported Russian statehood, though on a fundamentally new basis. Tatarstan-style sovereignty turned out to be only a mechanism of more-effective redistribution and consolidation of the powers of the Center in favor of the regions and creation of a possibility for more effective economic reform under which the people's standard of living would not drop abruptly. The individual had to come first, together with all of his daily problems and concerns, and the theories, programs and mechanisms had to come after that.

Having signed a unique agreement delimiting the powers of the bodies of state government of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan, the republic successfully untangled the knot of political problems, and was able to switch its efforts over to the economy.

Tatarstan's success became possible in many ways chiefly owing to the role played by its president, Mintimer Shaymiyev. His experience, intuition, politics, and precise understanding of life as it really was allowed him and his team to find solutions to most of the problems, and effectively control the processes of reform.

Here are just a few examples of what the republic did in recent years. When the crisis of defaults was only just beginning on the backdrop of the harsh variant of transition to a market economy in the Russian

Federation, in 1993 Tatarstan started up its own system of circulating promissory notes. This almost completely solved the problem of defaults within the republic itself, and made it possible to save trillions of rubles for industry and agricultural production.

It was not until the second half of 1994 that the Russian government undertook similar measures, but it was already too late, because the default crisis had transformed into an uncontrollable process in many regions of the Federation.

It has already been four years that Tatarstan has been pursuing its own policy in the area of wage reform. This has led to the republican laws "On the Subsistence Minimum," "On the Minimum Wage" and "On the Minimum Consumer Budget." According to these documents, anything that was "minimal" in the republic could not be below the value of the subsistence minimum, and employers were given the task of providing income to their employees that was not below the value of the minimum consumer budget. In December 1995 this was 669,000 rubles. While debates regarding "minimums" are still going on in the Russian Duma, Tatarstan is successfully keeping the minimum wage at R200,000, and it is working on proposals to raise this amount in the next few months in connection with growth of the cost of living. For example the average wage in the Republic of Tatarstan in December was R883,200, at the same time that in Nizhniy Novgorod for example, it was only R548,900.

The republic actively protected its citizens from the complexities of the transitional period. The program of targeted social protection of the population of the Republic of Tatarstan contained a package of measures to protect the poor and vulnerable strata of the society. For example pensioners in Tatarstan have been receiving an average of R75,000 additional to their pensions since 1 February 1996.

The Republic was about the only region of Russia in which phased introduction of a law like Tatarstan's law "On Veterans" was started. It will cost the republic's budget almost R1.3 trillion.

Tatarstan has formed a unique data bank on the social safety net system, which provides extensive information on the republic's population, and on this basis permits economically justified decisions.

The resources of all extrabudgetary state funds in Tatarstan were declared by presidential edict to be republican financial resources, and were concentrated in a special bank authorized by the government. The functions of controlling expenditure of these resources was assigned to a special interdepartmental commission. This was to ensure that funds for social protection of the population would be used for their intended purpose. The commission itself was headed by R. F. Muratov, a recognized reformer and the first vice-premier, who supports a position of a close and inseparable tie between the course of economic reforms and the course of social policy.

Just in the second half of 1992 Tatarstan launched two programs of enormous importance: razing dilapidated housing, and 100 percent gasification of the republic's rayons. Unusual ways of solving financial problems were found for this purpose.

Over a year ago Tatarstan was one of the first to recognize the importance of preserving and strengthening its traditional strategic markets in Russia and beyond. This explains its efforts to form financial and industrial groups with Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, and a number of regions of Russia.

Examples of an active domestic economic and social policy in the Republic of Tatarstan cannot of course provide a complete impression of what has been done, but this is not even what is most important. It is important to note that all actions of President Shaymiyev and his team were an inherent part of efforts to implement the state program of economic and social progress. This document essentially reduces to formation of a republic-wide economic model—a model of Tatarstan. The main goal is to purposefully upgrade the quality of life of Tatarstan's citizens.

Back in 1994 the president of Tatarstan posed the objective of developing a program of such a scale, and he instructed First Vice-Premier Ravil Muratov, who has developed most of the republic's economic and social projects, to write it.

When Ravil Muratov made the principles of this program public at a republican scientific and practical conference in late February, it became clear that it took in everything positive from republican programs implemented previously, and that it went far further forward in its approaches. This means that the president of Tatarstan already has a foundation for his practical economic program for the next five-year plan. Moreover all of the basic practical approaches to continuing the economic reforms underwent discussion, finalization and coordination in the course of work on this program, and people who may be called in to implement the program and reinforce the effectiveness of the president's team underwent an apprenticeship.

What things are most interesting in the new program?

1. The present objective is to build an effectively operating system of forecasting and indicative planning

of the economy on the basis of objective indicators of the quality of life.

2. Realization of the concept of the republic's economic security on an internal republican, Russia-wide, and geopolitical scale will make it possible for the republic's economy to find its place in the world process of division of labor. Formation of the market mechanisms of state regulation in strategically important sectors by creating and supporting the appropriate organizations (financial and industrial groups, consortiums, banks, holding companies etc.) is already proceeding at full steam. And as experience shows, Tatarstan is working here on the basis of a well-developed strategy.

3. The task of forming and developing national capital as a counterweight to the shadow economy is posed as a fundamental principle of privatization. In this case state capital should gradually be transformed into national capital, and supplemented by a strong state social and tax policy.

4. There are plans to develop good mechanisms of targeted social protection of the population making it possible to implement the principle of a socially oriented economy (gradual transition to granting social assistance on the basis of applications, creation of a base of standards for regulating income, organization of a system to ensure against the inability to pay wages, a structured approach to employment policy, etc.).

Preparing for active implementation of the radical program, President M. Shaymiyev feels certain that he will get the support of the republic's population. By the way, Tatarstan is about the only region that still has a positive balance between the number of supporters of reform and opponents of the course of economic transformations.

This program is also vitally necessary for the republican elite. It is they—the administrative heads, enterprise directors, major entrepreneurs and leading scientists—who hope that by investing their labor into creating the program, they will impart new momentum to their progressive initiatives.

The advent of a program of active movement toward a market economy in Tatarstan on the eve of the Russian elections also strengthens the positions of federal reformers and the current president of the Russian Federation, since after all, this proves the viability and necessity of the course itself of economic transformations.

The problem of mutual relations between the regions and the Center is certainly the most complex. Tension will always exist here. But it is time for governors to stop blaming all sins upon the Center alone, and to get on with the business of regional reforms themselves. The experience of Tatarstan and other regions graphically demonstrates this. It is already clear that there will not be a single recipe that will fit everyone—the differences between Magadan Oblast and Krasnodar Kray are too great. We need to assume increasingly more responsibility and initiative. And not only Yeltsin but all of us must be accountable for the things that are done.

Russia: Tatarstan Law To Improve Foreign Investment

964F1528A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN in Russian 19 Mar 96 p 2

[Text of Republic of Tatarstan law, "On the Status of the Approved Investment Project With Participation of a Foreign Investor," signed by President of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Shaymiyev in Kazan, 6 March 1996. Followed by decree of Republic of Tatarstan State Council defining order of implementation of said law, signed by Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan V. Likhachev in Kazan on 6 March 1996]

[FBIS Translated Text] The present law defines the legal and economic conditions and the order of granting the status of approved investment project with participation of a foreign investor on the basis of the Republic of Tatarstan law, "On Foreign Investments in the Republic of Tatarstan."

The law is aimed at ensuring conditions facilitating active investment activity for the development of priority directions of the Republic of Tatarstan economy.

Article 1. Status of approved investment project.

An investment project is a collection of documents containing organizational-legal and economic measures, with technical justification of their effectiveness, prepared in accordance with the standard methodology ratified by the Republic of Tatarstan Cabinet of Ministers.

An approved investment project is a project which has a specific preferential status, granted by decree of the Republic of Tatarstan Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 2. Classification of investment projects.

Investment projects are classified according to the following categories:

—"Category K" (large investment projects) - projects whose realization ensures significant effective influence on the republic's consumer market, employment and the Republic Budget of the Republic of Tatarstan, according to which capital investments exceed the sum equivalent to $10 million U.S., and under the condition that the relative share of the foreign investor in the overall sum comprises no less than 45 percent of his own and (or) borrowed funds;

—"Category S" (medium-sized investment projects) - projects of republic significance with capital investments in a sum equivalent to from $2 to $10 million U.S., and under the condition that the relative share of the foreign investor comprises no less than 35 percent of his own and (or) borrowed funds;

—"Category M" (small investment projects) - projects aimed at solving problems of a regional and municipal character, for which capital investments comprise a sum equivalent to from $0.1 to $2 million U.S., and under the condition that the relative share of the foreign investor comprises no less than 35 percent of his own and (or) borrowed funds.

Article 3. Procedure of approving investment projects.

In order to receive the status of approved investment project, it is necessary to submit an application to the Republic of Tatarstan Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

A necessary component of the application is a business plan, presented in the form ratified by the Republic of Tatarstan Cabinet of Ministers.

A state expert investigation of the investment project is performed by the Interdepartmental Commission on Structural-Investment Policy of the Republic of Tatarstan. For categories "S" and "M" such expert investigation is to be performed within a month's time from the day of receipt of the proposal, and for Category "K"—within three month's time.

The Republic of Tatarstan Cabinet of Ministers, within 10 days from the conclusion of the state expert investigation, shall adopt a decree. Applicants whose investment projects have been rejected are sent a written notification of this fact within a week's time by the Republic of Tatarstan Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 4. Order of selection of investment projects.

The Interdepartmental Commission on Structural-Investment Policy performs selection of the projects on a competitive basis, in accordance with the classification specified in Article 2 of the present law. The conditions and order of holding the competition are approved by the Republic of Tatarstan Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 5. Types of presented benefits.

Aside from the benefits specified by the effective legislation and at the decision of the Republic of Tatarstan Cabinet of Ministers, legal entities created with share participation of foreign investors or wholly belonging to foreign investors, in the part of realization of the approved investment project, are also granted the following benefits for a term of from one to five years, and with subsequent extension for a period of one to five years in the amount of 50 percent:

—exemption from payment of the tax on profits from the sale of products (services) on the part of the income obtained from introduction of the investment projects or directed toward the introduction of these projects, credited to the Republic Budget of the Republic of Tatarstan;

—exemption from payment of the value-added tax in the part credited to the Republic Budget of the Republic of Tatarstan, on sold goods (work, services) received from the introduction of the investment projects or directed toward the introduction of these projects;

—exemption from payment of excise taxes in the mining sectors;

—setting of accelerated standards of amortization on equipment whose use is specified by the approved investment project.

The procedure, target application and terms of granting benefits on an approved investment project are ratified by the Republic of Tatarstan Cabinet of Ministers.

The local organs of state power may grant benefits on payment of local taxes, aside from the cases specified in the contracts concluded by the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan, where benefits are specified in mandatory order.

Article 6. Termination of status of approved investment project.

Termination of the status of approved investment project is performed on the following grounds:

a) upon expiration of the term of effectiveness of the status of approved investment project specified in the decree of the Republic of Tatarstan Cabinet of Ministers;

b) application of the granted benefits for other than their intended purpose;

c) violation of conditions of the approved investment project.

The effectiveness of the status of approved investment project is terminated on the basis of the conclusion of the Interdepartmental Commission on Structural-Investment Policy of the Republic of Tatarstan and formulated by decree of the Republic of Tatarstan Cabinet of Ministers.

In case of adoption of the decision on termination of the effectiveness of the status of approved investment project on the grounds specified in points "b" and "c", part one of Article 6, the legal entity receiving the benefits specified by the present law is obligated to pay the full sum of the benefits granted to him to the appropriate budget.

[Signed] President of the Republic of Tatarstan M. Shaymiyev

Kazan, 6 March 1996

Decree of State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan, "On the Order of Implementation of the Republic of Tatarstan Law, 'On the Status of the Approved Investment Project With Participation of a Foreign Investor'"

The State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan **hereby decrees:**

That the Republic of Tatarstan law, "On the Status of the Approved Investment Project With Participation of a Foreign Investor," shall be implemented from the day of its publication, with the exception of the second sentence, paragraph 3, Article 3, which shall be implemented from the time that changes and amendments are introduced into Article 14 of the Republic of Tatarstan Law, "On Foreign Investments in the Republic of Tatarstan," stemming from paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Republic of Tatarstan law, "On the Status of the Approved Investment Project With Participation of a Foreign Investor."

[Signed] Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan

V. LIKHACHEV
Kazan, 6 March 1996.

Russia: President Potapov on Buryatia Economy

964F1544A Moscow KULTURA in Russian
16 Mar 96 No 10, p 3

[Article by Leonid Potapov, president of the Republic of Buryatia: "To Turn Toward the Future"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Buryatia Days in Moscow are a noteworthy event for the Republic. People may tell us that the time that has been chosen for the celebration is not the best one; during the past year, 1995, the Republic did not succeed in surmounting serious economic difficulties, and the life of its population is a poor one. People may even tell us that a situation of economic depression—and that is how Buryatia's present situation is characterized—is no time for songs. Well, let them say so, but we believe that the time that has been chosen is the most appropriate one. Today concern for people's standard of living is coming to the fore throughout all Russia. And this is the very time that Buryatia is beginning the implementation of a new program of socioeconomic development that is scheduled to run until 2005. It has become a vital necessity for us. We must overcome our poverty and economic backwardness. Culture has a critical role to play in this connection.

The economic situation in the Republic still remains complicated. I will go further than that—the crisis in Transbaykal has proven to be even deeper than in Russia as a whole. Our economic complex was firmly tied to that of the union as a whole, and only crumbs were left for the republic. Industry, like a number of other sectors, was in large part oriented toward defense production. At the time that the changes began, the Republic was in a very unfavorable starting position. Even now our plants are operating at only 20-30 percent of capacity, and our agriculture finds itself largely without demand for its products (and approximately 40 of the republic's population is rural), since it was extremely one-sided in its specialization. For example, we developed a unique type of Transbaykal fine-wool sheep. From the wool of one sheep, enough fabric could be produced for 10 size 50-52 suits, but in the new situation the price of natural wool has proved catastrophically low, and that has delivered a heavy blow to the entire production cycle of fine wool materials.

Our timber industry complex was tied chiefly to the Central Asian republics, and the former ties have been severed.

I cannot fail to mention the fact that these and other branches of the economy have been developing in the Baykal water-conservation zone. This zone covers 80 percent of the republic's territory. Of course, we are proud of the world's pearl and love and protect it, but one can imagine what strict restrictions this imposes on agriculture and the timber industry, what additional expenditures are required for the construction of purification and environmental-protection facilities, and how far away our animal husbandry and all industrial and construction zones have to be removed from the shores of Baykal. In addition to the so-called "Baykal factor," we have all the difficulties of regions of the Far North. Sixty percent of Buryatia's territory falls in that category.

One-third of the construction of the Baykal-Amur Mainline, with all of the miscalculations associated with its social and production structure, passes through the northern part of the Republic. Unfortunately, this railroad still operates at a loss rather than a profit, and the Russian Federation cannot support this complex out of budgetary funds.

I won't enumerate other of our economy's difficulties. I want to discuss something else—we must turn toward the future. The Republic has the economic potential to do so, and our task is to make it work.

In preparing a program for the republic's development under the conditions of a market, we oriented ourselves not toward power-wielding, vertical, centralized structures, but toward market-based, horizontal structures and those that are more effective by virtue of their democratic nature.

It is common knowledge that Transbaykal gravitates more to the Far East than to other regions of Russia, including the vast Siberian region. In the recent past, when enormous amounts of union resources were spent on developing the West Siberian or East Siberian economic complexes, Transbaykal was usually forgotten. Later it was remembered, and an attempt was made to rectify matters, but things developed historically in such a way that little consideration was given to the interests of the Republic itself. Up to 60 percent of its consumer goods had to be shipped in. And even now, we are forced to ship in 52 percent of everything we need, including grain, from far away. Everyone knows what that costs nowadays.

It seems that in the very near future major changes should be made in state economic policy with respect to the Transbaykal region, as well as to the Far Eastern region as a whole. The state must deal with the problems connected with our territories' remoteness in terms of transportation, and must take into account the higher cost of providing for people's life and activity. Such measures as pay increments for length of service in remote regions and, say, for work in specific zones, and the provision of every reasonable support to the region would make it possible to get out of the tense situation in the social sphere. We think that the year that has begun will not yet be a year of economic growth, but I am convinced that if certain obligations on the part of the state and the center are met, the year may become a year of economic stabilization for us. [passage omitted]

Russia: Rostov Procurator Protests Local Legislative Acts

964F1643A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 16 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Sergey Agafonov: "Rostov Procuracy Protests Five Local Legislative Acts: And It Is Ready To Settle the Conflicts in Court"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Rostov Oblast procuracy sent five protests to the attention of the next session of the legislative assembly regarding the activity of oblast legislators. The first has to do with the oblast law "On Measures to Intensify Control Over Migration Processes in Rostov Oblast," which limits the flow of refugees of non-Russian nationalities from Chechnya, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and other hotspots of the former CIS. In particular the law restricts movement and residence of these categories of persons, payment of not less than 5 million rubles for registration, and additional forms of punishments for violations, going as far as exile from Rostov Oblast. In the procuracy's estimation this law is surprisingly reminiscent of the Ataman edicts that were enforced sometime ago in the oblast of the Great Don Forces, and it goes contrary not only to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and its legislation, but also to the Universal Human Rights Declaration and other international agreements signed by Russia. The legislative assembly of Rostov Oblast decided to suspend the migration law and return it for reworking.

Two other protests from the procuracy have to do with oblast laws on the status of deputies of the legislative assembly and the Rostov City Duma. In the procuracy's opinion the legislative assembly went beyond its powers in adopting them, and placed itself at odds with the federal law "On the General Principles of Organizing Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation." In addition to a broader interpretation of the immunity of deputies, privileges for the families of deputies were introduced into oblast laws.

Discussion of the two procuracy protests against lengthening the terms of office of deputies by another two years evoked sharp debate. In the opinion of the procuracy this violated certain items of the statute "On the Basic Principles of Organizing State Government in Subjects of the Russian Federation" and Presidential Edict No. 951 "On Elections to Bodies of State Government of Subjects of the Russian Federation and to Bodies of Local Self-Government," which declare that an oblast representative (legislative) body of state government is to be elected for a term of two years, and that the term of his office may not be lengthened during this time. Moreover an item of the presidential edict requiring elections no later than December is also violated.

After heated debate the legislative assembly of Rostov Oblast decided to reject the procuracy's protest, and it sent a resolution to that effect to the procurator of Rostov Oblast. The formal basis for this was Decree No. 1166-1-GD, 6 October 1995 of the state duma "On Elections in Subjects of the Russian Federation" and Presidential Edict No. 315, 2 March 1996, which in the opinion of oblast legislators give a subject of the Federation the right to independently schedule elections on its own territory. It was explained to this SEGODNYA correspondent off the record that the legislative assembly is hoping that a package of agreements between Rostov Oblast and the Center will be signed prior to the presidential elections. Broadening some of the rights of Rostov Oblast is proposed. In a telephone conversation with this SEGODNYA correspondent, Rostov Oblast Procurator Albert Posidelov expressed disagreement with the legislative assembly's resolution, and did not exclude the possibility of settling the dispute in court.

Russia: Rostov Free Customs Zone Planned

964F1643B Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 19 Mar 96 p 9

[Article by Sergey Agafonov: "Free Customs Zone To Be Created in Rostov: With Its Help, Local Authorities Hope To Keep Enterprises From Moving to Offshore Zones of Ingushetia and Kalmykia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Establishment of the Rostov free customs zone received the approval of executives of four federal ministries and personally of the RF president, who acquainted himself with the project. It is proposed that the project will be formalized during the month by a separate presidential edict giving it the official status of "an experiment to attract investments to the southern region."

The main thing that makes the Rostov variant different from the Kaliningrad and Nakhodka versions is that rather than a free economic zone, a free customs zone is established here. No status is foreseen in Russian legislation for a free economic zone, such that a formation of this kind would find itself suspended in a legal vacuum, requiring a mass of individual supplementary decisions in each concrete case. Establishment of a free customs zone is foreseen by the customs code, and in the words of Aleksandr Yepifanov, the chief of the North Caucasian Customs Administration, the appearance of the first free customs zone in Rostov logically follows from the city's location at the junction of different transportation flows—air, water, rail and motor.

The cofounders of the Rostov free customs zone included—in addition to the customs administration—the city and oblast administrations (each contributing 10 percent of the authorized capital, with the first stock issue totaling 1 billion rubles), the Rostov branches of Inkombank and Kredobank, the Port of Rostov, the Donskiye Avialinii and Donvodstroykomplekt joint-stock companies, and a couple of dozen of regional financial and productive organizations.

On one hand in the opinion of the Rostov administration the Rostov free customs zone creates a real possibility for keeping local enterprises from moving to the offshore zones of Ingushetia and Kalmykia. Just last year alone, such flight of enterprises reduced local budget revenues by almost R100 billion. Specialists of the Zarubezhskhema Scientific Research Center and the Internauka Center, who developed the package of documents on the Rostov free customs zone, believe that the project's value lies in the fact that it fits organically into the "International Intermodal Corridor for the 21st Century" program adopted by countries of the European Community. This project foresees movement of freight flows from Europe and Asia through Moscow, Rostov and southern ports: Taganrog, Novorossiysk and Tuapse.

On the other hand in the words of Yuriy Pogrebshchikov, president of the Rostov Free Customs Zone Joint-Stock Company, preliminary agreement has already been reached on cooperation with similar zones in Turkey (Antalya, Trabzon), Central Europe (Vienna, Budapest) and the Near East (United Arab Emirates, Dubai). Transit through Rostov customs in 1995 totaled approximately 1.5 million tonnes of cargo amounting to over US$200 million. Thirty percent of these goods are destined for the southern regions, and they may be sold in the Rostov free customs zone without having to move them all the way to Moscow and then getting them back in small lots.

In the words of Mr Pogrebshchikov small-scale wholesale trade will be another direction in the activity of the Rostov free customs zone. In the estimation of specialists "shuttle" trade in Russia reaches an annual volume of not less than US$20 billion, and a significant part of it goes through Rostov, which communicates regularly with countries of the Near East, Europe and Asia by all forms of transportation. Former shuttle traders would now be able to order consignments of goods at the center of the free customs zone, without having to waste time and money getting them delivered. The system of consignment warehouses is also advantageous to consumers: The cost of goods decreases, and their assortment increases.

And third and finally, modern, ecologically clean production operations are to be created in the Rostov free customs zone. Space reserved for it on the left bank of the Don, across from the city center, has already been increased from 80 hectares to 200. And many production firms—from computer to machine building enterprises—are showing interest in the second stock issue, planned for summer (a volume of R100 billion).

Russia: Amur River Contamination Reported

964F1649A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Galina Mironova: "Daddy, Daddy, This Net Has Brought Us Lead; Unprecedented Ecological Catastrophe on the Amur"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first to sound the alarm was an amateur fisherman from Khabarovsk, whose surname remained unknown. Having pulled a whale of a fish out from under the ice of the Amur River, he suddenly smelled a distinct pharmaceutical odor coming from it, which in the fresh frosty air seemed all the more inappropriate and unpleasant. Making use of the occasion, the fisherman filled a can with water from the ice hole. Ultimately, handed over by the fishery inspectorate, this can ended up at the kray committee on ecology. When they analyzed it, everyone was shocked—the water contained 900 times the marginally allowable concentration of phenol!

First of all, of course, they rushed to check the intakes of the Khabarovsk city water collectors. And, fortunately, they found no phenol there. However, starting from the mouth of the Tunguska, which empties into the Amur not far from the city, and further—along the entire 1000 km extent of the large river, all the way to Tatar Strait, the ecologists began to record unheard of concentrations of phenol.

But, first of all, the residents, of course, had to be informed: Could they eat the "pharmaceutical-smelling" fish? They sent frozen samples from the extent of the entire river to the sanitary-epidimeological inspectorate. Here they had never dealt with such problems before. They had neither the methodology, nor the need to do so. They performed the analysis, even using some things from judicial medicine: They sniffed it out and cooked it. But they came to no final conclusion. Moreover, some fish were completely clean, while others were phenol-contaminated. Upon thawing, the flesh even fell away from the bone. They told people to be extremely cautious.

The fish stalls at the markets grew empty, and the swarms of fishermen disappeared from the Amur ice. Forty tonnes of delicatessen smelt which had been caught in the lower reaches of the river were not put on sale.

The first thing everyone thought was that they had submerged some industrial waste under the Amur ice. And, if, as it turned out, the phenol came from Tunguska, there was nothing there but a railroad tie impregnating plant and a wood-processing combine. However, nothing was confirmed. There is no chemical production on the Amur, even on the China side.

Scientists at the Institute of Hydrological and Ecological Problems, located in Khabarovsk, stated that they knew perfectly well that this winter would become a critical one for the Amur, because the degradation of the river had begun, and it was already incapable to handling the pollution. A specific fungus and algae is developing in the Amur, the nutrient medium for which is household and industrial waste. In the summertime, the self-purification of the river proceeds more successfully, but in the winter, when the water level drops, the current slows, and the oxygen concentration declines, the fungi and algae begin to flourish, especially in the stagnant areas and holes. This winter they accumulated in great amounts and, upon decay, emit not only phenol, but also allergens, mutogens, and carcinogens.

But how could such a small population living in the Amur region destroy such a mighty river? After all, there are only about five cities along the entire extent of the Amur—no more. The residents here have become accustomed to taking from nature, not conserving, and believing that there would be enough for many generations to come. As a result, last year Khabarovsk alone dumped 3,280 tonnes of organic waste, 40 tonnes of petroleum products, 267 tonnes of nitrogen, 270 kilograms of phenol, as well as lead, zinc, and aluminum into the river, and this is not counting the sewage water and all else that was not registered and recorded.

Many believe the natural origin of the poison to be a fairy tale and a scientific fantasy. Even some professional ecologists think so. It seems that the current will wash everything down to the sea, and once again the Amur fish will become the main entree. One always does not want to believe the worst.

Russia: Krasnoyarsk 'RT-2' Nuclear Waste Problems

964F1621A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 10-17 Mar 96 No 10, p 17

[Article by Aleksandr Bolsunovskiy, Biophysics Institute, Siberian Department, Russian Academy of Sciences: "A Plant Without Sugar?: The Country Is Transforming Into a Nuclear Burial Ground"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During his visit to RT-2 the president of the Russian Federation was categorical: "The plant has to be finished. And don't argue with the president." The result: Tons of radioactive wastes from the entire world are converging on Krasnoyarsk, but the plant's construction hasn't moved from square one. There's no money. The needed amount is around 12.5 trillion rubles. But the real amount of the outlays will grow by several times. This is because construction of RT-2 will unavoidably require construction of a fuel preparation plant, and a nuclear power station to use this fuel. In Great Britain, such a plant cost 3 billion pounds sterling. And the cost of a plant in France is not any lower. Considering the entire cycle of outlays on RT-2, in the foreseeable future Russia will be unable to find the needed money. The leadership of the Ministry of Atomic Energy suggests building the plant with prepayments from Western clients. But the countries we are talking about are Ukraine, Moldova, Bulgaria, India, China, Kazakhstan and countries of the Near East. Russia is rendering an expensive foreign exchange service to these clients, but they insist on making their settlements by barter. As an example according to the most modest calculations Ukraine was supposed to pay R400 billion, but only 50 billion in "real" money was received. Kiev compensated for the balance by barter—construction materials, government treasury bills and, of all things, sugar. But how are you going to build a plant with sugar? In the beginning the Ministry of Atomic Energy hoped for rich clients like Germany and Switzerland. But they refused to participate in the project, while negotiations with South

Korea and Taiwan are in great question. Even if a wealthy client is found to pay for part of the construction (this might be Japan or the United States), RT-2 will be idling more often than working. For example the processing plant in Great Britain, which was built in part with money from Japanese firms, is idling. Germany's nuclear power stations also refuse to send their spent fuel for processing. The Germans are even ready to pay steep fines. The reason—the offered services are so expensive. Russia of course could get new clients if it offers additional services to them. For example, burying the wastes of others on its territory. And this is what is being done at Chelyabinsk-40 and is threatening Krasnoyarsk-26. But this is equivalent to transforming Russia into a giant burial ground for many hundreds of years. In the meantime Russia initially fell into debt owing to wastes imported from Finland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Ukraine. The declaration that all radioactive wastes of foreign nuclear power stations will be returned is almost unfulfillable. Thus, 450 tonnes of spent fuel from Ukraine containing around 5 tonnes of plutonium are stored at the site in Krasnoyarsk-26. In France, the supplying country is supposed to pay for every day of such "storage," while under Russian terms a single payment in goods or in credit suffices.

When we take account of the old age of the production operation, the long waiting line, and the fact that RT-2 is not finished yet, under these conditions leakage of plutonium is almost guaranteed. Considering that the land on which fuel is being stored and RT-2 is being built was already subjected to radioactive contamination, any added contamination harbors disaster. Even without construction of new, dangerous facilities, the state of the radioactive wastes is extremely serious today. No one can guarantee that an accident similar to the kind at Chelyabinsk or Chernobyl will not occur in Krasnoyarsk-26. The integrated works do need money, though not for construction of the RT-2 plant, but to process old wastes.

Russia: St Petersburg Crime Rate Among Minors High

964F1575A Moscow PRAVDA-5 in Russian 15-22 Mar 96 No 10, p 3

[Article by Aleksey Tarabrin, under "Nation's Security" rubric: "Lost Generation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] St. Petersburg—**"In Leningrad Oblast, nearly 70 percent of the participants in organized criminal groups whose activities were terminated in 1995 were young people aged 18 to 25."**

(From Saint Petersburg GUVD [State Administration of Internal Affairs RUOP [Rayon Directorate for Organized Crime] report).

Leaving No Living Witnesses

—Give me a smoke, bud,—a short, skinny teenager appears before a passerby.

—You should drink milk, not smoke...

But the man never got to finish his sentence. After a powerful blow from behind to his head with something heavy, he sank to the asphalt, dropping his briefcase and a parcel. The boy adeptly scooped them up, tossing back:

—Let's see what you've got here.

Two others, a little older and bigger, bending over the deafened victim, checked his pockets with a practiced air. But the man suddenly grabbed the thief by the hand. Using a hold, he twisted it, throwing one opponent onto another. Then he rose. At that very instant, the blade of a dagger flashed dully. Moaning, the man fell to the ground. And the person who had struck him extended the knife to the teenager: "Finish him off so he doesn't tell. Nothing will happen to you, anyway—you're a minor."

Horrible facts: last year, Dmitriy V., a student at PTU-47 [professional-technical institution] in the city of Luga, in a group with adults committed five murders with which the bandits were attempting to conceal traces of robberies. Here, taking into consideration the personal qualities of the teenager, the older members left the "wet work" to the boy.

Figures and Facts

Over the last five years, a firm tendency has been noted towards a rise in crimes committed by minors (for Leningrad Oblast, of nearly three times). The highest peak was registered in 1993—over 3.5 thousand crimes. The greater part of these were of the violent, mercenary kind. In 1995, their share accounted for close to 90 percent of the total number. Robberies increased by 8.5 percent, muggings and thefts became more frequent. Premeditated murders rose by over two times (from eight to 18 cases). Motive—gaining possession of another's property.

'I'm Very Hungry'

A herd of kids was gathered at the entrance to the Volzhskiy Aluminum Plant. They were openly begging workers for food coupons and money, repeating in a rehearsed manner: "Help me, please, I'm very hungry." Andrey Z., having placed his worn cap on the asphalt, was singing.

This picture can be seen here nearly every day. Sometimes, the militia takes the moochers away. They surrender without opposition. The boys know that they will at least be fed if this happens. But after this, their fate will not change a bit: children's homes in the city and the rayon are overfilled. The teenagers gathered on the street have nowhere to go. For example, Andrey Z. lives with his mother, who has been deprived of parental rights. The others have it no better. Their alcoholic parents drink everything away, even the coupons for free lunches that are given out at social protection divisions.

—Two months ago, we were picking up two or three guys here,—said an employee of the Volkhovskiy GOVD [City Internal Affairs Department]. Today, there are already over ten of these neglected kids. They are almost the same teenagers. Five are registered at the psycho-neurological clinic because of developmental anomalies. Seven are registered with us for violations of the law that they have committed.

Figures and Facts

During the 1995 "Teenager" operation, employees of internal affairs organs in Leningrad Oblast established 1,207 parents who were using their children for a parasitic existence. In the subdivisions dealing with minors' affairs, materials were prepared that would deprive 457 parents of parental rights. The commission was forced to take these extreme measures because living in such families presented a danger to the children's lives. But almost no movement has been made towards solving the problem. Individual courts (in Luzhskiy, Tikhvinskiy and other rayons) have been forced to refuse to examine these cases because all the overnight facilities for children are overfilled. They are accepted for examination only if there is a real possibility of guardianship or trusteeship.

Nobody's Children

In times gone by, a whole institution of public organizations played an active role in the system for preventing violations of the law by minors. Today, they are practically nonexistent.

Because they run on their own funding, many of them have started to close down, are being done away with... Some have begun operating on a paying basis. That means that they are no longer for everyone, but just for the "select."

If you look seriously at the problem of child neglect and crime on the scale of an individual rayon or the country, you could make the statement that having demolished one thing, they have forgotten to create something different. Many children are supporting themselves, and have thus become nobody's. But after all, they are the nation's future. This is an urgent problem. The modern school has lost its former educative functions. Who's going to teach someone else's children for pennies, when you don't have enough for yourself? A teacher must take on more hours in order to earn more.

Figures and Facts

Last year, 185 people dropped out of school in the city of Volkhov, 90 were granted entry to professional-technical institutions—65 to evening-shift schools, and only eight have found work. The rest fall into the "not" category (not studying, not working and so forth). What will their future hold? For example, Anatoliy I. and Andrey L., expelled for not wanting to study from Pashkaya High School, were brought to trial for robbery and theft. Dmitriy S. and Vladimir A., dropped from Novoladozhskaya High School, committed over 20 crimes.

It is impossible not to pay attention to teenagers at evening schools. Today, the transition to this kind of training has become a mass phenomenon (every third who drops out of school). Without further explanation, it is clear that a minimal amount of study goes on here. One may assume that the greater portion of time is dedicated to work. This is the theoretical side. In practice, it is exactly this category in which most of the violations of law and crimes are committed. As a rule, every second gets onto a militia register. The school, itself, without its basic component, that is, a production base where a child would be able to acquire a specialty, to work, is transformed into a place where minimally educated and enculturated, criminally inclined teenagers are concentrated.

Thus, one gets the idea that these teenagers, torn away from socially useful, active work, turn out to be abandoned. Neither the state nor their parents have any need for them. They are a lost generation, whose only remaining path lies through the open gates to criminality.

For a certain category of teenagers, crime is the only way to survive. In Leningrad Oblast and Saint Petersburg, every second participant in crimes was not working, was not going to school. Moreover, in Vyborgskiy, this number exceeded 70 percent, in Vsevolozhskiy—65. According to the results of the "Employment" operation, 3,103 teenagers were found to be without any defined employment, of them 32 percent were graduates of professional-technical schools and technical schools, 22 were expelled at various grades from educational institutions, 26 did not start classes in the new school year (unwillingness to study, illness), 20 were sentenced by courts to punitive measures, not related to deprivation of freedom, and had arrived from other places due to loss of housing.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan: Finance Ministry Notes Losses Up 9.7 Times

964F1555A Almaty EKSPRESS-K in Russian 19 Mar 96 p 4

[Report by V.D.: "Budget Allocations Are Decreasing, but Embezzlement Is on the Rise"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **According to the Finance and Currency Control Committee of the Kazakhstan Republic Ministry of Finance, 2,732 budget-carried organizations and institutions, including agencies of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs, were audited in 1995. Total losses amounted to 341.5 million tenge, including 86 million lost in shortfalls and thefts. Therefore, total losses exceeded the 1994 figure by 308 million tenge, or by 9.7 times.**

Foreign currency losses amounted to 4.103 million dollars (or 230.9 million tenge), including 1.849 million dollars (or 79.7 million tenge) lost as a result of shortages and thefts.

Paradoxically, in spite of the underfinancing of budget-carried organizations, staffers of the Finance and Currency Control Committee report a yearly rise in deliberate violations of financial discipline. Furthermore, the embezzlement of funds and forex assets and of commodity stocks and supplies through middlemen and commercial structures is also growing increasingly common.

Regrettably, the largest amounts of budget funds not used for their designated purpose, of shortages, and of thefts of funds and physical assets were discovered in institutions of the Ministry of Health, Education, and Social Welfare. The embezzlement of pension funds amounting to 2,404,300 tenge, for example, was discovered in the cost accounting center of the Semey Oblast Department of Social Welfare. The method was simple: Pension payment authorizations were made out in the names of deceased pensioners, pensioners who had moved out of the republic, and fictitious persons. Seven members of the staff of a pension and grant delivery enterprise of the Oktyabrskiy Rayon Social Welfare Department in Oskemen padded the totals in payment records and paid out money on fictitious statements, thereby appropriating 401,200 tenge.

Embezzlement on a particularly grand scale was committed in Taldyqorgan Oblast with the direct participation of O.S. Kan, the chief physician of the Teqel Municipal Hospital, and V.V. Dorokhina, the chief bookkeeper. Funds were also embezzled there by means of hospital purchases of medications without quality certificates from commercial structures and private individuals at prices far in excess of state prices. The resulting oblast budget losses amounted to 966,700 tenge. Besides this, the hospital administration transferred 2,464,000 tenge to the personal accounts of private individuals in the guise of advance payments to various commercial structures, and this money was then returned in cash to Chief Physician O.S. Kan. The incurred debts of the structures were written off by filling out fictitious deposit slips for the account of pharmacist Muravskaya. In all, the unlawful actions of hospital officials caused losses totaling 3,543,000 tenge. During the investigation following the audit and the institution of criminal proceedings, Yu.S. Kan, the brother of the hospital's chief physician and the director of the "Resurs" enterprise, one of the suppliers of the medications, was arrested.

The committee also reported the improper use of funds allocated from the budget to cover debts for grain purchased for state needs. Grain procurement enterprises of the "Astykh" agricultural combine misused 278.1 million tenge of the 1.652 billion allocated for settlements with agricultural producers for this grain. The "Sevkazkhlebprodukt" combine used only 43.4 million tenge of the 150 million it received for the designated purpose of the allocations and then spent the remaining 106.6 million on its own needs, paying off bank credits with 76.1 million, debts to the pension fund with 11.5 million, and debts to motor transport enterprises with 10.6 million tenge. Comparable incidents of the improper use of budget funds were also recorded in North Kazakhstan (106.6 million tenge), Torgay (43.2 million), and Qoqshetau (26.8 million) oblasts and in Almaty (40.4 million).

Measures taken during the course of audits and inspections of budget-carried institutions and organizations in 1995 recovered 77.9 million tenge in losses. In addition, discovered underpayments of taxes and other fees, including penalties, added 71.3 million tenge to the budget.

Audits and inspections of 4,597 state-owned economic entities revealed losses totaling 1,559,400,000 tenge. These losses included the illegal expenditure of funds and physical assets worth 695,361,000 tenge at 1,690 facilities, including 33,909,000 spent on the payment of wages and bonuses. The shortages and thefts of funds and physical assets at state enterprises amounted to 828,868,000 of the total discovered losses.

Losses amounting to 2,286,800 tenge were recorded, for example, at the Petropavlovsk Heater Enterprise, and 2,254,000 of this amount was spent illegally on the connection of water and sewer lines, without charge, to the private summer homes of municipal administration deputy chiefs V.A. Bondar and V.A. Ovchinnikov, Director I.A. Kovalev of the Petropavlovsk Heating Network, Director V.N. Chernoshvets of the municipal power transmission system, Director M.S. Dudkin of the municipal GES, and other officials. A shortage of 9.1 tonnes of nonferrous metals worth 2,760,200 tenge was discovered in the accounts of warehouse administrators V.Ye. Semenov and T.N. Sharypov at the Serebryansk Inorganic Production Plant in East Kazakhstan Oblast.

Inspections of 92 enterprises and organizations under the jurisdiction of "Kazakhtelekom" revealed that 76 had overstated the rates and volume of services performed, had authorized and paid excess wages, and had written off commodity stocks, supplies, and funds totaling 12,400,300 tenge on invalid grounds, including shortages and thefts of commodity stocks, supplies, and funds amounting to 3,650,700 tenge.

The national economy suffers substantial losses from unprofitable barter operations with foreign partners and the export of products and physical resources to foreign states without guarantees of full payment in foreign currency.

The "Embaneftegeofizika" joint-stock company in Atyrau Oblast sent petroleum products worth 4,392,100 tenge to the "Balkhashbalyk" joint-stock company in February 1995 according to the terms of a barter contract in exchange for canned fish. The fish was then sent to the "Granat" limited-liability partnership in Moscow without any handling or payment records. Besides this, the 471,000 U.S. dollars received in September-December 1994 from the Western Atlas International company for leased warehouse and office space were used to buy computer tapes without ever being deposited in a foreign currency account.

The "Shygys LTD" partnership in Almaty signed a contract with three Chinese firms ("Nongken," "Sunwuzen," and the South China Chamber of Commerce and Industry) for shipments of 36,400 tonnes of metal for 3.7 million U.S. dollars. They actually sent the metal out of the republic for 3 million U.S. dollars in exchange for goods worth only 1.6 million dollars.

Many administrators of economic entities have also set out on the road to crime. A small business and foreign trade firm, "K-rezeks," was set up as part of the "Karagandarezinotekhnika" joint-stock production association in November 1991. The association's deputy general director in charge of foreign economic relations, A.M. Pribulskiy, was appointed the director of the new firm. According to its articles of incorporation, the right to conduct financial operations through the association's foreign currency account was illegally transferred to "K-rezeks." The central accounting office and the finance and economic planning departments of the association received no reports of these operations, and this resulted in accounting errors and losses totaling 138,576,300 tenge, including shortages and thefts amounting to 15,270,000 tenge.

Russia: Military Procurator on Armed Forces Crime

964F1551A Almaty PANORAMA in Russian 15 Mar 96 No 10, p 6

[Article by Gulmira Arbabayeva: "The Prevention of Weapons Theft Must Begin With an Inventory by Republic Military Agencies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last Wednesday, 13 March, was the date of Republic Military Procurator Yuriy Khitrin's first press conference this year. He gave the journalists a detailed account of his agency's work to enforce laws and strengthen law and order in subunits of the Ministry of Defense and other troops and military units of the Kazakhstan Republic. As a result of the measures it had taken, the rate of crime had been stabilized and law and order had been strengthened in some branches of the armed services for the first time since the Armed Forces of sovereign Kazakhstan were created, according to Mr. Khitrin. Positive changes have been recorded in the dynamics and structure of crime. The rate of crime is lower in the air force, air defense troops, the troops of the National Security Committee, and the Republic Guard. The total number of crimes this year, for example, is nine percent below last year's figure, and there were decreases of 16 percent in group crimes and of 33 percent in suicides by servicemen. In addition, the number of disciplinary offenses also declined slightly.

In the military procurator's opinion, however, it is still too early to report a fundamental change in the situation and to expect radical changes in the future. The crime rate is still high in the armed services. In 1995 the rate rose 12 percent in troops of the Ministry of Defense, 11 percent in border troops, and 23 percent in internal troops.

The rate of military crimes is still rising. Last year the number rose 15 percent. These are mainly crimes connected with the avoidance of military service, breaches of regulations in interrelations, abuses of authority and the misuse of power, and violations of the rules of guard details. In addition, the number of servicemen committing crimes under the influence of drugs or alcohol is rising.

One matter of serious concern to the military procuracy is the fact that 74 officers, including 14 senior-level officers and a top-level officer, were charged with bribery, theft, and other forms of criminal malfeasance by military procurators in the last two years.

In view of the tendency toward the rise in various types of crime in the armed forces, the military procuracy instituted stricter oversight last year, and this led to the timely detection and elimination of violations, their causes, and the factors contributing to them. As a result of 672 general oversight inspections, military procurators issued 316 recommendations, 160 orders, and 81 protests against concealed violations, imposed disciplinary and financial penalties on 214 servicemen, and filed 50 suits for amounts in excess of a million tenge in the courts.

Military procurators kept an eye on factors connected with the death and injury of servicemen. The rate of these incidents in the Armed Forces and in other troops and military units of the Kazakhstan Republic rose 26.7 percent last year. Mr. Khitrin believes that the high rate of injury among servicemen is largely due to the failure of the commanding officers of military units to protect inducted personnel against improper conduct and criminal assaults on their dignity and health. The military procurator said that accidents and crimes are still being concealed in some units to create the false impression that everything is fine, but this fosters an atmosphere of lawlessness and leniency, giving rise to a new round of breaches of regulations. Last year the procuracy discovered 730 unreported crimes.

The strict observance of legality in the activities of military commissariats is still an acute problem. Procuracy inspections turned up significant violations of the Law: "On Universal Military Service Obligation and on Military Service," particularly cases of the conscription of citizens who were physically or mentally unfit for military service and, conversely, the unjustified exemption of conscripts not eligible for this status.

An analysis of the results of procuracy inspections and criminal investigations allowed the military procuracy to set definite priorities in its oversight activities, and this should reduce crime indicators. Desertion and absence from military units without leave are a matter of constant concern to the military procuracy. Yuriy Khitrin said that the reasons for them include incidents of improper conduct in military barracks, unsatisfactory conditions for the performance of military service, and the indifference of commanding officers to the needs of individual soldiers. Besides this, the indifference of the soldiers themselves is another reason. They commit flagrant violations of regulations and leave their units to go home.

The other extreme occurs when the parents of servicemen simply come to the unit and take their sons home, frequently on the pretext of reports of alleged outrages in the army. The military procurator said that the procuracy also presses charges against the parents of the servicemen in these cases. Mr. Khitrin did not deny that the problem of improper conduct is getting worse in the republic Armed Forces, however. In particular, he reported that improper conduct was widespread in one of the military units of the Taldykorgan Garrison in the absence of the proper supervision by commanding officers. For a long time a group of soldiers had literally terrorized new recruits, and one of the young soldiers finally committed suicide. The military procuracy instituted criminal proceedings against the group of servicemen, who were sentenced to long prison terms. In general, over 100 servicemen were convicted by the procuracy just last year for breaches of regulations in interpersonal relations, according to the military procurator's report.

Besides this, Mr. Khitrin expressed concern about the concealment of crimes committed by the commanding officers of units.

Yuriy Khitrin also spoke at length about the equally disturbing problem of the theft of weapons, ammunition, and explosives. The interest of criminal gangs in weapons has not subsided, he said. The presence of "hot spots" in nearby countries and the consequent higher demand for weapons are another reason for the theft and sale of arms. "There are some soldiers, as well as officers and warrant officers, who will betray the interests of the service for money and become thieves," Mr. Khitrin said with chagrin. Last year 70 servicemen, including several officers, were convicted of weapons theft. Furthermore, most of these crimes were of an organized nature, and civilians were often involved in their commission. "A complete inventory should be taken in conjunction with the Ministry of Defense to establish the exact quantity of weapons and to discourage theft," Mr. Khitrin said, explaining that the number of weapons in the republic is still unknown.

Because the effectiveness of preventive work depends not only on the activities of military procurators, but also to a considerable extent on the coordination of these activities with the actions of the commanding officers of large and small units, a coordinating council of military administrative bodies, made up of the leaders of the Armed Forces and of other troops and military units of the Kazakhstan Republic, was created on the initiative of the Kazakhstan Republic Military Procuracy. Crime prevention offices have been opened on the premises of garrisons and are striving for the stricter enforcement of laws and for stronger law and order.

Yuriy Khitrin also answered the questions of journalists. In response to a question about the thefts in the Almaty infantry regiment that were reported at a meeting of the Ministry of Defense Collegium last fall, the military procurator said that the case files had been forwarded to the military procuracy. "The departmental audit was conducted under such unsatisfactory conditions that we had to return the files to the Ministry of Defense for a second audit, which is being conducted at this time," Mr. Khitrin said. He added that the losses from the thefts total 8 million tenge. After the second audit the case files will be turned over to state investigators.

In reference to violations of laws by the administrative personnel of the guards garrison, Yuriy Khitrin stressed that the inspection of the garrison had been initiated personally by the Ministry of Defense. The inspection turned up serious abuses of authority by General Aubakirov and several other officials. They abuses took the form of the misuse of state funds and the transfer of fuel and lubricants to other parties. The military procurator used this information to institute criminal proceedings against six officials of the garrison. The pretrial investigation is being conducted now.

Tajikistan

Russia/Tajikistan: Russian Interests in Tajikistan Assessed

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[Article by Sergey Smirnov: "Drug Business in the Pamir Is Being Run by CIA and KGB Associates"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian intelligence has frequently erred in evaluating the military and political situation in Central Asia. It is well known that the East is a delicate matter. Especially since the military department apparently does not have such valuable agents as, for example, officer in the 2nd Intelligence Department of the Russian General Staff, and simultaneously well-known traveler, Przhevalskiy. The present-day James Bonds most probably do not possess his encyclopedic knowledge of Asia. Hence the mistakes and punctures. And they have manifested themselves especially clearly in Tajikistan.

Russia's Strategic Interests

Why is Yeltsin supporting Rakhmonov so zealously? Of course, not because of the former sovkhoz director's partocratic love of the *raykom* [rayon committee] past. Russia needs Tajik cotton, which is the most suitable kind for the production of modern explosives. Russia needs cheap aluminum, which is produced by using the energy of the local unique hydroelectric power stations. Otherwise our aircraft in the twenty-first century will not be competitive in the West's aviation market. Nor can the Russian military-industrial complex do without Tajik nonferrous and rare-earth metals.

But the item that is of the greatest strategic interest is the uranium ore that is produced here, which, on the basis of its concentration rate, is the best in the world. Allowing it to get to Iran or Pakistan, where nuclear programs are actively developing, would be the pinnacle of political short-sightedness.

The Russian General Staff also has purely military interests in Tajikistan. The chief one is the restoration of the air defense system. Because radar stations in the Pamir used to monitor the air space covering thousands of kilometers. As long ago as the Khrushchev era, it was precisely those radar stations that locked onto the U-2 being flown by American [pilot] Powers. In the early 1990's the country's PVO [air defense system] collapsed. From the south it was possible to fly without any hindrance almost as far as Moscow. It was not until 10 February of last year, on the insistence of General of the Army Viktor Samsonov, chief of the Staff for Coordinating Military Cooperation in the CIS, that the agreement entitled: "Creation of a United System for the Air Defense of the CIS Participating States" was signed. A new working agency — the Coordination Committee on Air Defense Questions — was created in the Council of Ministers.

Military Presence

Who is defending Russia's interests in Tajikistan? First of all, the 201st Russian Motorized Rifle Division. It has the status of a peacekeeping division. According to Colonel-General Viktor Barynkin, the chief of the Main Operational Administration of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, as of 1 January 1996 there were 5148 persons in its makeup. Recently the number of people in that division has increased sharply by relying on contract personnel.

During the past three years there was a considerable increase in the number of Russian border troops. Whereas in 1993 approximately 5000 persons remained in Tajikistan (with absolutely no Russian military presence in Gornyy Badakhshan), now the Group of Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan consists of 18,000 persons. True, 12,000 of that total are Tajiks. Their combat training is considerably lower than that of the Russian professionals. In addition, the makeup of the collective peacekeeping forces includes battalions from Kyrgyzia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Their total size is about 2000 persons.

But Lieutenant-General Viktor Zavarzin, the new commander of the collective peace-keeping forces in Tajikistan, has prepared the latest in a series of official requests to the CIS heads of state. He is asking for authorization to send an additional battalion of the peace-keeping contingent into Tavildarinskiy Rayon, where the heaviest combat actions have been occurring.

Price of Resistance

What is the support of Emomali Rakhmonov's regime costing Russia?

It is extremely difficult to express this in rubles or dollars, because the expenses for supporting the Russian presence in Tajikistan have been smeared over many items in the budget. Many of those items are very highly classified.

But the scandal that recently broke out with regard to the training of the command element of the Tajik armed forces by the Russian Ministry of Defense revealed a figure — $4.31 million. That is how much Tajikistan owed Russia for training its military personnel.

Because of their even greater poverty, the inhabitants of the Pamir settlements are becoming the henchmen of the drug barons. For example, last year alone on the Tajik-Afghan border, according to official data provided by the Federal Border Service [FPS], more than one and a half tons of narcotic substances were detained and destroyed. But since even the FPS analysts themselves assert that no more than 5-10 percent of the drugs are being confiscated, one can imagine the tremendous amount of drugs that have been moving along the mountain paths.

Incidentally, the drug business in the Pamir is being run by CIA and KGB associates. The old enemies cooperate in the sphere of the most lucrative business in the world. In Peshawar in Pakistan, everything is being run by an American with the nickname of Admiral. He operates in concert with Khamid Gyul, the former chief of the Pakistani ISI intelligence system. In the Pamir the movement of drugs is guaranteed, according to data provided by counterintelligence, by a former Chekist and specialist in the fight against the "reactionary clergy" and by highly placed associates of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Tajikistan.

Here are the figures that characterize the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. During 1995 alone, there were 144 attempts to breach the border; 202 violators were detained; and the following were confiscated: 16 guns and mortars; 27 rocket-projectile launchers and grenade throwers; more than 700 small arms; more than 500 mines and shells; and approximately 10,000 rounds for the AGS-17 "Flame" automatic grenade thrower.

Russian border guards on 33 occasions entered into major combat engagements against opposition groups, and carried out 14 border operations and 20 searches. During one year alone on the Tajik-Afghan border, 63 border troops died. They included 17 citizens of Kazakhstan, 26 of Tajikistan, and 20 of Russia. A total of 117 military personnel were severely wounded. This is the most terrifying payment for the Russian military presence in Tajikistan.

Don't Put All Your Eggs in One Basket

Is Russia making a mistake by putting its stake only on Rakhmonov?

In the Kremlin, Lubyanka, and the Arbat, Russia's political and military leadership is asking itself that question more and more frequently. The Rakhmonov government that is remaining in place only with the use of Russian bayonets is too weak to guarantee independently Russian interests in Tajikistan.

There is rampant corruption, which even for the East has taken on unprecedented dimensions in Dushanbe. For example, Russia's 80 billion [rubles] credit to Tajikistan has disappeared without a trace, and a total amount of 3 billion rubles that had been allocated by a decision of the RF State Duma specifically for the support of the Russian community also failed to reach the addressee.

It is no secret that the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzia, and especially Uzbekistan would like to see another political figure as the head of Tajikistan. But Russia is not yet ready to give the okay to the replacement of Emomali Rakhmonov.

Russian analysts are looking carefully at the most diverse figures on the Tajik political horizon. People in the General Staff are attentively studying the personality of the recent insurgent Colonel Makhmud Khudoberdyyev. It is well known that he is a graduate the Almaty Higher Combined-Arms Command School and that he fought for three years in Afghanistan. He was the commander of an intelligence company, was awarded three USSR combat decorations, and was wounded several times. In recognition of his combat merits during the civil war, in 1993 Khudoberdyyev was personally awarded by Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev the Russian order "In recognition of personal bravery." The Tajik government provided him with six "Zhigulis" and two

"Volgas." And also entrusted to him the command of the most combat-ready army brigade.

Makhmud Khudoberdyyev, although he is not an Uzbek, as rumor hath it, nevertheless is supported by Uzbekistan. In addition, he does not have any experience at all in managing the economy. One would scarcely think that he is capable of bringing the republic out of the crisis or defending Russia's strategic interests.

Opposition leader Khodzhi Akbar Turadzhonzoda is probably the best-educated Tajik. Whether or not that is so, he has three higher degrees. But the Kremlin is afraid of getting a new Ayatollah Khomeini in Tajikistan. Although it has been remarked in analytic centers that recently the spiritual leader of Tajikistan's Muslims has sharply reduced the anti-Russian fervor of his public statements. It would seem that a reasonable compromise with the opposition is not entirely precluded.

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